Sept. 18—William Binney’s presentation to the 140 persons attending the September 9 Manhattan EIR conference, “The ‘Russian Hack’ Inside Job: Who’s Trying To Destroy the Presidency and Start a World War with Russia?” contained not one, but two explosive revelations regarding the practice of disinformation and obfuscation carried out by various “national security” agencies against the American people over the past twenty years. While the forum was devoted to disproving the now thoroughly discredited “Russian hack” story, Binney, a thirty-plus year veteran of the National Security Agency (NSA) who resigned in disgust in October 2001, besides demolishing the “Russiagate” hoax, revealed to the astonished audience that security systems he had designed prior to 9/11 would have prevented that attack from occurring, had he and his associates not been deliberately prevented from deploying them by others at the NSA.

Instead, Binney asserted, universal surveillance capabilities that he personally designed to protect Americans from terrorist attack, were deployed after 9/11 to monitor virtually every citizen of the United States who has an electronic device.

Ray McGovern, Binney’s colleague in the Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS), also addressed the conference.

Binney’s revelation was not beside the point, especially when presented to New Yorkers on the weekend of the 16th anniversary of 9/11, the September 11, 2001 killing of 3,000 persons at the World Trade Center’s North and South towers, which, together with World Trade Center Building 7, disintegrated that day. It was not beside the point, given that, were the contention proven true—as it indeed was again, in the course of Binney’s presentation—that the so-called “Russian hack of the DNC” was in fact an inside job, it would be not only reasonable but necessary to conclude that the continuing irresponsible scapegoating of Russia, for whatever reason, by media, the legal system, and political figures is in fact intended to provoke war, including possible thermonuclear war, perhaps with Russia, perhaps with China, just as the 9/11 attacks had ensured war in their immediate aftermath.

There is a precedent in recent American history for the use of multiply connected agencies, private and governmental, to carry out such illegal operations. In his introduction of the panel that day, moderator Dennis Speed pointed out that the same criminal elements in-
volved in the attempt to overthrow the Presidency of the United States today—including former FBI Director Robert Mueller, for example—were also involved in the 1987 prosecution of Lyndon LaRouche. That prosecution was characterized in September 1994 by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark as representing “a broader range of deliberate cunning and systematic misconduct over a longer period of time utilizing the power of the federal government, than any other prosecution by the U.S. Government in my time or to my knowledge.”

LaRouche, who had acted as a back channel negotiator with the then Soviet Union on behalf of the policy that became known in 1983 as the Strategic Defense Initiative, was at that time feared by his policy enemies, according to a former Reagan Administration staffer participating in the September 9 meeting as “the most dangerous man in the world.”

The fact that Robert Mueller, FBI Director on September 11, 2001, has in recent days come under renewed scrutiny in the press for his role in then preventing the follow-up of crucial “9/11” leads (including by the FBI itself), and that Mueller is also now at the center of the “Russia probe of the Trump Administration,” is ominously consistent with the crimes that have been committed by a British-manipulated “treason faction” for some time inside the United States. That “Tory faction” has often condemned the United States to self-destructive perpetual war. But the “systemic misconduct” in criminal investigations and prosecutions, perpetrated either to prevent discovery of the authors of a crime, as in 2001, or to perpetrate one, as seen in today’s Russia-gate hacking hoax, did not begin with 9/11, but extends back at least to the criminal prosecution of Lyndon LaRouche and his associates from 1984 to 1987 and after.

Referencing LaRouche’s celebration of his 95th birthday September 8, Speed said at the outset that Executive Intelligence Review was “founded in 1974 by Lyndon LaRouche, an economist, statesman and philosopher, as well as lifelong political opponent of the British Financial Intelligence Establishment. Yesterday, despite his lifelong enemies, Mr. LaRouche celebrated his 95th birthday. The EIR has distinguished itself by employing a unique investigative method that has been brought by LaRouche to an extraordinarily high level of refinement as a scientific tool. As a friend of mine (the late biographer, Russian expert, and acquaintance of Albert Einstein), Paul Robeson, Jr., said to me after meeting Mr. LaRouche in 2008, ‘Lyndon LaRouche is to economic analysis what Einstein is to physics.’”

