In this second part of a two-part series (Part I appeared in EIR, July 11, 2014), we pick up the story of the British drive to rupture the U.S.-Russia alliance, and recruit the United States as a collaborator in a post-war attack on the Soviet Union, including the possible use of the new atomic bomb, with Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech in March 1946.

Churchill Delivers the Shock

The propitious moment for the British to challenge America’s longstanding friendship with Russia, and its historical enmity toward the British, arrived on March 5, 1946, at Westminster College in Fulton, Mo. It was here that former Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his notorious “Iron Curtain” speech.

Entitled “The Sinews of War,” the speech referred, for the first time, to an invisible wall between the West and the Soviet Union. Churchill attacked the Soviets as running a tyrannical police state bent on world domination. To combat this, he called for an alliance between the United States and the British Empire, “a fraternal organization of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and United States.” He further proposed complete military integration, and suggested that the U.S.-British alliance was more important than their relationships to the United Nations.

The initial response to the speech on both sides of the Atlantic was cool. It was pilloried in much of the U.S. press, and attacked by some elected officials. Sen. Claude Pepper of Florida and several members of the House of Representatives denounced Churchill as an unbridled imperialist. Commerce Secretary Henry Wallace attacked the speech, as did columnist Walter Lippmann, for provoking hostility against the Soviet government.

But the speech had its intended effect, sending a shock through the U.S. population. It launched the campaign to revive the anti-communist, jingoist agitations of the 1930s, and succeeded in raising the specter of an “evil Soviet empire” in the minds of a public which no longer had FDR to guide them in a nuanced and statesmanlike approach to the USSR.

Stalin was outraged: The speech confirmed his worst fears, viz., that an Anglo-American alliance was being assembled against the Soviet Union, shattering the relatively peaceful hiatus of the past year.

Immediately after Churchill’s bombshell, President Truman, who had accompanied Churchill to Fulton, deployed the U.S. battleship Missouri to the eastern Mediterranean, as a signal to the Soviets, who were asking for a military base in Libya, and access through the Dardanelles to the Mediterranean.

The Empire Raises the Stakes

In London, Christopher Warner, head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, followed up
Churchill’s speech with a Memorandum dated April 2, 1946, entitled “The Soviet Campaign Against This Country and Our Response To It.” The Soviet government, it said, was pursuing three policies: “the return to pure doctrine of Marx-Lenin-Stalinism; the intense concentration upon building up the industrial and military strength of the Soviet Union, and the revival of the bogy of external danger to the Soviet Union.

“In other words, the Soviet Union has announced to the world that it proposes to play an aggressive political role, while making an intensive drive to increase its own military and industrial strength. We should be very unwise not to take the Russians at their word, just as we should have been wise to take Mein Kampf at its face value.”

Warner continued, “the fact remains that Russian aggressiveness threatens British interests all over the world. The Soviet Government is carrying on an intensive campaign to weaken, depreciate and harry this country in every possible way. There is no guarantee that this is not going on indefinitely…. Concessions and appeasement will merely serve to weaken our position while the Soviet Union builds up her industrial and economic strength; therefore we must defend ourselves.”

He also attacked the Soviets’ economic and political buildup, in what Churchill had acknowledged to Stalin in 1944 to be its sphere of influence, claiming that, “it will destroy the hopes of world prosperity based upon a free economy.” In other words, Soviet industrial development will protect it from the looting of the British Imperial system. This must not be allowed!

The military chiefs of staff outlined an even more aggressive policy accusing the Soviets of intending to carry out communist expansionism and impose world domination. They opposed any pullback of the British Imperial military deployment: “If the British moved out in peacetime, the Soviet Union would move in, pursuing her policy of extending her influence to further strategic areas by all means short of open war. Concentration solely on main support areas would result in Soviet domination of all of Europe, less the United Kingdom, of North West Africa, and of the Middle East and North East Africa. This would present a grave threat to British sea communications, arising from hostile control of the entire Atlantic coastline from the North Cape to French Morocco.”

After Western Europe, Northern Africa, and the Middle East, the Memorandum stated, India and South Africa would be next to fall, and all of this would add to the resources and manpower and industry of the Soviet Union. Shamelessly, the British asserted that they would be stripped of their empire.

