United States News Digest
EIR ONLINE POSTS SENATE HEARINGS ON GOSS NOMINATION
Given the importance of the Director of the CIA position to the Bush Administration's policy of "preventive war," and "perpetual war," EIR Online provides the full transcript of the Sept. 20 hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, where Senators questioned nominee Rep. Porter Goss (R-Fla). The hearings were chaired by Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.). The following transcript was prepared by Federal News Service; it has not been edited by EIR Online.
See this week's InDepth for the LaRouche PAC testimony opposing the Goss nomination.
Transcript: Senate Hearing on Porter Goss Nomination As Director of CIA
SEN. ROBERTS: The committee will come to order.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence meets today to continue considering the nomination of the Honorable Porter J. Goss to be director of Central Intelligence.
Congressman, thank you for returning to make a second appearance before the committee after five and half hours, as of last week.
I have one or two additional questions for the nominee, but before I get to them I would have recognized the distinguished vice chairman for any remarks he might wish to make. We will recognize him just as soon as he attends the session.
Congressman Goss, often we hear concerns about policymakers and intelligence and the politics of same. Rarely, however, do we hear concerns about the flip side of the coin, the intelligence community efforts to shape or influence policy. The latter is a very real and very unwise phenomenon. The intelligence community should provide the facts, let the policymakers simply sort them out.
How will you ensure that the intelligence community does not cross the line into policymaking?
REP. GOSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I stated last time, I feel very strongly that it destroys the credibility of the intelligence if it is thought to be contaminated by the policymaking process. I believe it is the DCI's responsibility to make sure that that does not happen in all the product, that the product has to be vetted and considered pure by the DCI before it is given to the policymakers. I think that that process can be worked out, and very well, in a management form, and I would foresee no problems at all conveying that understanding to the people who are involved in the intelligence community.
And I would have to point out, I think that understanding is pretty well there. There is a very strong line among the people who work in the community between those who are in the process of taking the product and analyzing it, and taking information and analyzing it a delivered, finished product and those who are policy who are not part of that. Intelligence is to inform policy. And I think that the professionals do understand that. But I think that they have to be continually monitored and there have to be safeguards put into the system. If I am confirmed, I will certainly consider that a critical job, because it has been one that has caused the intelligence community a good deal of consternation in the past couple of years. SEN. ROBERTS: I appreciate that strong statement.
Should the intelligence community have a voice and a vote at the interagency table on questions that first and foremost are policy decisions?
REP. GOSS: Absolutely not, sir.
SEN. ROBERTS: Congressman, as you know, the president did direct the CIA and the FBI to co-locate their operational and their analytical counterterrorism components at the new TTIC facility. The FBI's counterterrorism division just finished moving into that facility. It's my understanding that almost all of the CIA's counterterrorism center is still at Langley. Do I have your absolute commitment that when you are confirmed you will take immediate steps to ensure that all of the operational and the analytical components of the CIA's counterterrorism center will be co-located with their FBI counterparts at the new TTIC facility?
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir.
SEN. ROBERTS: Senator Wyden.
SEN. RON WYDEN (D-OR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Goss, as you and I talked about in the office, what I am most troubled about is your willingness to be a change agent at the CIA.
I think that we discussed over the course of the last week the matter of being partisan, the question of being objective, those kinds of issues. And my sense is, I can give somebody the benefit of the doubt on those kinds of issues.
But I have scoured your record, and I just don't see any real evidence of your willingness to push for intelligence reform and be a true change agent. And it is heavy lifting; nobody underestimates that. But I think we saw with Tom Kean that it can be done. I mean, he went into that 9/11 commission project. He had to take on the White House. They were reluctant to cooperate. He handled it in a thoughtful way, and he was able to get a lot of the information that was needed.
What in your record shows that you're willing to be serious about pushing for intelligence reform and particularly doing what Tom Kean did, which is to stand up to your administration, stand up to a president of your party?
REP. GOSS: Senator, as I said last week, I believe it is the intelligence community's job to provide the best product to any administration. It's not a partisan question at all. And as I explained last week, I well understand that I am leaving one arena and, if confirmed, heading to another arena that operates completely differently, where partisan politics are not part of the job.
In fact, I take that so seriously, I've made a down payment on that pledge. You have not heard a word from me publicly on any partisan possible way since the president nominated me.
So I assure you that I understand that the product of the community is for the administration that is running the country, whatever the voters choose on that.
Now with regard to your questions on what have I done, I did appreciate our conversation very much, and I appreciate you taking the time last week to speak to me specially on that. And I have compiled some information, which I hope will be persuasive to you, that we have not been just idling our time away in the past several years under my chairmanship. If you wish, I would start back a few years and give you some examples.
SEN. WYDEN: Well, you can certainly do that. But I would like an answer to the question I asked. Tom Kean showed that he would stand up to the administration of his party and that he would take them on in the name of intelligence reform. I'd like to have even one or two concrete examples of where you are willing to stand up to the administration, the administration of your party, to try to bring about intelligence reform.
REP. GOSS: Senator, again, without regard to the question of the partisanship or the party, which I believe is not appropriate, as I also said last week, even in the construct of the oversight committees that we have in intelligence, so I tried to practice, as I said, nonpartisanship. I didn't always succeed, but I tried to practice it. And I think seven out of the eight bills I pushed through came through on a bipartisan basis. I did find it necessary to push very hard on the administration on some issues with regard to reform. One of them surely has to be the area of classification and declassification. We had quite an arm- wrestling discussion with the executive branch about that system, which I said last week is a broken system; it is a broken system. I tried very hard to do some reform with it. I actually worked with Senator Moynihan. We did pass a bill bicameral, bipartisan a first step. It wasn't as much as either of us wanted, but it was a good step and it is the law, and it has made it easier now on the declassification process.
A second area that I think is critically important to remind ourselves of is that the joint inquiry did turn out a report and it had a number of recommendations 19, to be exact. And a good number of those have been enacted by the executive branch at this time. So we have made some strong progress. Now, the major one was the question of the director of national intelligence, or the national intelligence director I don't want to get mixed up in the alphabet soup but the kingpin, as it were, the coordinator, the person with the overall accountability for the whole community, which is a huge issue as we talk about stitching together a network. I think we did put out a good report, and I think that the fact today that the work we did in that joint inquiry is out there and is being so thoroughly addressed on the Hill and downtown now is a sign of success. I consider it a victory. We have gotten to a place where we had not gotten to, despite even the good efforts of the Aspin-Brown and other commissions like that, which pointed out pretty much the same thing; maybe we ought to consider this sort of stuff. So I think we have rolled the ball pretty well, sir.
SEN. WYDEN: The only the only thing about your answer is that you're essentially citing you said, for example, the executive branch made some changes after 9/11. Of course, no one disputes that. But after 9/11 and you served on a commission you could have introduced a piece of legislation that would have pushed us further and faster. It would have meant you would have had to take them on. And you didn't do it.
But let me move on to the question of Iraq. And obviously, on the basis of the pessimistic NIE that was reported in the press last week and you obviously are not up on this, and these are just press reports; you can't get into all of the details there but I'd like to ask you, with respect to Iraq, about your ability to brief the president objectively on the Iraq issue. As you know, you voted in support of the president's decision to go to war in Iraq. The conflict continues. Obviously, there are a variety of different perspectives on the current situation and of course also what the future portends for that troubled part of the country part of the world. As part of the CIA director's job, you're going to have to brief the president and the Cabinet on the situation in Iraq and how well or how poorly his policies are doing there, and whether the administration's goals are going to be achieved or not. Yet as a policymaker, as a member of the Congress, your decision to invade Iraq was a policy that you yourself supported and voted for. You voted for the policy to go into Iraq.
How are you going to handle matters regarding Iraq and other foreign policy matters that you supported while in the Congress? It's pretty hard for a CIA director to recuse themselves, but how can you tell us, given your past history, that you're going to give the president the unvarnished truth, despite having a stake in policies you voted for?
REP. GOSS: Senator, last week I said it. I will repeat again: I understand the difference in the jobs. To carry out my responsibilities as an elected member of Congress on behalf of the people of southwest Florida, Florida's 14 District, required one set of activities. This job, if I am confirmed, very clearly requires a very different set. And as I've explained, I totally understand the difference.
What I am going to do is try and improve the product that the policymakers get, so that the policy is as best informed as it can be by an unvarnished, straightforward intelligence product. That's my goal, if I am confirmed, to do that.
Now in answer to the chairman's questions when we started out, I pointed out that I do believe the DCI or whatever the equivalent role would be who is speaking to the president has that responsibility to be the bearer of all news, not good news or bad news, that comes legitimately out of a proper, professional job of creating intelligence product throughout the intelligence community.
