

British MP Tam Dalyell: We're Looking to Congress

The international importance of the American Congressional hearings into the "Iraq WMD" hoax was a subject of an exclusive *EIR* interview with Tam Dalyell, the longest-serving member of the House of Commons and the most vocal opponent of the Iraq war in the British Parliament.

Said Dalyell, "People like me in Europe, who want to know the truth about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and related matters, are looking to the American Congress, as more likely to produce it. The reason is, the separation of powers. In the United States, promotion of Senators and

Congressmen comes from the judgment of their peers. But in Britain, it is different. Most Parliamentarians want something from the Prime Minister, be it ministerial office, or membership in the House of Lords when they retire. They are beholden."

On Blair's own political fate, Dalyell commented that "Tony Blair is being protected, by the uselessness of the leader of the Opposition. As long as Iain Duncan-Smith remains the leader of the Conservative Party, Blair will hold on. Duncan-Smith's performance in the House of Commons on Wednesday was ludicrous, with his finger-shaking and shouting, when all he had to do, was to stay calm and firm, and proclaim, 'Before the House of Commons makes a judgment, points one, two, three must be considered.' "

the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

The same day, according to a March 31, 2003 *New Yorker* article by Seymour Hersh, "Who Lied to Whom?" a group of senior U.S. intelligence officials delivered a closed-door, classified briefing to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, citing the same Niger "yellow cake" evidence of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Two days later, Secretary of State Colin Powell reported on the same subject and repeated the CIA material.

- Two weeks later, the U.S. Congress voted to grant President Bush authority to go to war against Iraq. As Representative Waxman wrote to Bush on March 17, 2003, "Despite serious misgivings, I supported the resolution because I believed Congressional approval would significantly improve the likelihood of effective UN action. Equally important, I believed that you had access to reliable intelligence information that merited deference. Like many other members, I was particularly influenced by your views about Iraq's nuclear intentions."

- On Dec. 19, 2002, the U.S. State Department, in response to Iraq's weapons declaration to the UN Security Council, issued a one-page fact sheet, "Illustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council," which cited eight cases. The third item, "Nuclear Weapons," simply read: "The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger. *Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?*"

- In January 2003, senior Administration officials repeated the allegations about Iraq's attempted procurement of uranium, including National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld—and President Bush, in his Jan. 28, 2003 State of the Union address.

- On March 7, Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), testified before the UN Security Council, and flatly declared that the Niger documents were forgeries. "Based on thorough

analysis," he testified publicly, "the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents—which formed the basis for reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger—are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded."

- Even following Dr. ElBaradei's public discrediting of the Niger forgeries, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney appeared, on March 16, on the Sunday TV talk-show "Meet the Press"—three days before the invasion of Iraq—and repeated the false charges. Referring to Saddam Hussein, "We know," Cheney told host Tim Russert, "he's been absolutely devoted to trying to acquire nuclear weapons, and we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons."

- On March 17, 2003, Rep. Henry Waxman wrote the first letter to President Bush, detailing the Niger forgery, and seeking an explanation.

- On April 29, 2003, Representative Waxman received a one-page reply from Paul V. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs. After reviewing the sources of the Niger allegations, Kelly wrote, "Not until March 4 [2003] did we learn that in fact the second Western European government had based its assessment on the evidence already available to the U.S. that was subsequently discredited. Based on what appeared at the time to be multiple sources for the information in question, we acted in good faith in providing the information earlier this year to the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors responsible for verifying Iraq's claims regarding its nuclear program."

- On June 2, 2003, Representative Waxman sent his second letter to the President on the forged Niger documents and the Administration's continued references to the documents, long after they were known to be fakes. Waxman wrote: "Unfortunately, to date I have received only a cursory, one-page response from the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs. Although this April 29, 2003, letter as-