Intelligence Is Determined by Method

The underlying topic, the “substrate” of the day’s symposium was, in fact, a dialogue on scientific method and its application to crime solving. Schiller translator and LaRouche associate William Wertz’s presentation (in the preceding article in this issue) had used Schil-
ler’s method of universal history to establish British authorship of the recent Russia hoax. He situated today’s events in the centuries-old British hostility to the development of Gottfried Leibniz’s proposal for East-West win-win cooperation, and the round of assassinations and “regime changes” carried out by London’s Prince Albert (later Edward VII) in Germany, France, Russia, and the United States, to prevent what has now once again emerged through the efforts of China, Russia, and Lyndon and Helga Zepp-LaRouche.

In his introduction to Binney, who spoke next, Speed pointed to Binney’s thought process, rather than the mere “agency” collection of information, to distinguish between what is properly called intelligence, and what is mere “trash collection.” One of the things that distinguishes him is that, in his design of the particular system called ThinThread, when he was confronted by the concept which seemed by many to be very daunting, of “how do you monitor two and a half billion electronic units globally in real time,” he said, “Well, you think about it as being instantaneous—there’s only a certain finite number of atoms in the universe at any instantaneous moment.”

Speed referred to Binney’s own statement, taken from a recent documentary. “My philosophy was very simple. If somebody said that something was impossible, that’s something you have to do. It’s like open-ended thinking. You don’t bound your thinking. You let it float anywhere it wants to go. So that gives you the idea how you can be creative in any environment. And so I—that’s what I was after: being creative anywhere I went. And that’s what the SARC—the Sigint [Signals Intelligence] Automation Research Center—was all about.”

Such insight allowed Binney to think in ways unavailable to others, and therefore to solve problems they could not see, much less solve. William Binney and his SARC were able to design ThinThread to meet that impossible requirement. This meant, as he recounted in the film A Good American, “building relationships among billions of people. I mean, we were talking trillions of transactions. It was pretty clear that we were building the most powerful analysis tool that had been developed in history, to monitor, basically, the entire world, in near-real time. This is monitoring every member of the population automatically…”

Binney described his failed attempt to deploy his system on behalf of NSA’s sworn mission to protect the American people in these words, featured in the just-mentioned 2015 documentary directed by Friedrich Moser, A Good American, only released recently in the United States:

“We decided to continue developing ThinThread to try to ensure that we had something that would functionally work by the end of 2000 so that we could address the terrorism problem in the real world—not in the wish world of [the inferior system] Trailblazer, for example. That’s when I went to our Terrorism Analysis Center and said, okay, what sites do you have that produce any meaningful information for you to analyze the terrorism targets around the world? So they gave me a list of eighteen sites. So I took that as a target set to go against terrorism. And then I came in November of 2000, and made a proposal that we do a deployment of ThinThread to those 18 sites, starting in January of 2001. But it came back rejected. So I don’t know exactly who rejected it. I assume it was the chief of
CID—Maureen Baginski. She was the third person in rank in the Agency. There was the Director, then the Deputy Director, then her . . .

“On 9/11, I had taken my father-in-law to the eye doctor for an examination; so I was sitting in the waiting room, watching television while he was getting examined. And that’s when I saw the first plane hit the tower in New York. And immediately that said to me that we as an agency had failed to give warning of this terrorist attack. . . .”

Thomas Drake, who took over the running of ThinThread after Binney’s departure, decided to run the Thinthread program after the fact, to determine whether there was valuable intelligence already in the NSA database that ThinThread could identify. He stated in the Good American film that “we let ThinThread run—it was somewhere around 24 and 36 hours. I remember our program manager coming back with the initial results. And they were just devastating.