To protect the integrity of the Empire, it must confront the Soviets at every turn. Britain must also main-

tain its scientific and technical superiority over the Russians, as well as air and naval superiority. The key to fighting the Soviet Union will be through air power and long-range weapons. Tremendous emphasis was placed on holding the Middle East, the gateway to Africa and India; it contained the oil upon which the Empire depended, and it was the nearest location to the Soviet Union to be reached by the British Navy and Air Force. It was also the nearest location for U.S. or British conventional or nuclear attacks on southern Russia.

Were the British to hold the Middle East, they could attack Soviet oil and energy supplies in the southern region; but if the Soviets grabbed the Middle East, then they in turn would be positioned to attack Imperial holdings in all contiguous regions. Sir Bernard Montgomery said, “an immediate attack on vital Russian points from the Middle East was the best defense.” He also stressed that it was imperative to recruit the United States as an ally.2 “Provided we are established in the Middle East area before the Russian advance and provided early reinforcements can be obtained from the Dominions and the United States it should be possible to defend our interests in the Middle East.”3

The report was interspersed with references to the atomic bomb. The British knew that this was the trump card; it must either be used, or threatened, to achieve global hegemony.

Empire Campaign Against Russia Intensifies

The rhetoric between the Soviet Union and Great Britain ramped up through the Summer and Fall of 1946 (Bertrand Russell’s infamous threat of a unilateral atomic strike to enforce a one-world government came in October 1946). At that point, the Soviets were singling out the British, not the United States, as their number one enemy.

The British Foreign Office issued yet another Strategy Paper outlining the method by which they would manipulate the U.S. and Russia into becoming adversaries. Entitled “The Strategic Aspect of British Foreign Policy,” it began, “The post-war alignment of the Allied Powers has resulted in the co-existence of a) two political systems, the Soviet Union and its satellites on the one hand, and the United States of America and the British Commonwealth and a number of States less rigidly attached, on the other.”4

The report proceeds to “analyze” the motives and capabilities of the two major players. The Soviets have an ideology rooted in belief in the superiority of communism, and are paranoid about Western machinations, the report said. They also have a stated policy to rapidly build up their currently exhausted industrial and military might (which terrified the empire). The convergence of these two policies would inevitably lead to war between Russia and the West.

The key was London’s determination to bring about a U.S. alliance with the British Empire.

“In drawing up this paper it is throughout assumed that the United States will continue its present policy of active intervention in all international questions and of the exertion of its influence in directions which coincide by and large with British interests. But it must be recognized that this assumption is not necessarily valid. The Americans are a mercurial people, unduly swayed by sentiment and prejudice rather than by reason nor even by consideration of their own long-term interests. Their Government is handicapped by an archaic constitution, sometimes to the point of impotence, and their policy is to an exceptional degree at the mercy both of electoral changes and of violent economic fluctuations, such as might at any moment bring about a neutralization of their influence in the world. If this were to occur, the outlook for the British

---

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 329.
4. Ibid., pp. 363-64.
Commonwealth would be very serious, for it must be assumed that without United States assistance the Commonwealth would be unable to maintain a full-scale war with modern weapons. It is obvious that if this contingency were to arise the whole position would have to be reviewed” (emphasis added). 5

The rest of the memo is an outline of British policy and preparations for war. It outlines five areas where war could break out: an attack on British territory; areas where “we have important strategic or economic interests”; Germany, which is still under occupation; intervention authorized by the UN Security Council; and “a major conflict with the Soviet Union, whether arising from a local conflict involving a Soviet satellite or from a direct clash with the Soviet Union itself.”

Everything depended on the British “persuading” the United States embrace the Empire as its ally against the Russian bear.

It should also be noted that throughout this period, the British had their agents inside the Soviet Union, manipulating it against the United States. At one level, it was simply British agents like Kim Philby and Donald Maclean playing back the radical change in U.S. posture from pro-Soviet to enemy, through their intelligence circles, as this paper delineates.

An enlightening case study, of course, is the duplicitous role of Bertrand Russell in his many disguises, from the nuclear warhawk of 1947, to the “dove” of the 1950s, to playing both sides in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. (See Lyndon LaRouche, “How Bertrand Russell Became an Evil Man,” Fidelio, Fall 1994.)