Obviously, there will be dissents. Obviously, there will be different views. And i think all of the issues of the formula of what do we know, what don't we know, and what would we like to know need to be clearly presented to the policymakers, so that they can be well informed not only for the policy but the tasking that inevitably the community will be asked to do. SEN. WYDEN: But what is your reaction to these press reports last week with respect to the bleak assessment in Iraq? You obviously can't get into all of the details, but I'd like to know. Do you think, on the basis of the information that you now have, which of course is not what's in an NIE, that these bleak reports are warranted?
REP. GOSS: Does which I'm sorry?
SEN. WYDEN: The reports about the NIE last week and the situation in Iraq were pretty bleak and they painted a gloomy picture.
REP. GOSS: I'm sorry, I didn't understand.
SEN. WYDEN: You can't get into all of the details of something like that. But based on what you know, do you have any reason to question that NIE?
REP. GOSS: Senator, obviously I'm not going to comment on a product I haven't seen. I don't know anything about it. And I frankly, I read some of the press reports and have heard some commentary on it, some opining about it. I would like to reserve judgment on that until I have a chance to see it myself.
What my interest is would be in it is have we got the information we need for the policymakers, and if we haven't got the kind of information we need, how do we go about getting it for them? That's the job of the intelligence community.
SEN. WYDEN: My time has expired. But do you know anything that would indicate that that NIE of last week, that painted a gloomy picture, is off base?
REP. GOSS: Senator, as I said, I don't know anything about that NIE. I read in the papers that there was one. I haven't seen it.
SEN. WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SEN. ROBERTS: I would now like to recognize the distinguished vice chairman for any comments he might wish to make.
SEN. JOHN ROCKEFELLER (D-WV): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning
REP. GOSS: Good morning, sir.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Congressman Goss. I want to continue a little bit on Ron Wyden's theme.
(To Chairman Roberts) Are we following the 10-minute rule?
SEN. ROBERTS: It's 10 minutes, sir. And you can have a Rockefeller theme or a Wyden theme, either one.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: There was some of this questioning last week, and there was this question, "my record is my record." And I think that you could tell there was some that stirred up a sense of incompleteness or unforthcomingness, which was not inaccurate in the sense that "my record is my record," but we were looking for something more.
And as I think I also pointed out, independence, which to me is the most important part of all of this it's not how much does Porter Goss know that's a lot; what kind of man is Porter Goss he's a good man; does he have experience with the CIA he surely he does. It just comes down to telling truth to power, the independence. You indicated that you can separate your past life from your present life. I think you and I, in private conversations have indicated neither of us are particularly political. But I'm not sure it's as easy as that.
I have two volumes here that my staff collected, going back over 10 years of statements. They're thick, they're all political. They're not all about intelligence. They go back to some other things too, but most of them are about intelligence.
And I'm trying to get into your mind a little bit about how it's so easy for you, in a position where you have a let's say, a powerful vice president, a powerful secretary of Defense, a powerful political adviser to the president, powerful people around him who are accustom to exercising their power in powerful ways, that you just suddenly become a different person. And I need to understand that.
I've never been in that position where I've gone from I am who I am, and I can sort of say that because my life has had kind of a continuum to it, but yours is now potentially probably going to change quite radically. And so I need to know how you do that. Now, for example, in the case of Mohamed Atta and the famed non- trip to Prague, which the vice president is still referring to and talking about, proving therefore a relationship between 9/11 and quote, "proving" and the twin towers. That's stunning to me, shocking to me. I mean, I don't know why he says that, how he says that. It's not responsible.
Now, you're the head of the CIA, and he says that, but he says it very he says it publicly, as he does. What do you do about that? You can answer, "Well, that's a policymaking question and not a matter for me." On the other hand, you are the head of the CIA and he is misusing intelligence, he's misleading the American people in my view, in this senator's view about an instant which didn't happen which the FBI, the intelligence communities can prove, and which I believe you know also. What do you do with that? Do you go to him? Do you just leave it lie there?
REP. GOSS: Senator, you've asked a lot of questions, and they're very good ones and they're very hard ones. I'll try if I can answer them in reverse order.
I think very definitely at any time that anybody with responsibility for delivering product to people in high places is concerned that that message is fully understood or what that product says if there's doubt in their mind that it's incumbent upon that person in the intelligence community whether it's the DCI or the NID or the DNI, or whatever it might be to go to the customer and say, "I want to make sure you understand that this is the range of what we know, this is the range of what we don't know, this is the amount of credibility we give this," and put in the caveats if there's any doubt, if there's a need to go back and do that. I think that's appropriate.
I do not think it's appropriate for the DCI or the NID or anybody else in that kind of position to go and tell a policymaker how to use product. That would scare me a lot. If you had a very strong intelligence network with that intelligence person at the top who controlled the whole community, who was trying to say this is our product and this is how you must use it, I think that that would be a breach of the faith that we have in how the system is supposed to work. There has to be a clear delineation between delivering unvarnished product and allowing policymakers to do their job in the way they see fit, because as I have been told many, many times, policymakers do not make their decisions just based on the input from the intelligence top person alone that they get their information from a number of sources, and they have a number of reasons for making judgments that quite often go beyond intelligence. And I would not want to try and affect that.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: This isn't a question which would go beyond intelligence, would it? I mean the FBI and the CIA make their investigations, they look at ticket stubs and where people were. And in a sense, it really does come down to you, as head of the CIA, as opposed to what the vice president is saying to the nation. Now, you're not making policy if you go to him and you say, "Mr. Vice President, I just want you to know, as your director of the CIA, that what you're saying is not backed up by intelligence," and that and that that's not making policy. It's simply saying to him that as a person in intelligence and director of intelligence that you think he's wrong.
REP. GOSS: Senator, if you if I am confirmed and I am the person responsible for the intelligence product of the United States of America all of those thousands of men and women doing all of that hard work, all of that investment of the taxpayers' money, all of the total machine, which is huge and you bring that out, and I am the point of fusion to the decision-makers, I can assure you: I am going to defend that the product is pure and that the understanding is absolutely clear about that. And if there is a misunderstanding or if there's question about that, I would be very quick to point it out.
And if there were no intelligence
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: To the vice president?
REP. GOSS: To anybody, sir. If there were no if there were if I had never I had never myself or caused to have the community present intelligence to anybody and somebody went out, no matter who, and said, "This is what our intelligence community said," I would certainly find out and advise that person very quickly that that was not this intelligence community.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Would you correct the public record on the matter?
REP. GOSS: I would certainly judge the situation at the time. I am not going to let the credibility of our intelligence community be in any way affected by the battles that swirl around on the question of the use of intelligence.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: But then wouldn't that be the only way to make sure that that would happen, is by correcting the public record?
REP. GOSS: It would certainly be one of the ways. I'm not sure public is the only way. Sometimes private words work. Sometimes other approaches work. I think power of persuasion sometime it's a good thing; sometimes there are just plain misunderstandings.
I don't believe, in something as important and as sensitive as intelligence can be and the machinery we put into it, that the first thing to do is to go public. I think the first thing to do is to understand are we damaging in any way our capabilities on how we handle this. And I always want to pay attention to capabilities in how we handle any problem like that. But I agree if somebody is abusing the product, and I think it's it is important that the person who is in charge of that product, which would be the DCI or the subsequent equivalent of that, has a reason to go forward and say that's not what we said.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Congressman Goss, you indicated in our last meeting and there were a number of statements given that you had made with respect to the Democrats are damaging intelligence. I think you recall my question about John Kerry, what you said about John Kerry, the article that you wrote about John Kerry. The just help me understand how, you know, 10 years this is 10 years of statements which are partisan I think this is honest questioning, Porter Goss. I really do. I really do. It gets to the core of what the CIA has to be. How does one simply become a different person?
REP. GOSS: Mr. Vice Chairman, I think I got through my adult life without giving a partisan speech until about 1988 or 1989. I was forced to choose a party system in order to run under the system we have in this country, and I was very comfortable with it. Before then, for the great majority of my life, I don't believe I'd made a single partisan speech.
Of course, there have been times on partisan issues I've been on the Rules Committee. As you very well know, we have a lot of partisan vote, and I've had to support those partisan votes in the Rules Committee.
But on the things that count, the things that are not just the interplay between the two agendas of the two parties, there's only one flag in the room, and it's that flag back there. And we all know that. National security is one of those areas. I'm very proud that for every year I brought my bill in on a bipartisan basis. Even this year, even though we did not vote it out of committee on a bipartisan basis, we got I think five out of eight of the minority party voted for it on the floor.
So I have worked very hard in that direction. I have not always succeeded. As you know, in this town there tends to be an outside atmosphere that tries to cloud in and affect these things. If I didn't think I could do this, and give up public speaking which I would be happy to do, frankly, and have enjoyed the past few weeks immensely not doing that I wouldn't be sitting before you, because I feel just as strongly as you do about it, Senator.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, sir. My time is up.