“We discovered critical intelligence—Al-Qaeda and associated movement and intelligence that had never been discovered by NSA. They didn’t even know they had it in their databases. But also the specific details of numbers and movement and times and locations, travel—and you’re seeing the dispersal patterns that occurred after it happened. You’re also seeing that there were parts of the plot in which they weren’t successful. There were multiple planes that had been targeted . . . And for a number of reasons, those particular planes were not actually hijacked. You can imagine the horror of realizing what had not been discovered, and the confirmation of what was known, sitting in these databases. What if this was discovered prior to 9/11? We had the information in the databases. NSA’S response? Completely shut the program down.”

The program as designed was shut down. Then the very same program that Binney and his SIGINT team had refined and perfected, was instead used to monitor everyone in the United States. It was when he discovered that his system was being used for this purpose, without him, his team, and against his will, that William Binney decided he had no recourse except to leave the NSA and begin the process in which he is now engaged—exposing the actions of fraud, including the recent Russia-gate deployed against the President of the United States, as the only honorable means available to him to carry out his oath to protect the citizens of the United States from enemies foreign and domestic.

His and Ray McGovern’s VIPS had attempted to warn about the “weapons of mass destruction” hoax (itself inspired by the British Downing Street Memo and the “Niger yellowcake” hoax), prior to the 2003 Iraq War. They and others failed at that time. Now, with the danger of thermonuclear conflict looming, failure is truly not an option.

What follows is an extended excerpt from Binney’s remarks. The entire speech can be seen here.

William Binney: “Thank you. Thank you. And thanks for inviting me here. It’s a pleasure to be here. I should tell you a little about my background, so you can understand where I’m coming from. I basically was one of the main people, or one of several main people at NSA, and in the intelligence community doing warnings against the Soviet Union. And so, I learned very clearly that whatever you did or said in relation to warning, had to be right. You could not be wrong, because this was really a serious issue. People could be vaporized as a result. So you had to know and be sure of what you were doing.”

Binney created an independent working concept of how to assess real national threat conditions by developing a system of indicators that contrasted multiple intelligence evaluations and their collection methods, as well as their change over time:

“As part of that process, I built up a way of just thinking about how to verify and validate things, from multiple sources, or from over time, and based on my knowledge of how [intelligence sources] operate, and the existence of my better understanding of what really meant warning, which the entire intelligence community didn’t have. I had five warning indicators, which I discussed a little bit in the movie, but I didn’t say what they were—because I can’t. But the point was, they were the only five meaningful warning indicators, and there are over a hundred-some on the warning list in the Pentagon. None of the five were there. So, it basically said, people didn’t really understand what they were doing. It was a matter of trying to figure out how can I verify this entire process and be right in what I said to people, with back-up of basic facts that would indicate these are the things they are doing or are intending to do.”

Believing Is Not Necessarily Knowing

“So I was always a factually-based person. So, in other words, I had to have something to factually
ground what I was saying; otherwise, I didn’t say it, because it was pure speculation at that point. And anybody’s speculation is as good as anybody else’s. Emotions can come in, and emotions can change expectations and beliefs and so on. And so you could speculate any way you wanted at that point; it was meaningless. So, in other words I didn’t want to waste my mental energy on meaningless activities. So that was the founding principle that I used to verify and validate what I was doing, all through the years that I was there. And fortunately so, because I wanted to make sure that the government of the United States didn’t have a false statement or false grounding to make a bad decision, because it could be very serious and bad for the country and bad for the people of the world.

“So, that was my founding, and when I first heard about this Russia-gate and Russia was doing this, I was listening to the news, just like everybody else. And the way they came across, saying, ‘we have high confidence that this is what they did’—OK: I knew immediately what that meant. That meant they’re lying to us. This is called a ‘wild-ass guess.’ Because they fundamentally didn’t know. Of course, you see, I designed a lot of programs they currently are using to spy on everybody—not intentionally, but they subverted it to do that.”