How To Shape U.S. Opinion

The death of Franklin Roosevelt was a decisive moment in world history. America under FDR was anti-colonial and anti-British, and with his death, the British utilized all their cunning to reverse that.

During World War II, the British deployed an extensive spy network into the U.S. It was run by Col. William Stephenson, head of MI6’s British Security Coordination (BSC). BSC ran a propaganda campaign aimed at shifting U.S. allegiance toward the British. It planted stories, some true, others fiction, in newspapers and radio stations all over the country. It also deployed spies, such as Isaiah Berlin and Ian Fleming, who were sent into the U.S., to spy and to change public opinion.

Some reported directly back to Churchill, and others to Stephenson and MI6 chief Sir Stewart Menzies. Some were tasked with removing or compromising enemies of the British in Roosevelt’s inner circle.

One of Menzies’ key agents was Rex Benson. His father, a merchant banker and country squire, was in the inner circle of the King. It was Rex Benson who smoothed the way for Menzies to be brought into British intelligence, and during the war, he was Menzies’ personal spy in Washington.

Benson was repeatedly confronted with American anti-British sentiment. For example, toward the end of the war, at a U.S. Officer School in Charlottesville, Va., he found that “the curriculum was almost entirely on anti-colonialism and contained nothing about enemy ideologies. Benson was particularly incensed when he also discovered that many of the lecturers ‘openly talk anti-British’ and when one of the lecturers began by stating (unaware that there were two British colonels in the room) ‘of course, I take it most of you here are anti-British.’”

The British also had a stable of sympathetic policymakers in high places throughout the U.S. establishment, among them, the Prescott Bush family, the Rockefellers, Morgans, Harrimans, Harriman’s confidant Robert Lovett, Theodore Roosevelt protégé Henry Stimson, and Wall Street insider John J. McCloy.

The Roosevelt Administration by and large had ramped down the anti-Soviet inclination of the Wall Street-allied operatives. The focus for the Soviet-haters was the State Department, specifically, the group around Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs. During the 1930s, Henderson collaborated with other State Department operatives in the U.S. Moscow Embassy, including Chip Bohlen and George Kennan, to create a de facto anti-Moscow cabal. 8 This same group even worked closely with the

---

5. Ibid., p. 364.
6. Ibid., p. 366.

8. While it is true that Henderson played a nasty role in the run-up to the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, several years later, the same Henderson was one of a relative handful of cogent thinkers on the Middle East situation. As the Director of the Office of Near East Affairs, he warned President Truman in September 1947 against the partition of Palestine to allow the creation of Israel. Henderson’s insightful analysis stressed that this policy would guarantee that the Palestine problem would be permanent and still more complicated in the future. In effect, Henderson broke with the British divide-and-rule schemes that were meant to foster the endless wars we now have, including between Israel and the Palestinians.
German Embassy staff in Moscow that was appointed by the Hitler government, in their anti-Russian intrigues. After the war, Kennan and company scoured the POW camps, rescued their Nazi allies, and brought them into the newly created anti-Soviet espionage and spy operations.

During the war, Roosevelt had deployed Harry Hopkins to ride herd over this treacherous bunch of Wall Street scoundrels, and prevent them from sabotaging the war-time alliance with the Soviet Union. When the war ended, and FDR was laid to rest in Hyde Park, the whole pack of pro-British operatives revealed their true allegiances.\(^9\)

Churchill’s March 1946 trip to the United States spurred the anglophile establishment into action. Following the speech in Fulton, Churchill made the rounds in Washington, meeting with leading anglophiles Averell Harriman and Dean Acheson, and attending a private reception in his honor at the State Department. Harriman was easily won over, and began rounding up support for Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” declaration. Acheson held a dinner party on the night of the speech to which he invited columnist Walter Lippman, Commerce Secretary Henry Wallace, and State Department operative Charles “Chip” Bohlen. Acheson defended Churchill: “It was time to stand firm with the Soviets. Bohlen belittled the Soviets’ fear of encirclement; they were the ones on the offensive, not the United States.”\(^10\)

Not everyone was convinced. Wallace warned that Churchill’s invective could lead to war. Lippmann concurred. In his column the following day, Lippmann wrote, “The line of British imperial interest and the line of American vital interest are not to be regarded as identical.” But Harriman ally Bohlen enlisted Kennan, serving in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, to the Churchill policy. Kennan cabled back in agreement with Churchill, attacking the Soviet as hopelessly paranoid, and urged on a British-American alliance.