SEN. ROBERTS: I think that I have about eight minutes remaining, or maybe seven, and then will be more than happy to recognize Senator DeWine.
In response to Senator Wyden's comments, I know that Governor Kean apparently, in your words, "stood up to the president" in regards to his efforts or at least in your opinion on the 9/11 commission. But basically, the administration in considering that I think has taken many forward steps in response to that. I am not sure that that was the result of Governor Kean. I would point out that I think the 9/11 commission took 10 days to make 41 recommendations. The 41 recommendations were then encapsulated into a bill introduced by Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman. It was a marker bill. But basically, it was simply recommendations. It was like the Nike ad: Just do it. And so you'd have the recommendations, and if Congressman Goss would be the national intelligence director, it would simply be, "Here, Porter, here's the baby. You rock it." Because it isn't a comprehensive bill.
Right now the Government Affairs Committee has that jurisdiction and they're writing a bill. We have some suggestions for that bill. I would say that if there's an example that members of this committee wish to take to stand up to the president or, for that matter, anybody in their party in terms of leadership, they should get on the bill that I've introduced, along with seven other members. That is real reform. That is standing up. Now, that bill has been described as everything from bold and far-reaching to nutty and radical. So, in that regard, I'm not sure that that comparison is really the best one.
Let me just say that asking staff and I have not asked the witness for this but in terms of what the congressman has done, in September he and Representative Harman noted that the House Committee on Intelligence has held no less than 62 hearings on reform just this year alone. Even before 9/11, he was thinking ahead on the key issues like biological warfare threats, the Department of Energy, counterintelligence, the NSA, legal authorities. On Iraq he has also been an informed and often a very cautious voice, as I have been, by the way. In September of last year and many members of this committee Mr. Goss and Mrs. Harman also laid out their concerns and suggested improvements needed for better intelligence collection.
I know that change comes in various forms, but I would think a step- by-step process, well thought out, would be the form I would prefer, at least in regards to change in the intelligence community, as opposed to 41 recommendations that came out of a 10-day deliberation. And I'm not trying to perjure that effort; I think it's a great effort and has given us a catalyst for reform. I just happen to have here the joint inquiry recommendations. That was the investigation conducted by this committee and the House committee, and really was the blueprint or the foundation given to the 9/11 commission. And there are somewhere in the neighborhood here I have 19 recommendations. One annual report, four one-time reports, three proposed reports. Seemed to me there was 21 long-range reports. That was in conjunction with Congresswoman Pelosi and the chairman of this committee at that time, Senator Graham, who is no shrinking violet in regards to recommending reform. I suggested at the time that they considered all these. By the way, these reports, some about I don't know 12 of the mandatory reports had to be done by June. And Congressman Goss signed on to those.
We had some discussions about that. I said, you know, how in the world can anybody at Langley. find any time to do anything if they had to do all of these 19 recommendations and 21 long-term steps and 12 mandatory reports by June? And he indicated that something must be done. And so basically he's the godfather, if you will, along with three others Senator Shelby and Congresswoman Pelosi and also Senator Graham of the basic foundation for the 9/11 report. So to say that he is not an agent of change or is against reform, I think, is a misnomer. Let me say that in terms of the use of intelligence, we had hoped to get to that in terms of phase two, but we find ourselves in the middle of 9/11 reform, and we find ourselves in this nomination, which we are very pleased to do. And one of the things that I want to do very badly, along with the vice chairman, is the postwar intelligence on or the intelligence on postwar Iraq. Obviously, we are in the middle of an insurgency. You can call that a war if you want to. We have not had time to do that. But that would be the appropriate place to take a look, and we will look at the National Intelligence Estimate that has been brought up by Senator Wyden, and we intend to be very aggressive.
I don't know if raising issues of partisanship, subject to opinion, over 10 years is not being partisan as well. I hope to heck
nobody in 10 years takes all the stuff that comes out of my mouth in regards to whether it's partisan. I have a reputation around this place of being somewhat obstreperous. I think the Congressional Quarterly comes down and says I'm "pleasantly irascible." Well, I've been two hours in traffic this morning, and I'm very irascible! And so consequently, if they took everything that I have said over 20 years of service and put it in context and said, "Roberts is this partisan" I remember standing up, shaking a finger at Tip O'Neill, in regards to the speaker of the House. He told me to take off my "Thou shalt not steal" button when we thought that the other side had stolen an election. Was that partisan? You're darn right.
If people don't understand that this is a partisan outfit in the Congress, they're either very naive or very disingenuous or have their head lodged firmly where there is no sun or light. (Laughter.)
And so consequently, I hope to heck that after 10 years, somebody could make a statement and then not pick and choose and say that's partisan. Is that partisan? I think it's partisan from the other side, and I think it's time to quit this. The gentleman has indicated he's independent, he will be nonpartisan and he will be aggressive. I think sometimes you have to take a man at his word. Does this mean that no member of the Senate or House, in terms of 10 years going back over statements, can serve in any any kind of duty in this place?
I'm sorry my time's not up. (Laughter.) But at any rate, I can name you 10 people in the House, probably 25 people in the House I had the privilege of serving there for 15 years with this gentleman who are very partisan. I can name you people in the Senate who I think are very partisan. This man is not part of that posse. He doesn't ride with the partisan posse. That's my considered opinion after knowing him for 16 years and working with him on a weekly basis ever since I have had the privilege of being on this committee. Senator DeWine.
SEN. MIKE DEWINE (R-OH): Well, I get to follow up on that. Good. (Laughter.) Congressman Goss, good to see you again.
REP. GOSS: Good morning, Senator.
SEN. DEWINE: Good to be back.
For the record, I might add that you and I had the privilege of a bill which certainly not a partisan bill at all, and that was the Ricky Ray bill
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir.
SEN. DEWINE: where I think did some good for some folks who had been hurt by the government, and certainly had been hurt, who acquired AIDS because of the blood supply. And I certainly enjoyed working with you on that, and that certainly was an issue that had nothing to do with politics at all, but certainly had everything to do about trying to help people. And you were able to lead the charge on that, and I thank you and salute you for that.
REP. GOSS: Thank you, sir.
SEN. DEWINE: Let me ask this question. As a those of us on this committee and you on the House committee really were consumers of intelligence, as is the executive branch. It strikes me that we are many times in the position of wanting to have a consensus from the intelligence community. But it seems to me also that we also have the need to see where the dissent is coming from in the intelligence community, if there is dissent. And I bring this up because we have in front of us a number of proposals that seem to consolidate the power. And I wonder if there might be a tendency, if any of these proposals are adopted, for the dissent to be stifled, or at least for the ultimate consumer never to see the dissent?
For example, INR, I've noticed a few times has had a different opinion. At least on one occasion I noticed they were right; everybody else seemed to be wrong. Do you want to comment on that and just how we make sure that as we do these reforms that we make sure that the consumer the president, the Congress at least make sure when we see the consensus, that we at least make sure that we still have somebody out there who is independent and getting an alternative view, and that we also see that alternative view?
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir, I agree with that very much. I think there is a system in place now that has not worked as well as it should have, or perhaps as it could have. I don't know the answer, whether it's a "should" or "could," but it has not worked as well.
I believe that dissent is a critical part of the process. You want the differing opinions, you want the competitive analysis, you want to avoid groupthink things that you've pointed out very well in this committee's study, I think now recognized by the DI in a paper that I understand you all are going to get. I mentioned it last week. It's a study that's worth taking a quick look at. I do believe that it's very important to have in the reorganization, however it is done, the understanding that the 15 elements within the intelligence community operate as elements but also as part of a larger whole, and that they have a responsibility not to only unto themselves, for their own agencies the FBI, INR, whatever it may be but to participate into the network as a whole. That means we're going to have to take some mechanical steps, like co-location and things like that.
We've had some recent disputes; they are continuing to happen. This process is not going as well as I would like it to go. There is room for improvement. I will certainly say that. And part of the reorganization that you all decide is going to color very much what it looks like. But I think we all understand we have to do it. I think when you have dissent you have to understand why the opposing opinions or views were rejected. I think it's not just simply it was a vote of three to two; I think it's this is because when we added the pluses and minuses on the yellow sheet we got three pluses and two minuses, and these were the pluses and these were the minuses. But what we don't know is this, and if we knew that, that might tip it. I think that enrichment process is very important.
Now, not every customer is going to want to know that, but every customer needs to be able to get to that if they do want to know it. So I would suggest that it will work two ways: if you, as a customer on this committee, want to go behind what the finished product is that you read or what the daily SEIB is or anything else, and want to get into that, then I suggest you have the right to do that and should do that, and that the community has the responsibility to come forward and say look, this is how we weighed it.