Don’t Bury Intelligence in Data

Binney recognized that intelligence and “information”—data—are two completely different things, which can even be opposites.

“And that’s fundamentally what the movie [A Good American] is about. It’s about how to design a system to monitor the entire world and pick out—the whole idea, back then, we were facing terrorism, all kinds of criminal activity in the world, and the explosion of the digital communications, in terms of phones, and email, and so on. So the question was, how could you design a system to figure out what’s going on in the world and only pull out the data that’s relevant to target what you want to analyze; and not take in the entire data of the world, because at that point you’re buried. And that’s fundamentally what they did, so that’s why they can’t figure out anything now—they’re buried!

“And people like Clapper and others come out—and I know them personally, by the way—they come out and say, ‘We need to collect more intelligence.’ Now, collection is intelligence, in their mind. Well, to me, that’s only data, that doesn’t mean anything. Only when you understand what you collected can you produce intelligence. It’s like, I collect books; I build a library. What’s in the library? Do I understand? No! I haven’t read all the books.

“That’s the stupidity of what’s going on here. But it costs a lot of money to do this—a lot of money. They spent almost $1 trillion on intelligence, just intelligence, since 9/11. That’s $1 trillion of the $20 trillion that we have now in our debt. So, when they said that, I knew immediately this was false. You know, the Russians,— Obviously, they have no idea who did it, but they wanted to create an agenda. And they had an agenda driving them and they wanted to create a narrative and manipulate people, and give disinformation. And the Russians did the same thing; every country in the world does the same thing—they call it desinformatsia, manipulatsia, things like that. Every country does it.

“But coming in and hacking into the DNC, I knew they had no evidence whatsoever, and the question was, can we on the outside, without having access to the collection data, can we figure it out? Well, I went on television at the time, in August of last year, saying that this was false, because if it was true, NSA would have it and they would know exactly who did it. And the reason I know that NSA would have it, is because of these programs.”

We, Not Terrorists, Are the Target

When Binney provided the New York Times with hard evidence that the United States intelligence agencies were engaged in universal, unconstitutional surveillance against the entire American population, “the Gray Lady,” the “national newspaper of record” turned yellow, and refused to record the facts.

“These are the tapping points inside the U.S. as of 2004. [Fig. 1] Thirty years ago, these were the tap points. Now I know exactly where every tap point is, down to the building. I don’t know what floor in the building, but I know it’s this building. I gave these to Laura Poitras [director of the film, Citizenfour], with the hope that they would get published, informing the U.S. public where they were being spied from, and she gave them to the New York Times. They would not publish. The reason they didn’t publish, is because they said, ‘Well, if somebody attacks one of these sites, then we’ll be to blame.’ So much for informing the U.S. public of what’s going on.

“What this really means is [the points are] distrib-
uted with the population of the United States. *We* are the target. If they were after foreigners—you see the little dots on the corner there, the little green ones on the coast? That’s where the transoceanic cables come up. And that’s where all the foreigners are. So if they were going to collect for foreigners, they’d be at those little green dots, and nowhere else."

Binney demonstrated that between the unacknowledged universal surveillance used domestically against the American people, and the international universal surveillance deployed against everyone else, there was no way for any foreign service, including the Russians, to carry out a “hack” without prior or real-time knowledge of that fact.

“So this is one of the first indications; this is where they get it first. The DNC [hack] would’ve been picked up by somebody, one of those tapping points. This is, by the way, AT&T. All the buildings are AT&T buildings. And I did, in mathematical terms—I’m a mathematician, you’ll have to excuse me—I had to do a mapping that matched the cluster grouping and cluster mapping of the color code of these tap points with the facilities of AT&T, and they match perfectly. So the random probability of that being somebody else other than AT&T is about zero. [laughter] That meant to me, I had it right, it was correct. And plus WikiLeaks said it, too. I wanted to prove it, of course, mathematically. So this is just inside the United States. This is just the first net that’s going to catch anything going out of the DNC, or Podesta’s server, or anybody’s server inside the United States, this is the first set of tapping points where they will pick up all this data….