**U.S. ‘British Agents’ Emerge: Acheson and Kennan**

Dean Acheson emerged as the key figure in turning the United States into a Russia-baiting ally of the British Empire. Acheson was at the center of power in Washington in 1946, as Under Secretary of State, advisor to George Marshall, the Secretary, and confidant and controller of Truman. Acheson’s anglophile credentials were impeccable:

“Acheson’s lifelong Anglophilia was instilled as a child. He and his two younger siblings were the only U.S. citizens in the household, which included his parents (who were loyal subjects of Queen Victoria), two Irish servants, and a Canadian governess. Celebration of the Queen’s birthday in May ranked with St. Patrick’s Day and July 4: a Union Jack would wave, and after dinner the children were given a glass of diluted claret so they could join their father in toasting Her Majesty.”\(^11\)

Acheson was a Democrat, but of the Wall Street variety. He served as Under Secretary of the Treasury under FDR in the first term, but opposed Roosevelt on the issue of taking the dollar off the gold standard, which Acheson advocated. He was in league with Wall Street banker Jimmy Warburg, fly-fishing buddy John J. McCloy, and others, against FDR; he was forced out by Roosevelt in 1933.

He returned to the administration in 1941 as Assistant Secretary of State, and was instrumental in aiding Great Britain with the Lend-Lease program. FDR needed a bona fide anglophile to run Lend-Lease, and there was no one more qualified than Acheson.

---


10. Ibid., p. 363.

11. Ibid., p. 51-2.
State Department Russian expert George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” on Feb. 22, 1946 (see Part I), written in concert with Britain’s Frank Roberts, also stoked the fires against the Soviets.

Typical of the change was Acheson’s negotiation of a loan package to Great Britain, which met with serious opposition in Congress. He got it through the House by touting the “system of free enterprise that was shared by both nations.” In the Senate fight, for the first time, Acheson couched his effort in anti-communist rhetoric. The bill passed, angering the Soviets, who had been promised that they would receive the next U.S. loan to aid the post-war reconstruction. Acheson’s switch to vocal anti-communism sunk that possibility.

Anti-Soviet rhetoric was ramped up for the duration of 1946, on the claim that Soviet “expansionism” must be confronted; Truman prepared to go to war against Russia. The war parties on both sides of the Atlantic contrived to confront the Russians at every juncture. The first crisis erupted in March 1946, over Soviet occupation of northern Iran. The British, who assumed they were the rightful overlords of Persia and its oil fields, were infuriated. Convinced that the U.S., Britain, and Russia were on the verge of war, Truman

named Harriman U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, telling him, “This may lead to war, and I must have a man in London who knows the British, a man I can trust.”

At the same time, Kennan cabled from Moscow warning of impending catastrophe: “The U.S.S.R. aims not only at acquiring a privileged position in northern Iran, but at virtual subjugation, penetration and domination of the entire country, and Bahrain and Kuwait as well.’ Nor were Turkey or other neighbors, stretching as far as India, immune from Russia’s drive for ‘ultimate political domination of the entire Asiatic mainland.’”

The United States, which had previously ceded policy in the region to Turkey and the Soviet Union, this time entered the fray on the side of Turkey and British Empire.

In August 1946, the Soviets went to Acheson to request a joint Soviet-Turkish defense system for the Turkish Straits (the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus). The demand was legitimate. The Straits had been used repeatedly to attack Russia, and the Soviets wanted a naval presence. To the British and Acheson, this was further evidence of a Soviet plot to take control of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Acheson convened an emergency meeting in the State Department with military and cabinet officials; he again framed the Soviet request as part of a pattern of expansionism that must be checked before it spilled into the Aegean, Gibraltar, and/or the Red Sea.

Acheson drafted a memo for the malleable Truman.  