SEN. DEWINE: It seems also to me, though, that as the report is prepared there is some responsibility in the intelligence community to give us that alternative view even if we don't ask for it, because many times
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir
SEN. DEWINE: Many times we're not going to we don't know you don't know the question to ask sometimes. You don't know if there was a minority view unless someone says it.
REP. GOSS: That's absolutely correct, sir. One of the problems that we have is a system now of trying to protect our sources and methods and sensitive matters where we use a system that doesn't work very well. It's you know, how much credibility can we give this? Do we have confidence in it? Well, what does high confidence mean? If you say high confidence four times and it's only right three times, turns out to be only right three times, then the next time you hear high confidence, it's not quite that high.
So I think we do need a different way of telling our consumers, and I agree that those dissents are important to point out. I mean, some people say footnotes do it. Actually, footnotes don't do it. Most people don't have the time.
SEN. DEWINE: Let me ask another question somewhat related to this, and that is a problem that we have seen; and that is, when the analysts are so separated from their sources that the they do not have the ability and we've seen this when some cases were mistakes were made they don't have the full ability to analyze or to judge how good the sources are. And we've seen several specific cases where they did not really know that, and there was this wall.
Now I understand sometimes why there is a wall there. You have to protect your sources. How do you deal with that problem and still how do you protect the source but at the same time make sure the analyst, who is going to ultimately be giving us the information or the president of the United States the information, can make a fair judgment about how good the quality of the source is, so he or she can make that good opinion to us?
REP. GOSS: Senator, you've correctly described a problem which we obviously need to fix rather quickly. And there has been there have been efforts in the past to try and get the DI and the DO to use one agency's area, working more closely together. There is an esprit de corps in both of those elements, and it's a good thing to have, but it's got to work more closely.
There are a number of ways that suggested the white paper that the DI has put out talks about a number of things. If there were resources, we would like to put some of our analysts out in the field, working with some of the case officers, so that they can understand better what the problems are out there and so the case officer can understand better what it is the analyst absolutely needs. But unfortunately it's not just the problem doesn't just lie there. It lies it goes beyond that, that we do not have analysts talking to analysts, as opposed to analysts talking to collectors. We find analysts in one agency not talking to analysts in another agency.
Now hopefully TTIC, in terms of terrorism, is going to deal with that. But that's only terrorism. There are other problems out there. There's WMD problems. There's narco-trafficking problems. There's racketeering problems. There's political intelligence, all of those things that you need to deal with, which aren't covered in the TTIC, necessarily. So I think that the area you have focused on is the area that is broken in the analytical part and that it does need attention. And we have some ideas, and the people involved in that are aware that we are looking for ideas. So I think we have a will to do a correction, and I believe you will see progress. If I'm confirmed, I assure you, you have my word on that.
SEN. DEWINE: As you're aware, we passed a few years ago the Nazi war crimes bill, which called on the CIA to provide additional new information, to go back in their files, open up their files. That has worked fairly well. I don't want to get into great detail about this today. But there is still information that needs to come out, and I would just like your assurance today that I was the author of that bill here in the Senate, and I would like your assurance today that you will continue to work with us on that.
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir. Of course I will continue to work with you on that, if I'm confirmed.
SEN. DEWINE: I appreciate that. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. ROBERTS: Senator Hagel.
SEN. CHARLES HAGEL (R-NE): Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have no questions for Mr. Goss. I will just add one comment. I think the president has chosen wisely in his nomination of Mr. Goss, but more to the point, I think he has placed a very appropriate amount of confidence and trust in Mr. Goss. I enthusiastically support Mr. Goss's nomination and look forward to our vote and getting him to the floor of the Senate and getting him to work.
Mr. Goss, thank you.
REP. GOSS: Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that very much.
SEN. ROBERTS: Senator Hatch.
SEN. ORRIN HATCH (R-UT): Mr. Chairman, I echo those sentiments. I feel exactly the same. I've watched Congressman Goss for years. I'm aware of how much he did in a bipartisan way to make the committee work well over in the House. And I'll reserve the balance of my time.
REP. GOSS: Thank you, Senator.
SEN. ROBERTS: Senator Levin.
SEN. CARL LEVIN (D-MI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the most important quality that I'm looking for in a director of Central Intelligence is somebody who will reliably provide objective intelligence assessments that are independent of the policy and the political agenda of the White House. And, frankly, we haven't had that lately in George Tenet. Too often his public statements were exaggerated, shaded, distorted to support policy positions of the White House. Whether you agree with that or not, there's a 500-page report of this committee that identifies the errors, omissions, exaggerations of the CIA. Phase two will get to the question of what the impact of those were on the policymakers and the policymakers' statements themselves.
But I think even you agree that there were significant failures in the area of intelligence prior to both Iraq and to 9/11 although you've hesitated to use the word "failure" in the past. Repeatedly, I think at the last hearing you were willing to acknowledge that there were significant failures, intelligence failures. Is that a fair statement?
REP. GOSS: Senator, I said in response to your question I believe it was your question that I agree that there are failures involved in intelligence and that require fixing. And that is one of the reasons why I seek your confirmation, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: And that these significant failures that you're referring to were failures prior to Iraq and to 9/11?
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir. There were shortcomings very definitely in both areas. And as I said last week, I believe your report on weapons of mass destruction, your 500-and-some-page report, much of which, sadly, was redacted, was extremely helpful and very informative to me.
SEN. LEVIN: Was it troubling to you?
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir, in the sense that the depth of some of the analytical problems is great. I agree with your group think. And I would point out and again
SEN. LEVIN: You agree with our group think?
REP. GOSS: Your group think. No, sir, you did have a consensus product, which I'm pleased that the chairman was able to deliver. But I don't suggest that you are the one doing group think. I suggest that the group think problem the failure from competitive analysis Ms. Harman and I actually wrote a letter in September of '03, I think, which I'm sure you have about four pages or so which is pretty tough. And it went to some of the same areas. So I feel that the work that you've done and, frankly, the work that I hope the HPSCI is going to continue to do and I have every reason to believe they will deliver a report will follow up on that interim letter that Ms. Harman and I wrote with regard to WMD.
SEN. LEVIN: One part of that letter said something similar to what you said this morning, which is that where public officials cite intelligence incorrectly, the intelligence community has a responsibility to go back to that policymaker and make clear that the public statement mischaracterized the available intelligence. You, in a conversation with Senator Rockefeller, seemed to avoid committing yourself to correcting public misstatements by public officials relative to intelligence in a public way so that the public misinformation could be corrected. You seemed to avoid saying that public corrections were appropriate. You say you'd like other approaches first. You want to personally talk to that person, and so forth.
But I want to and where there are very public misstatements about what the intelligence provides, it's the public that's been misinformed, and a private comment to a policymaker doesn't correct that public misinformation, of which there was a vast amount prior to the Iraq war.
But let me ask you this specific question. Can you give us some examples of where, in your judgment, policymakers, prior to the Iraq war, mischaracterized the available intelligence? Would you for instance, were the Atta comments, were the meeting in Prague comments, were the comments relative to uranium, were the comments relative to the use of aluminum tubes, the vast number of comments characterizing intelligence that were made by public officials which went beyond the intelligence. Can you give us an example where you believe that the public statements of policymakers mischaracterized the available intelligence prior to the Iraq war?
REP. GOSS: Senator, I don't believe any public official in a position of responsibility has deliberately mischaracterized or misled anybody in the United States or anyplace else.
SEN. LEVIN: That wasn't my question.
REP. GOSS: You asked me if I could give you an example. I can't
SEN. LEVIN: Example I didn't use the word deliberately or intentionally or purposefully or willfully. I just simply said mischaracterized the intelligence.
REP. GOSS: I don't believe
SEN. LEVIN: I mean, we're looking for independence here. We got
REP. GOSS: Well, I understand
SEN. LEVIN: We got a lot of examples where intelligence was mischaracterized, not necessarily intentionally that's a very difficult thing to assess but where it was exaggerated. There's many examples which have been out there in the public, and I'm going to go through a few of them with you, if you'd like. I just want to know whether you're willing to acknowledge that intelligence can you give us any examples where in your opinion this administration, or any of our policymakers, mischaracterized, exaggerated the underlying intelligence? I'm looking for independence. Can you give us an example to show that you are willing to challenge the policymakers, that you are willing to speak truth to power?
REP. GOSS: Senator, I've been a policymaker for the past several years. I don't know all the intricacies of how the decisions have been made in the executive branch. I have had a perch from the oversight committee of HPSCI to look at intelligence. The intelligence problems that we have looked at lead to questions about have there been sufficient caveats to warn the users of the product. That was a question that Ms. Harman and I had a disagreement on. It's certainly a question that this committee has studied very intently and has come up with some conclusions about the difference between the NIE and the white paper and why those words caveats were dropped.