“At any, rate this is just inside the United States. Around the world it gets even worse [Fig. 2]. Because out there, there’s no distinction whatsoever; they go through anything unilaterally they want to. If you
notice, down in the lower right-hand corner, the real important one there is the CNE, greater than 50,000 implants. This is about five or six years ago, at least. CNE is Computer Network Exploitation, and implants, that means software and/or hardware—implants into switches, servers, routers, around the world where they control that router, and they control that server. So that means that anybody sending anything—I mean, Chancellor Merkel didn’t have to be in Germany to be collected on her cell phone; she could have been in Brazil, for example. And any switch we have control of down there, we pick up her number and we dual route it back to NSA, a recording.

“So you don’t have to be there: This says they own the network. And this is how they monitor. Now, they’ve got hundreds of trace route programs embedded in all this stuff. And what trace route does, it allows them to trace the route of the individual packets of the transmission going through the network: You know, if your email gets broken down into say 20 packets, they can trace the 20 packets, and how they got to where they went. So they knew the routing across every segment of the network—the time it took and all of that—and they could trace it from one point to the other. And embedded in the packet is the originator ID, and the ultimate recipient ID, so you can trace everything from end to end. And even if they try to manipulate that internally in different places, you can still follow that through the switches and the servers and the networks and the implants you’ve got.

“So I knew that NSA wouldn’t say ‘we’ve got high confidence.’ They should say ‘we know who did it’—there’s no question; I mean, they did that with the Chinese, a few years ago. And there’s no reason not to be able to do it in any hacking attempt at all.

“So if I were running it, I would have that automated. And that’s the way I do things. And so it would be automatically alerted, and no one would have to ask, and we’d say ‘here’s who did it—here’s when they did it,’ and all of that.”

‘Let’s Monitor Everybody’

“But the objective is really—this is really the ultimate one they have. This is called the TREASURE-MAP program [Fig. 3]. You can go on the Web and read about it if you want. The basic objective is, in that little box there, ‘let’s monitor everybody in the world, every minute of the day, and know where they are.’

“This is unconstitutional, of course, this is all unconstitutional: That’s why, when I put it in the sworn affidavit I submitted to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals—a lawsuit against the NSA for their illegal, unconstitutional collection of data on U.S. citizens—I included all these slides as a way of saying I know personally about all this stuff and I’m ready to testify. And that’s a sworn affidavit: I’m liable to perjury there. And NSA is trying to say, ‘well, he doesn’t know, he’s been out of this for 15 years.’ But the programs they’re using are the exact ones I invented for them 15, 25 years ago. [laughter] And so I know exactly what those
programs do and how they interrelate and everything! So I was ready to testify to that and I still am, and that’s why they don’t want me in court.

“At any rate, when it came to the Russian allegation that they did that, we started looking around; obviously I knew it was false to begin with, and I said that. But the question is, can we find some evidence of actually who did it? It took a long time before some evidence came out.

“Guccifer 2.0, I think, came out on July 5th; back then, he said, ‘here’s the data, and I took it out on this date.’ We looked at that, and we said, ‘Uh, gee, here is 1,976 MB’—a byte is eight bits apiece, so it’s really about 16 gigabits of data—and [Guccifer said] ‘we took it out, downloaded it over 87 seconds’; like two parts, one part initially, then a 12 minute dead time—no transmissions—and then another part came out. But overall just the transmission part was 87 seconds. So that turned out to be about 23 MB per second. And that said to me, ‘Hm, that’s the speed of a download through a USB port to a thumb drive, but that can’t go across the worldwide network to Russia.’ Because you can’t get that speed for that distance.”