12. Ibid., p. 367. During the buildup to the United States joining the British drive for confrontation and war with the Soviet Union, Kennan, who was under the influence of the British Foreign Office and State Department hardliners, played an active role in providing an analysis that emphasized a Soviet posture against the other war-time allies. Later in life, he clarified his views, including his “containment” policy, and stated that his intent was to address the political issues, and not the military posture of the Soviet Union. See also: Clifford A. Kiracofe, Jr., “The National Security State,” EIR, March 17, 2006; and George Kennan, At a Century’s Ending, 1996.
“For global reasons, Turkey must be preserved if we do not wish to see other bulwarks in Western Europe and the Far East crumbling at a fast rate,” it said.

Acheson proposed to challenge the Russians over Turkey, so “we will learn whether the Soviet policy includes an affirmative provision to go to war now.”

On Aug. 15, the war council convened a meeting with Truman to lay out its perspective. Acheson began by stating, “The only thing that will deter the Russians will be the conviction that the U.S. is prepared, if necessary, to meet aggression with force of arms.” Truman responded, “We might as well find out whether the Russians are bent on world conquest.” Truman said he was prepared to “go all the way to the end” to find out.

Truman dispatched the new super-carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt and its task force to join the Missouri in the eastern Mediterranean. Realizing that the Truman regime was willing to go to nuclear war, Stalin withdrew his demand.

On Sept. 12, Commerce Secretary Wallace delivered a speech on foreign policy in New York City’s Madison Square Garden to a rally sponsored by the National Citizens Political Action Committee and the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions. Wallace accused the administration of hypocrisy. We are erecting military bases all over Western Europe, he said, yet we are attacking the Russians for doing the same in Eastern Europe. He criticized the get-tough-with-Russia policy, and argued for legitimate spheres of influence. He said, “the tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get.”

Amid the ensuing firestorm, Acheson, Forrestal, and others demanded that Wallace resign. Bowing to the outcry, Wallace quit the Commerce Department on Sept. 20. Truman replaced him with Averell Harriman, who accepted the job at the urging of Churchill.

**British Detonate Greek Crisis**

The ouster of Wallace and the anti-Soviet shift under Truman and Acheson signaled to the British that the time to fully recruit the United States to its imperial worldview was at hand. This was to be accomplished by the tried-and-true British *modus operandi*: Create a crisis.

The British chose to detonate the crisis in Greece and Turkey. Civil war in Greece had been roiling throughout World War II, as the communist-led insurgency collaborated with republican forces and monarchists to defeat the Nazis and their Greek allies. Churchill was adamant that he would not tolerate a communist or communist-allied government in Greece.

In 1944, when he made his “percentages” deal with Stalin, they agreed that Great Britain would retain 90% control over Greece. On Sept. 1, 1946, the Greeks held a plebiscite under British oversight. The King was restored with 69% of the vote, and the right-wing National Party was elected to power. The issue was how to ensure that the monarchist government would survive, with Greece bankrupt, and civil war raging. Until the Fall of 1946, the United States had opposed a restoration of the monarchy, and had supported the concept of a republican government.

Tensions were also growing around Turkey. The Soviet Union wanted bases in the Dardanelles, and denounced the Montreux Convention, which had given Turkey almost total control over the region. The Soviets delivered a strongly worded note to Turkey on Aug. 7 insisting on access to the eastern Mediterranean. Then tensions flared on Aug. 9 and again on Aug. 19, when Yugoslavia shot down two U.S. cargo planes, killing several Americans and capturing others.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs issued a memo on the strategic importance of the Turkish Straits to the U.S., and
days later, the War Department issued a paper titled “U.S. Security Interests in Greece,” which underscored the importance of Greece to U.S. policy and called for substantial economic aid.\textsuperscript{14}

The State Department’s Loy Henderson told the British Embassy, “inasmuch as Turkey and Greece were of strategical importance to the United States, the U.S. was clearly interested in their affairs.” The U.S. would consider reexamining its military and economic commitments to those nations.\textsuperscript{15}

On Dec. 1, 1946, Britain’s Prime Minister Clement Attlee tried to stop the imperial plans for Greece and Turkey. He issued a letter opposing the plan, which “stunned” Ernest Bevin, the Secretary of the Foreign Office. Attlee attacked the imperial policy, and said that aid to Greece “was a drain on the Britain’s limited resources. He thought the ‘strategic importance of communications through the Mediterranean in terms of modern warfare is overrated by our military advisers… The Middle East is only an outpost position. I am beginning to doubt whether the Greek game is worth the candle.’”