It is very clear that there are different needs to present intelligence scenarios, which are, admittedly, scenarios; they are best estimates, they are not hard fact. If you're a warfighter, you want a worst-case scenario; you want to know what is the worst to expect to protect your troops. If you are perhaps in the diplomatic corps, you do not necessarily want the worst-case scenario. So, if you're asking me do I know of anybody who has deliberately mischaracterized or exaggerated intelligence, I don't believe that's the case.
SEN. LEVIN: That's not what I asked you, but you're again responding to a question that wasn't asked. Let me give you an example. December 9th, 2001. Vice President Cheney said that it's "been pretty well confirmed" that 9/11 al Qaeda hijacker Mohamed Atta did go to Prague, and "he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in Czechoslovakia last April, several months before the attack." Now that went significantly beyond what the underlying intelligence said.
Do you agree
REP. GOSS: I
SEN. LEVIN: Do you agree that went beyond the underlying intelligence? It's all been declassified now.
REP. GOSS: Senator, I don't believe it all has been declassified now.
SEN. LEVIN: Well, let me read you the declassification. "No credible information that the meeting occurred." That's declassified.
REP. GOSS: That's declassified. Yes, sir. And I have no reason to question that summation. What I don't know is what is behind it. Declassified
SEN. LEVIN: Well, you've read haven't you read the material on the Atta meeting as chairman of the Intelligence Committee?
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir, I have. And that's
SEN. LEVIN: I'm just asking you a very simple question. REP. GOSS: Yes.
SEN. LEVIN: Do you believe the statement that was made on December 9th, 2001, by Vice President Cheney, that it's "been pretty well confirmed" that that meeting took place, was an accurate reflection of intelligence that existed at the time, that it's "been pretty well confirmed"? Do you I'm just asking you a direct question.
REP. GOSS: Is the statement itself, that it was "pretty well confirmed" if that's your question is I don't think it was as
well confirmed perhaps as the vice president thought. But I don't know what was in the vice president's mind, and I've certainly never talked with him about this. So I don't know how we came to that conclusion.
SEN. LEVIN: Is that a kind of statement that's worthy of correction when it's made publicly?
REP. GOSS: I would suggest that it probably is something in that case it's a hypothetical, but if I were confronted with that kind of a hypothetical, where I felt that a policymaker was getting beyond what the intelligence said, I think I would advise the person involved. I do believe that would be a case that would put me into action, if I were confirmed. Yes, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. ROBERTS: Senator Rockefeller.
SEN. WYDEN: (Off mike.)
SEN. ROBERTS: Oh, I'm sorry. Well, I had you first and then Senator Wyden, but we can reverse that. Senator Wyden.
SEN. WYDEN: Thank you. Congressman Goss, in your view, what was the most important recommendation of the congressional joint inquiry on 9/11?
REP. GOSS: The most important was probably the first one, sir, to get on with the job of trying to find a way to create a better management of the intelligence community we suggested through a DNI.
SEN. WYDEN: Through the DNI.
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir.
SEN. WYDEN: And did you introduce a piece of legislation to do that?
REP. GOSS: Directly? I don't believe I did, sir.
SEN. WYDEN: Well, I guess it makes my point. That would be an area where somebody could aggressively push for change and aggressively be a change agent, and you passed on it. I was frankly
REP. GOSS: Well
SEN. WYDEN: If I could finish, because I want to give you another chance to answer it. I was going to be charitable and say all right, the congressional joint inquiry is completed in December of 2002. You put in your bill in 2004. It didn't really do what the 9/11 commission talked about, but at least I think you were moving in that direction. So it took you a year and a half a year and a half to really do anything on the subject.
So how does someone like myself, who, A, likes you personally; B, I'm willing to give you the benefit of the doubt on the question of partisanship and objectivity, but I'm still looking for somebody who's aggressively going to be a change agent. And here is an example where you had an opportunity to do it you're the chairman and it just doesn't seem to be done. So, if you could respond to me on that.
REP. GOSS: Senator, you asked me if I had directly put in a piece of legislation related to the number one recommendation of the Joint Inquiry. The answer is I did not put in directly, as I said. As you did properly point out, I did work to try and find the right moment, the right way, the right combination to go forward to get that job done in another bill, which I did, as you properly pointed out, introduced in our reform bill, which was an announced work product of the HPSCI for this year. That statement was made I believe at the probably at the end of '03, sir. I'm not sure exactly. It would be in the HPSCI records. But it was an organized way to go after a problem.
I did this, frankly, after consulting with this committee too, the leadership of this committee, about how we were going to proceed, and with the former chairman, Chairman Graham Senator Graham. And we did sort of take stock at one point; we had a meeting to discuss where we were on the 9/11 recommendations. It was my judgment and I think it's been borne out that having the horsepower and the additional awareness and understanding of the work product of the 9/11 commission that we did set up, and was specific action taken by me and our committee in the intelligence authorization, which I am very proud, to come up with a good committee, the Hamilton-Kean committee and the people who served on it, the commissioners who served on it, who have done a fabulous job of keeping the issue of reorganization before the public, before the Hill, before the administration, before the world, I guess. And I think that was a pretty good way to proceed. And in the annals of getting things done around here, speaking as a congressman, I tend to feel moving in a year and a half to get where we've gotten is pretty good speed.
I am committed to reorganization. We're going to have it. Once that reorganization is in place, sir, then it will be a little easier
to do some of the reform you're asking me to commit to. I commit to improving the product. That is going to take reform. It's a little hard for me to be specific about what precisely I am going to do if I don't know exactly what the blueprints are of the network. So I am asking, if I am confirmed, for a close working cooperation, positive, leaning-forward, complementary efforts by the oversight committees and the community to make the reform happen and to make the reorganization happen.
SEN. WYDEN: I'm going to move on, Congressman.
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir.
SEN. WYDEN: But my concern remains, because I have asked you for example after example. I mean, the very first question at the first hearing, you said, well gosh, there wasn't a constituency for the subject; it was hard to get attention. And I said well you're the chairman, you've got the bully pulpit.
And so in example after example, I will tell you, I remain concerned about your willingness to lead. And I'm going to ask you about some other areas where again I think you'll have an opportunity to lead, if you're so inclined.
The president's proposal to instruct the to restructure the intelligence community includes a provision that wasn't recommended by the commission, and I'm not sure many people are aware of it. It seeks to give the president an exemption from some existing laws on oversight of the intelligence community. And these are the laws requiring that the Congress be kept and I'll quote here "fully and currently informed, especially about covert action operations." The president is proposing that explicit language, as stated, that takes the carefully worked-out limitations and oversight requirements and only applies them to the extent consistent with the constitutional authority of the president. Now given the very broad interpretation of the president's authority that we saw in these memos with respect to torture the torture memos that finally came to light this summer, in which the Justice Department lawyers argued, in effect, that the president didn't really have to comply with the torture laws what assurance does this committee have that language like that advocated by the president wouldn't be used to undermine the congressional oversight that the 9/11 commission says needs to be strengthened?
REP. GOSS: Senator, is that the amendment to 12333 you're speaking to? Is that where that language is?
SEN. WYDEN: I'm talking about the language that the president has proposed to give the administration exemptions from the laws with respect to informing the Congress.
REP. GOSS: Is that a law that is
SEN. WYDEN: It's the draft reform bill.
REP. GOSS: It's the draft reform bill.
SEN. WYDEN: Right.
REP. GOSS: Senator, that's going to be your decision on how that goes, how you want to handle that.
SEN. WYDEN: But I want to know if you're for that, because it seems to me this puts in a huge loophole and a loophole that goes in the exact opposite direction of what the 9/11 commission called for. They want Congress to do a better job of oversight. The president in his draft bill has now proposed going the other way and giving Congress fewer tools.
REP. GOSS: I believe very strongly, Senator, that there should be strong congressional oversight. I have actually had a hearing as at the point of my transition out of the committee. I did get instructive testimony from Governor Kean and from Congressman Hamilton on that subject. And it's actually very important, and I'm very glad you asked the question, because their comment went very much to the issue of the dysfunction of oversight as it is now, and the need to fix it. And they both went to some pains to say they were not picking on your committee, on this committee, or on HPSCI, on our committee, and they were not comments about us. They were comments about the system, basically the jurisdictional problem.
And I think that the thing I take away from that, in supporting the 9/11 recommendations for strong oversight, is that Congressman Hamilton made it very clear and I think his words to me were: Look, if you don't get the oversight piece done, if Congress this is when I was a congressman he said: If you don't get the oversight piece done, none of the rest of it's going to work either. And that's why I make the strong statement about a forward, willing, complementary relationship between the director of national intelligence and the oversight committees. I certainly believe that we need to have the safeguard for the American people of strong oversight, and I do not believe it should be nullified by any shortcuts that have not passed muster with the Congress.
