From Volume 4, Issue Number 28 of EIR Online, Published July 12, 2005

Latest From LaRouche

Memo on London Scenario:


by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

July 9, 2005

Certain features of the context of the London terror incidents of this past week are now clear. The following preliminary characterization of the matter to be investigated, which I have slugged as "The Dirt Bike Terror Incident," is now clear. Beyond that characterization much remains muddy, pending further investigation. Despite the unsettled points to be clarified by pending, newly obtained evidence, the characterization of the circumstantial strategic evidence already on hand is clear enough to define the nature of the required investigation to the following effect. I name that investigative hypothesis "The 'Dirt-Bike' Terror Incident."

The relevant London events are all situated within the context of the following indisputable features of the situation within which the London bombings occurred.

1. The terror incident and its most strategically relevant sequelae occurred in the setting of both:

a) The immediacy of the ripe threat of a general, chain-reaction collapse of the world monetary-financial system, and,

b) the period of that Gleneagles "summit" confab during which U.S. President George Bush reportedly inflicted injuries on a Scottish policeman, through an assault by the bicycle which the desperate "lame duck" President was operating at that time.

c) The soaring focus on the matter of the indicated role of the Bush White House, Vice President Cheney's office, and the Republican National Committee machine respecting the criminal act of exposing CIA operative Valerie Plame.

d) The incident occurred within the time-frame of the concluding portion of that "summit."

2. The leading consequences of the terrorist incidents, included:

a) A flood of liquidity into international financial markets sufficient to postpone the chain-reaction collapse of the international monetary-financial collapse to some point beyond the conclusion of the "summit";

b) The utterly and maliciously incompetent, "sexed-up" set of allegations by the British Prime Minister and his Jack Straw;

c) The clear denunciation of the PM's and Straw's propaganda hoax by relevant British law-enforcement officials;

d) An hysterically and copiously incompetent coverage of the London incident by the Washington Post in the following day's edition;

e) A wild-eyed propaganda-hoax, claiming an upturn in the U.S. economy.

3. Where was the ghost of Hermann Goering during the early evening preceding the panic which struck on the following morning?

All fallacies of composition which ignore that set of correlated facts respecting the global context of this global set of events, fallacies which some errant types among us might be tempted to report in ways according with their perverted lust for "sexiness," will not be permitted to worm their slimy way in our coverage of that "Dirt Bike" incident.

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Memo on The 25th Amendment:


by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

July 9, 2005

Does the 25th Amendment provide anything more than a procedure for impeachment? Does it cover the case in which either the President is insane and the Vice President is playing the role of an accomplice? Does it cover the situation in which the President's disability is an immediate threat to the continued existence of our constitutional form of republic?

What are the safeguards against a morally corrupted political majority in the U.S. Supreme Court?

Would a President be exemptable from impeachment on grounds of his insanity? In other words, was the taint of criminality ever a required precondition for impeachment?

As to the relevant issue of historically situated intent of the Federal Constitution, how should we today apply the example of the corruption of Pericles' Athens in the launching of the crimes against humanity which launched the Peloponnesian War, a war whose implications were well known to the circle of those who framed our Constitution?

Under such and similarly implied circumstances, could we keep our Constitution? What is the constitutional approach we must take in defending our Constitution by means which do not overturn its historically determined original intent, as, for example, by the form of moral insanity known as "textualism"?

Certain partial answers to such questions exist. The immediate problems, as posed by the experience of the Bush-Cheney Administration to date, have a clear answer from a view of the historically determined intent of the original framing of the Declaration of Independence and the Federal Constitution. These answers to apparent paradoxes all have a certain common aspect, provided we always proceed from the higher principled standpoint under which all such questions are properly subsumed: the universal principle of the commitment to promote the general welfare, as defined in precedent by Plato's argument for the principle of agape@am, as from the mouth of Socrates, and in opposition to Thrasymachus and Glaucon, in The Republic.

Our constitutional republic was created as what was then a unique expression of that highest-ranking principle of constitutional law, the obligation to promote the general welfare, that despite any contrary implication otherwise attributed to other parts of the Constitution itself, or to any positive law enacted. This also applies to the defense of the character of our republic.

The relevant danger lies in the tendency for pettifogging "legalismus," even among some from our own association's ranks. This danger should be viewed, for purposes of the most relevant comparison, with the issue of creativity in the domain of the progress of discovery and application of physical scientific principle.

The characteristic moral defect of the stubbornly "blocked" personality is the method of sophistry, the method expressed by the attempt at literal argument from the vantage-point of a selected list of chosen actual, or even clearly false particular principles: what I have referred to often as "the fishbowl principle." All those problems which have longer-term and broader relevance could be shown to be outside the scope of definition by the sophistical methods inherent in the defective personality of the "blocked" mentality of the stubborn legal formalist, whether in the domain of physical science (e.g., empiricism, positivism) or law (e.g., the moral perversion of existentialism).

So, in matters of constitutional practice of our republic, as in physical science and Classical artistic composition, we must never attempt to degrade the notion of principle to a matter of deductive-inductive methods, or to the virtual dictionary nominalism of the neo-Confederacy fanatic Scalia. The method of scientific discovery associated with the work of the leading contributor to the shaping our of republic's constitutional thought, Gottfried Leibniz, is the only general rule in shaping an approach to the kinds of problems I have selected as examples here.

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