Even if the Americans gave economic assistance to Greece, Britain should bow out, he said. He criticized the Chiefs and the Foreign Office as having a “strategy of despair…. They were propping up ‘essentially reactionary’ governments which ‘afford excellent soil for the sowing of communist seed’ with the result that Britain was supporting ‘reactionary and vested interests against reform and revolution.’ He went on to question the truth of their analysis of the Soviet Union and its ‘desire’ for world revolution. Lastly, he called for serious negotiations with the Russians.”\textsuperscript{16}

The foreign policy apparatus immediately attacked Attlee. British aid to Greece was set to expire on March 31, 1947, and they were determined to use that moment to bring in the Americans. Bevin attacked Attlee for “appeasement,” and said that it would be “Munich all over again, only on a world scale, with Greece, Turkey and Persia as the first victims in place of Czechoslovakia.”\textsuperscript{17}

Viscount Montgomery, now Chief of the Imperial General Staff, announced that he and two other members of the GS would resign rather than support Attlee. Attlee capitulated. The last line of internal defense was eliminated.

The Foreign Office moved in concert with the military. They issued a new policy memorandum in January 1947. Dubbed “Stocktaking II,” the memo laid out a new analysis of the United States’ “subjective” change, and the potential for action that this created. The memo concluded, “Whereas initially the Americans ‘would try to avoid committing themselves’ and pursue a policy of mediation, when confronted by the prospect of an Anglo-Soviet conflict, they now appeared to accept the likelihood of a conflict between themselves and the Russians as more likely. As a result, they are consciously or unconsciously tending to claim leadership of any forces in the world which are willing to stand up to excessive Soviet Preten-
On Jan. 29, Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton announced he was going to cancel all aid to Greece at the end of March. The economy in Britain was in dire straits, and the loan that they had received from the United States was nearly exhausted.

On Feb. 18, 1947, after Dalton cut off funds to Greece, the British cabinet made its decision to pull out of Greece and Turkey within six weeks. Three days later, they notified the U.S. State Department.

Francis Williams, Attlee’s press secretary, and biographer of both Attlee and Bevin, wrote of Bevin that, “He judged that this moment and this issue had arrived in Greece in February, 1947…. Now Bevin shrewdly assessing in his mind the current of American opinion and the cumulative effect upon it of Russian policy decided that the time had come to force the American administration to a major policy decision.

“It was a declaration deliberately designed to bring America fully into the defense of Europe. If in making it Bevin employed the tactics of shock he did so because he saw that only thus was it possible to compel a decision on which the fate of Europe and perhaps the world depended…. Judging by its developing consequences Bevin’s carefully timed act must thus be seen as one of the most decisive strokes in the history of diplomacy…. He had achieved his first purpose.”

On Feb. 21, the British government delivered its Aide Memoire to the State Department, requesting that the United States assume responsibility for Greece and Turkey, to dispense nearly $500 million in aid to those nations, and to deploy a garrison of 40,000 troops. Britain would pull out of Greece and Turkey at the end of March.

Would the United States join the Empire and break with its Russian war-time and historic ally?

Birth of the ‘Truman Doctrine’

Acheson was primed to respond. On Feb. 15, he had told journalist Louis Fisher, “What we must do is not allow ourselves to be set back on our heels by the Russians’ offensive strategy. They throw bricks in the window and we push a newspaper in that hole and try quickly to plug another hole, and so on. [The U.S. must take the initiative against the Soviets] and keep on the offensive about it.”

On Feb. 20, Acheson strengthened a memo from anti-Soviet hawk Loy Henderson, which anticipated the British demarche, and called for economic and military aid to Greece. In its final form, the memo concluded, “Unless urgent and immediate support is given, it seems probable that the Greek government will be overthrown and a totalitarian regime of the extreme left will come to power.”