SEN. WYDEN: Can you envision any situation that justifies withholding oversight information from this committee for an indefinite period of time?
REP. GOSS: I don't believe I can think of any right now. But I would point out that there needs to be work on the statutory requirement when you say "this committee" on the statutory requirement on the gang of eight, and which gang of eight we're talking about. It turns out there are more than one gang of eight, as I think you know, which has confounded us a number of times. But there is one in statute, and that would, therefore, preclude some types of information being shared under the notification process with all members of the committee. So I don't want to mislead you in any way on that.
SEN. WYDEN: Just so we're clear, because you mentioned Governor Kean, Governor Kean did not make any recommendation at all with respect to congressional oversight along the lines of what's in the president's draft bill, and that's why I'm so troubled by it. Let me, if I might, turn to the question of the Patriot Act with you. And as you know, it will be expiring in December 2005. Do you support the Patriot Act in its current form? And Senator Murkowski and I have introduced a bipartisan bill to make changes in this area, and I would like to know your position generally with respect to the Patriot Act. And then I have a couple of specific questions about it.
REP. GOSS: Senator, when I was a member of Congress and the Patriot Act was before us, I supported it, and I stated my reasons in the record for doing that. I think it has been useful. I think we have testimony in this report about the breaking down of the wall and in other areas. You asked me about future legislation or pending legislation. Obviously, I'm going to respectfully demure from that. The job I seek has no business making comment on legislation that you all might be considering, in my view, if it comes to policy. And I don't think I want to try to be wearing two hats at the same time, sir.
SEN. WYDEN: Mr. Chairman, could I ask one additional question on this point? It will be very brief.
SEN. ROBERTS: Certainly.
SEN. WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Do you know of instances, Congressman Goss, where the agency needed the library lending records provision? This has been very controversial, as you know; librarians up in arms about this across the country. Do you know instances where the agency needed that provision in its current form?
REP. GOSS: Senator, we are in open hearing, and I can tell you the answer is yes.
SEN. WYDEN: Are you open the chairman has been very gracious. Are you open to working with myself and Senator Murkowski as I say, we had a bipartisan bill on looking at changes to parts of the Patriot Act?
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir, of course. If confirmed, in the appropriate role of the DCI, not as a member of Congress.
SEN. WYDEN: Mr. Chairman, you have been very kind. I would like the nominee, either when we are in closed session or in another arrangement that you and Senator Rockefeller put together, to have him furnish to us the matter that he felt needed to be kept secret this morning with respect to the library lending records.
SEN. ROBERTS: I think we can do that without having a closed hearing. And I'll be more than happy to address the senator's request. Has the senator concluded?
SEN. WYDEN: My time was expired, and you've been very gracious.
SEN. ROBERTS: Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congressman Goss, you discussed your intelligence community reform proposal at our last meeting. I didn't visit that with you. But there's one particular provision that troubles me, and perhaps you can lift me from those troubles. Your June bill, as I understand it, would amend the current ban against the CIA exercising police subpoena law enforcement powers inside the United States by adding the language, quote, "except as otherwise permitted by law or as directed by the president." I don't have any problem obviously with the first part, but the second phrase, "or as directed by the president," has been of concern to me and to some others who believe it would give the president the power to issue secret findings during the CIA which would then direct the CIA to conduct covert operations inside the United States, something which you know is currently prohibited.
Did I get that wrong? Does your legislation place any limitations on what the president could do to direct the CIA to do intelligence or gathering inside the United States? That's traditionally an FBI thing. Under your proposal, what guidelines would the CIA have with respect to that matter? Lift that burden from me, if you can, sir.
REP. GOSS: Mr. Vice Chairman, you did not get it wrong. The reason, as I stated last week, that that provision is in that bill is because we need to address the issue of the Patriot Act and the whole question of the balance between protection and privacy in this country. This report and others a lot of the conversation is going on now and a lot of the proposals that are out there for consideration legislatively tend to blur, some more than others, the line between the national foreign and I emphasize foreign intelligence program, which is what the '47 act, as you very well know, sets up and it precludes domestic spying; Americans don't spy on Americans. It's sort of that area.
We are now for the first time blurring that line and talking about because the terrorist beds are thought to be here, nests of them and so forth ways to find those people without spying on Americans or guests in this country. And so we need to craft some clarity for what is replacing the blurred line. I put that provision in there in order to encourage that debate. I gave a number of options that might want to be considered. You have named them properly. I have never suggested that there should be any absence of oversight in that whatsoever. I'm not in any way suggesting a change in the oversight, so I'm not saying that the president could do something unilaterally. What I am saying is we need to understand at what levels we're going to allow
things to happen in the United States, who's going to be in charge, who's going to be accountable? And I think that's very important, not only from the point of view of the efficiency of getting the terrorists who are here and disrupting them before they can do dangerous things, but just plain for the whole question of the protection of our operatives in the field who are charged to do this work so they don't find themselves with some huge liability because they violated a civil liberties provision at the same time they've stopped a terrible thing from happening. I think that's the responsibility of the legislative branch of government to deal with, and that's why that issue is there. There's nothing sinister in it.
As I said last week, I totally believe the Central Intelligence Agency should not repeat, not have arrest power in the United States. That's I have argued that for years. It would ruin the ability of this country to have a CIA if it did have arrest powers, in my view. That's one of the things that distinguishes this democracy from any other in the world.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: And it's interesting, because that does somewhat help me, because the 9/11 commission does suggest an approach which I think will cause certain controversies, but with which I agree: that there needs to be a kind of transnational approach to a lot of things, including intelligence, on our part. And so what you're saying is that you just simply did that so you get that debate going.
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir. I truly hope that debate is enjoined.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: In October 2nd of 2003, the House Intelligence Committee received a highly classified briefing from David Kay. He was the special adviser of the DCI on Iraq weapons of mass destruction, as you know. And he updated your committee on the progress of the Iraq Survey Group's search for evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Following the briefing, you issued a press statement that stated, "From the information uncovered to date" that's to be noted "it is clear that the threat Saddam presented to the region and to the world was real, growing and grave. Further, the brief highlights the fact that the intelligence regarding Iraq's WMD was properly used and is being properly used today. There continues to be no indication that anyone was misled by the intelligence analysis."
That's the end of your quote.
The Senate Intelligence Committee received the same briefing from Dr. Kay as your committee did, and I'm puzzled about the basis for your public statements. And I come back then, therefore, to information uncovered to date by the Iraq Survey Group made it clear that Saddam Hussein represented a real, grave, growing threat to the United States and the rest of the world.
I do not recall Dr. Kay's briefing in that highlight. And I would be interested if you could give me your reading on that.
REP. GOSS: Senator, I think it's pretty simply that Dr. Kay said: We this is unfinished business. We don't know where we're going. We do know for sure that we need to keep looking. I believe Dr. Kay said the right decision was made to go to war. I believe that Dr. Kay said that Saddam was a very dangerous person. I believe Dr. Kay said we don't know what happened to the weapons. And I believe that our concern about the gravity of the problem is, we still don't
know what happened about the weapons. I think that's generally the context I made those remarks (sic).
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: But he didn't you're not suggesting that he at some point suggested that he was on the trail of something?
REP. GOSS: No, sir. He was doing an investigation. In fact, it got turned over to Mr. Duelfer, and as I understand, Mr. Duelfer is going to be making a report soon.
That, frankly, was one of the things we wished to include in our WMD report in on the HPSCI side, which I no longer can speak for, obviously. But we had hoped to have not only the work of the commission and your work but the work of Mr. Duelfer to add, to try and give a more accurate and up-to-date snapshot this fall of where we actually were on the review of the WMD matter.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Just one final question from me. And I asked you this at our last meeting, and that was about the HPSCI report which did not actually come forth. And we discussed what we called the collection, the analysis, the production, the dissemination of intelligence.
And then I think and I may be wrong, in which case you need to correct me that we also talked about the use of, or misuse of, whatever. And in the Senate rules about our committee, that is a part of what we study, and it goes across all of government. There's no part of government which is untouched by that. And for a particular set of reasons, we didn't do that. And as the chairman has indicated, we're going to go ahead and do that, and I hope we will, because I think it's kind of the ballgame. But you indicated that the House rules did not have that flexibility. We looked at them and couldn't find that. And therefore, I'm wondering as to whether or not you discussed that all, whether you ever planned to discuss that. We didn't because of a particular reason, but I'm not sure if that applies to you.