‘Bench-Marking’ vs. Real-Life Hacking

Enlisting the support of those capable of doing the experiment, Binney tests the hacking hypothesis vicariously through the assistance of hacker specialists.

“Now, a lot of people said, ‘Oh yeah, we can do that!’ and they show it in the lab. It can go in the lab, sure, you can have a gigabit line in the lab, sure. But, let’s try to get it to Russia, OK? So they kept saying, ‘we’ll try some more stuff in the lab.’ We had a lot of tests going on—we got people testing things still, I mean, we’re still looking at it. And people who are trying to do it in the lab to find some feasible way to get that rate across—so in the meantime, I thought, why do this in the lab, let’s do it in the real world, and actually show what happens.

“So we started testing across the Atlantic to some of my hacker friends in Europe, just to say, ‘Why don’t you try downloading this file, close to a 1 GB, and see how fast you can get it across there?’ One of our colleagues that helped write the VIPS Memo, said, ‘Well, it’s nice to see that the transfer rate across the Atlantic is very similar to the rate at which an iceberg melts.’ [laughter] Because, we were getting it, for a 100 MB personal device at home, we were getting a transfer rate of 0.8 MB, which is about 6.4 megabits. And then, for a commercial BSO we were getting 1.6 MB, which is about one-tenth the rate we need.

“We’re still testing, we’re still going to do that and we’re going to document our testing results. But you can’t wait for the government to tell you the truth because they’ll never do it. They have an agenda: Their agenda is how can we swindle you out of money, how can we keep the secret state, the shadow government running; and that’s part of the point how they have to get rid of Trump, because he’s not a politician, he’s not from the community of government and he’s a real threat to them.

“He’s already talked about reorganizing the IC [in-
that was relevant, and that was all the data you got. We didn’t take in any other data, so everybody had privacy as a result. And anything that we took in the metadata, we could encrypt everything; so everything you were looking at was encrypted metadata. We actually mathematically found a way of getting by the homomorphic mapping of encrypted values, which people are stumbling on right now. There’s a little trick to it, but—"

Ray McGovern: “Did you have any information about 9/11?”

Binney: “Ah, yes. They had all the data to stop 9/11, before 9/11, in their databases, and didn’t know it. It was all there. Even the date of the attack was given. The date of the attack was given! It was given in a graphic form, you know, like 9/11,—11/9 is the date. Everybody else does day/month/year; we do month/day/year—it’s a progression. But at any rate, they did a line and a line, and a space; and a circle and line! 11/9. And it’s the attack date, as the execution date. That was given in an email; they had that, but they didn’t know it. In fact, I think according to some sources, they had actually had somebody in there who was saying the attack was coming but didn’t know the date or anything, and they were trying to report that but they couldn’t—NSA wouldn’t let them report it.

“So we’ve never gotten the truth about 9/11 or many other things, and the background, the shadow government and the deep state. The companies that make all the money off all the contracts for all this crap, weapons and intelligence, manufactured one way or the other, are behind this, and that’s the driving factor.

“That’s what Trump is a threat to. That’s why I thought he was the greatest hope we had to solve this problem, because he was an outsider, and he was at least a businessman, didn’t lead in a lot of BS, in a lot of crap that was wasteful energy; and I thought that was hopeful. And since they’re attacking him, I’m sure it’s hopeful! [laughter] I mean, they make it obvious that they don’t want him, and that’s why…."

“Much like spotting a pig passing through a python.” Binney said that any transmission of 16 gigabits across a communications network in 87 seconds, could not have been missed: “Communications networks around the world have flow monitors … If there’s any problem, they offload to other lines, reroute … A transfer rate of 16 gigabits in 87 seconds would be very much like spotting a pig passing through a python. A network monitor would see it immediately. So we maintain that it was a local download done through a USB port.”