The diplomatic pouch was delivered the following day to Acheson, who said it “hit him as a shock,” precisely as it was intended to do. He recognized that the Pax Britannica was on the wane and saw a moment for the emergence of a Pax Americana, to both save the British and supplant them as the new empire. This was what the British had hoped for: to incorporate the Americans into their empire, and to manipulate them into thinking they had arrived at that decision themselves!

No master of understatement, Acheson said “his country was faced with ‘a task in some ways more formidable than the one described in the first chapter of Genesis.’ This was the moment of Creation, and his job was to restore order from chaos.”

Under Acheson’s direction, the State Department issued a series of memos accepting the British fait accompli. It drafted a comprehensive military and economic aid package for two key strategic nations, Greece and Turkey, which lay at the center of defending the British Empire.

The policy shift still had to be sold to a skeptical Congress and nation. On Feb. 27, Truman summoned key Congressional leaders for an urgent briefing on “the crisis.” Acheson summoned up an apocalyptic vision to make his case. “The situation facing the world was only comparable to that of the Roman Empire battling Carthage. ‘There was an unbridgeable ideological chasm between the United States and the Soviet Union; the choice was between ‘democracy and individual liberty and dictatorship and absolute conformity.’ The Soviets were ‘aggressive and expanding.’ If Greece fell, ‘like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten,’ then Iran, Asia Minor, Egypt, even Italy and France would fall. Before long, two-thirds of the world’s population and three-quarters of its surface would be Red. This was not

an issue of ‘pulling British chestnuts out of the fire,’ but of preserving the security of the United States, of Democracy itself.’"

Sen. Arthur Vandenburg, the acknowledged leader of the Senate on foreign policy, told Truman, “If you say ‘that’ to the Congress and to the country, I will support you, and I believe that most of the members will do the same. Mr. President, the only way you are ever going to get this is to make a speech and scare the hell out of the country.”

Acheson and his group churned out a speech for Truman and a policy brief for the Congress, modestly entitled the “Public Information Program on United States Aid to Greece,” which came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. The key phrase repeated in both was, “It is the policy of the United States to give support to free peoples who are attempting to resist subjugation from armed minorities or from outside forces.” This line would lead directly to Korea, Vietnam, and beyond.

A fight ensued over the scope of Truman’s speech and its charges against the Soviet Union. Kennan, Lippmann, and others would not support something they believed might provoke World War III. On the hawkish side, Acheson was joined by Truman’s Special Counsel, Clark Clifford, who had already written a memo demanding a confrontational posture toward Russia, which was so antagonistic that even Truman had to pull it from circulation. A close friend of Acheson, Clifford told Truman that the speech had to be framed “as a contest between the forces of darkness and light.” Truman, an easy sell, toughened it even more, as an answer to “communist tyranny.”

On March 12, Truman addressed a Joint Session of Congress and announced the Truman Doctrine, effectively ending the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, and announced the aid package for Greece and Turkey. The response from the legislative body was guarded. It would still require a great deal of arm-twisting to get the Congress to accept it; the key was to ensure that Vandenberg delivered up the Senate.

Taking no chances, British secret intelligence deployed three female operatives into the company of Vandenberg: Mrs. Mitzi Sims, a confidante of MI6’s British Security Coordination chief Col. William Stephenson; BSC agent Elizabeth Thorpe; and top BSC agent Eveline Paterson (Lady Cotter). According to Thomas Mahl, author of Desperate Deception, British Covert Operations in the United States, the women planted around Vandenberg were all deployed by Stephenson, “Intrepid,” the head of British Intelligence in the Western Hemisphere. All three became frequent “companions” of Vandenberg, and used “all the means at their disposal” to “stiffen his resolve,” so to speak. The ploy succeeded, and Vandenberg delivered the Senate for the Truman Doctrine.

During the weeks that Congress was debating, Truman further stoked the fires of anti-communism by authorizing the Employee Loyalty Program, requiring all government workers to undergo loyalty tests, and triggered the lethal Red Scare hysteria that would soon envelop the nation. Foreshadowing the operations of today’s NSA, Truman would eventually collect files on over 3 million Americans!

Congress adopted the Truman Doctrine in May 1947, and the Cold War was official.

It is finally time to destroy the British Empire, the real “Empire of Evil.”

22. Ibid., p. 395.