REP. GOSS: Sir, actually we did rewrite the rules of the House a couple of years ago, and what we tried to do was point out where the jurisdiction of the HPSCI was in the House. And it was basically anything to do with intelligence, with the intelligence community, the process of how it works those types of things, and it stopped very abruptly at that point. And we have other committees of jurisdiction who wanted to be clear where that line was, and I think that we came up with a rule in the House that worked pretty well. So I was pretty careful about observing that we not get into other people's business on that. And it didn't go entirely smoothly. There were a lot of people who came to our committee who felt that there were things they needed to know that we claimed was intelligence, part of the intelligence community product. But it's worked pretty well.
Now, within the committee itself, you are asking me did we have some conversation about this? The answer is yes, sir. I have got to be very candid and say I'm not entitled to talk about what goes on in a closed session. My other colleagues would rightfully be upset if I did. I can simply say what I said to you last week in the hearing, which I think is not violating any confidences of committee work, and that is as the chairman, I made the judgment that we were responsible for the product, not the use of the product. But I did clarify and say if I felt the product had been misunderstood or there were need for the people who delivered the product to have further conversation for the users of the product, that should happen. But we didn't go that way in our WMD. We went to the question of sufficiency because we knew you were going that way here. I made the point to the committee, and they seemed to agree with it at least some members did, because this is what we did that we would study the sufficiency; that when you ask the question of why didn't we know this, and you got the answer is there weren't enough collectors, and then you ask the next question, well, why weren't there enough collectors; well, because there wasn't enough money; why wasn't there enough money? When you start asking those "why" questions and peeling back this onion, you come to some bedrock sufficiency questions, and those are the questions which I hope the HPSCI report on WMD will take up. Again, I can no longer speak for them, but that would be my hope as the former chairman.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: If the chairman will indulge me just to read this particular part of what governs HPSCI.
The collection, analysis, production, dissemination or use of information that relates to a foreign or government, et cetera, et cetera. So it doesn't appear, again, to be precluded. It was just that you were going to wait upon what we did.
REP. GOSS: Senator, primarily I interpreted the HPSCI role to be a capabilities committee. It's a permanent select committee in the House, as you know. It is a capabilities committee. It is not a policy committee, and International Relations does that over there.
I tried to stay out of there. Now obviously we bridge to other committees to expedite our jurisdictional problems. I would agree that there's no prohibition against it in that language, but I can tell you from the practice and from my own design, I don't believe that once we build the car and deliver it, we should be telling the operator exactly where and how to drive it, for a very simple reason. I think it's a little scary if the person in charge of intelligence is trying to inform policy by telling the policymakers how to use the product.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: This the question is not you as CIA director, let's say; this is an oversight function.
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir. As an oversight function.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: The use of intelligence would seem to me to be highly relevant with respect to the buildup to this Iraq war.
REP. GOSS: I would interpret that to mean having the ability to provide intelligence for use for our policymakers.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. GOSS: I believe the insufficiency of intelligence has been a big problem, as you've heard me say a number of times. Thank you, Senator.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: My time is up.
SEN. ROBERTS: Senator Hatch.
SEN. HATCH: I'll reserve the balance of my time. Hopefully this is the last round.
SEN. ROBERTS: I think you have eight minutes from the previous round and now 10 minutes, so you'd have 18 minutes that has been reserved.
SEN. HATCH: I'll reserve it.
SEN. ROBERTS: (Chuckles.)
Senator Levin.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congressman Goss, I sent you some documents over the weekend, relative to the operations of the office of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, and I don't know whether you've had an opportunity to read those documents or not. Did you receive them, and did you have the opportunity to read them?
REP. GOSS: Senator, thank you. I did receive the documents over the weekend, with one exception. And I did review them. Some I read very closely extremely closely, in fact.
One I did not receive. And it was just because it's a classified document, and I got it over the weekend. I have no storage facilities.
SEN. LEVIN: Right.
REP. GOSS: And it was the letter, sir, that was referred to on that footnote.
SEN. LEVIN: Right.
REP. GOSS: And perhaps we can talk around that.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. Relative to that letter by the way, it's a(n) extremely disturbing letter because of the factual inaccuracies and the factual misrepresentations which were made to this committee by Doug Secretary Feith. But since you haven't had an opportunity to read it, I'd just simply urge you to read that. And we will lay out for you in the next 24 hours those misrepresentations for you to comment on for the record, if you would.
REP. GOSS: Senator, of course. The letter is a letter from CIA to Defense, was it?
SEN. LEVIN: Yeah. And the misrepresentations were what Mr. Feith represented to the Senate as to what was in that letter until we saw it for the first time when it was referred to in that footnote that is in the 9/11 report. So what we will provide to you on a classified basis will be what he represented was in that letter to what he represented to the Senate was in that letter, comparing it to what was in that letter, and to ask for your comments for the record on that.
REP. GOSS: Senator, you will have those, of course. And I promise you I will tend to that as quickly as I can get to a place I can read a classified memo letter. SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. We appreciate that.
And then the relative to the materials you did receive, was there anything in there that troubled you, in both the operations of the Feith policy office
REP. GOSS: Obviously there is a lot of material, and it looks to me like your committee did an extraordinary job of going over the material. And I am very well aware there were dissenting opinions to the unanimous committee conclusions on the issues. There were some things that would say I would, if I am confirmed in this position, want to be very much on guard about, and that would be the kinds of concerns about policy sliding into the production of intelligence. I think you do have to make sure that the watchdogs are watching on that. On the other hand, I don't want to discourage dissent. I do want to have dissent, and I think that's extremely important.
And one other area that came to my mind is that I hope that we will have some guidance frankly, I speak as an American citizen I hope the American the nation will have guidance from the Hill on how we are going to deal with the relationship between the secretary of Defense and the national intelligence director, or whatever the position is, because it strikes me that the informal program that we've had over the years, it's worked fairly well perhaps does not provide quite the scope in what I will call informal meetings to get to some of the issues that are discussed in the packet you provide me. And I do believe that that's not just a throwaway comment.
Senator Wyden asked me if I've done anything. One of the things that we did do a couple of years ago, which I'm very pleased, is we raised the level of attention to some issues that needed to be adjudicated between the secretary of Defense and the now the DCI, but whatever position it will be. That is an area that has troubled me for some time.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.
To be more specific about some of the matters in those documents, the Senate Intelligence Committee report that you referred to describes a DOD e-mail that recounts that Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz wanted the department to quote, prepare an intel briefing on Iraq and links to al Qaeda for the SecDef and that he was not to tell anyone about it, close quote. The same e-mail referred the writer in that e-mail, who was quoting Wolfowitz referred to the quote, Iraq intelligence cell inside the office of the undersecretary of Defense for Policy, which is Doug Feith's office.
Now that intel briefing was given to the secretary of Defense and then to the DCI. A modified version was given directly to the staffs of the Office of the Vice President and the National Security Council, with material that the DCI had never seen, including a chart that was highly critical of the intelligence community for the fundamental problems with its analysis of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship. It promoted a view of a very close relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, and cooperation, in a slide that talked about "known" contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda, in quotes, including a meeting between Atta and the Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague. That was called a "known" meeting, although it was very different from the CIA view. Now that varied significantly with the intelligence community's assessment, but was presented to the White House, Office of the Vice President and to the national security folks.
Now my first question to you is whether or not one final point before my question, which is that the DCI Tenet told us at an open hearing, response to my question, that he was not aware of the briefing to the Office of the Vice President or the NSC staffs till just a few weeks before, when I brought it to his attention, and that he had never had a chance to review the content before it was provided. Do you believe it's appropriate for such rogue intelligence to be hot-wired directly to the White House without the knowledge of the DCI and without the opportunity for review by the intelligence community?
I am not asking you whether dissenting views are appropriate. We obviously want dissenting views. That's not the issue. We want alternative views. The question is, when there is a formal briefing that is made and an intelligence briefing, an assessment, an analysis, of the kind that you are now familiar with, and that was in this report when that is being presented to the Office of the Vice President and to the National Security Council, do you think it is appropriate that the DCI not even be informed of that so he could have an opportunity to comment on it?
REP. GOSS: If appropriateness is your question, Senator, I think it's appropriate that the DCI should always be informed about anything that is coming from the intelligence community as intelligence, that purports to be intelligence product.
There is a problem here, and it's one that I hope the reorganization is going to address rather directly. That is, we've got 15 agencies. Some of them have Cabinet levels, secretaries, that have different discourses with the White House or the National Security Council on different levels.
It is very hard to suggest that everything that everybody has when they go to a meeting is or is not from the intelligence community. And so I don't want to try and sit here and tell you that here's a hard and fast line somewhere. I certainly believe that any administration has the right to go to its secretaries, the right to go to its agencies in the executive branch and deal with it as it should.
But is it appropriate, if we are going to have a coordinated intelligence network, to keep the top man on the intelligence community involved if it's something that purports to be intelligence? The answer, sir, is yes.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. Well, that's what George Tenet, when he found out about it, said was unusual.
REP. GOSS: I did read the packet, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: Do you agree with him?
REP. GOSS: I agree with him that it's a fair point
SEN. LEVIN: that that was an unusual thing and he was going to talk to the folks about
REP. GOSS: Sir, I don't know if it was an unusual point, because I've never been a DCI.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. All right.
Now there's another aspect to this as well, and that is that The Weekly Standard published excerpts from a(n) alleged classified document that was prepared by Undersecretary Feith. And the article in The Weekly Standard alleged an operational relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. In the words of the author, "The picture that emerges is one of a history of collaboration between two of America's most determined enemies." And the article flat-out says that Osama and Hussein had an operational relationship. Now Tenet said at that hearing I referred to that the CIA did not clear that document and did not agree with the way the data was characterized in that document that was apparently leaked to The Weekly Standard. Nonetheless, the vice president referred to The Weekly Standard article, saying that it was based on a Defense Department study that was sent to the Senate Intelligence Committee and called it, quote, "the best source of information," close quote, on that issue, being the relationship between al Qaeda and Saddam.
Do you believe it is appropriate for a senior administration official to refer to a leaked classified document publicly as the, quote, "best source of information" on the subject?
REP. GOSS: Senator, I have absolutely no way of knowing what was behind that comment, and I therefore can't shed any light on it.
SEN. LEVIN: You don't know what was behind it, so that that if there's a highly classified document that is referred to in public, and it is validated by being called the best source, you're not troubled by that?
REP. GOSS: If there is a classified document that is released in public, I am troubled by it.
SEN. LEVIN: I think my time is up. Thank you.
SEN. ROBERTS: Senator Wyden.
SEN. WYDEN: Mr. Chairman, I have only one other question. Let me also say to you, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the time that you've given. I think this is probably going on my fifth round, and I appreciate it.
Congressman Goss, the last question I had for you is, in your judgment, what went wrong on the matter of the Iraqi nuclear threat?
As you know, we documented at some length in our committee the matter of the aluminum tubes. The president of the United States in his address talked about a mushroom cloud. I would be interested in your judgment on what went wrong with respect to how the matter of the Iraqi nuclear threat was handled.
REP. GOSS: There are several threats, Senator. I think that the first one is the atmosphere that the subject of the nuclear threat was brought up. I believe that the lesson we learned early in the '90s, when we got into Iraq, discovered that they were much closer to the capability for nuclear weapons than anybody had estimated, that they were perhaps within two years if I'm not mistaken; I want to be careful about what's classified and what's not here I think that the pendulum swing from, "Oh my gosh, we didn't get that one right and that was dangerous," led us to look at the worst-case scenario, properly, as we did with the other WMD, the chem/bio that we were convinced that if our troops went in there they'd have to have special protective equipment which they did, which of course was extremely unpleasant in the circumstances there. So I think there was abundance of caution. Now, there are some other problems as well that are very clear. I think that there was the problem of conventional wisdom; that when we started getting some of the people who were involved in the nuclear program you've asked me to talk their credibility, unless they picked up on where we thought the threat had gone, where the analysts has thought the threat had likely gone, given Saddam's continued intent and desires and public statements about rewarding his nuclear people, and so forth, that were out there, I believe that there was some dismissal of the statements that were out of line with what we expected to hear in the analysts' terms. And I think that's a mistake, and I think it's been well pointed out, the problems of conventional wisdom, in the work that's been done by your committee and others.
I think that there was some intentional denial and deception by Saddam. I think that the public statements and the accolades and I don't remember whether he gave ribbons or medals or just words of encouragement but it did hit the international media, to the wonderful work being done. So I think he was trying to at least convince us that he had the nukes. And we had been convinced before we had been slow before to get our guard up.
Then there were specific bits of information, which I will not speak of publicly, but I can tell you I think you're this committee is fully aware of them, as was ours there were things that were dug up, as it were; there were materials that indicated very clearly that as soon as the watchdogs get out of here, we're ready to go back to work in the nuclear area. I think that given the threat and given the war on terrorism and the statements by the fundamentalist leaders that they wanted to get weapons of mass destruction and deliver them to this country, seemed to me to be the kind of thing that we should be focusing attention on, and I think we did, and I think it was an area that we should have pursued.
SEN. WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. ROBERTS: Senator Rockefeller.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will have just one more question.
The predicate again, Congressman Goss, of all of this is not about you as a person; it's not about you as a somebody who knows the business. We haven't gotten into the business of management of a large agency, which you haven't done, but I don't choose to do that. It is about the question of independence. And I think there's sort of two approaches to take to that: one, which has been mentioned here this morning, is that it's we're being political; and the other is that it might be that we're being that we're genuinely concerned, because we're the only ones who can, in a sense, on behalf of the Senate other than the final vote is to vet you. And the questions, virtually all, have been in the same line the independence of you. There has been, as far as I know, one other at the very beginning, as you know, I said that we talked about it in my office that nobody who's been in politics, and particularly recently, should do this. And looking back, I think that the president's father, obviously, for I don't think quite a year, but he was head of the CIA. One could argue about Bill Casey because he wasn't in the Congress but he had worked with the RNC and that kind of thing. But for the most part, people have not come from that arena. And I think that's a fairly genuine basis from which to ask the kinds of questions that we're asking.
And so let me just ask one final thing. During the kind of hearings which we had some of and need to have more of, about pressure on analysts in the Central Intelligence Agency, we had it was quite interesting. There was Richard Kerr, who had been a former deputy director, and he had some things to say.
Then there was for me, more interestingly, the CIA ombudsman, who indicated that the pressure on the analyst to come up with certain kinds of products this is outside; this is across the great divide you know, we don't want to go one way from analysis to policy; well, then we don't want to go the other way from policy to analysis. And that's a fair trade. And he said that in his 32 years in his position he had never seen so much hammering on the part of the administration on analysts. That's a severe statement. I don't happen to know him, so I can't judge whether he would make a statement which was off-base, but I don't think he would have that position. George Tenet himself indicated there were people that came to him with these concerns.
So the question I guess I would like to ask you is, what would you do as CIA director? How would you go about the business, to whatever extent you could, of protecting your analysts from pressure, from whatever kind of administration on whatever kind of subject, in the business of intelligence, which is more delicate, more sacred, more because it's so secret, it's also so much more volatile.
REP. GOSS: The by analysts, Senator, I'm going to take your question to mean across the community
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Yes.
REP. GOSS: because we're talking generically, I believe. It's not just the agency you're talking about.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Yeah, the agency is what I'm talking about, but all admitted, you could be here, you could be there.
REP. GOSS: Okay, well, I'll answer for both, if I can, then, Senator. What I would try and do is in fact, what I would do, if confirmed, is to set up a very clear direct line between the analysts management and the top office, which would presumably be whatever the top office running CIA for them, or the top office of any of the other agencies that have analytical capability, with a follow-on line to the overall director of national intelligence or whatever we're going to call that person. So there are two stops at least, other than the normal management. And anybody who feels pressed as an analyst, whether it's the pressure of the time, it's the pressure of the questions, it's the complexity of the problem, it's the pressure of not having enough information, whatever it is, those pressures need to be understood in the product itself and undue outside influence has got to be kept out of it, there's no question about it. I believe we have a system like that that can be used enforced. I read very carefully what Senator Levin sent over. I read the deliberations of this committee, which were pretty exhaustive on the subject, and I read the dissenting views, which raised the concern which you have echoed. I agree it is an area for watchdog; it is an area where you have to have clear access to the top.
And let me tell you how personally I feel about that, if I may, very briefly. That is, I, if I am confirmed, do not want to be the person standing in front of the president of the United States, or anybody even close to that rank, with information that I do not have full confidence in. And I am not going to have full confidence in information that has been contaminated by policymaking. So I think I have a double reason to do it; one, because of the community; and others because I don't want to be put in a position of not delivering the product I say I've got.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: And I understand that statement. I think it's a very good one.
REP. GOSS: Thank you.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: My question was, how would set about to try to I mean, obviously, what has worked up to this point has not quite, at least in recent years, worked sufficiently.
REP. GOSS: Sir, I can't isolate the analysts. There has to be some kind of co-location, there has to be some type of interface with as we pointed out, with the collectors. So you run the risk at any point that you start getting product that's as pure as you can get it, but getting it as good as you can get it, of drawing that line. And all I can suggest is that you put on the door the sign that says, "If you think you're being pressured or somebody's interfering with your product unduly, you are invited to call your friendly director." And I don't mean that flippantly, I think it's that kind of a level.
It's a little bit like our whistleblower law or our you know, our 1-800-number we use. If you've got a problem with this, call your intelligence committee. That's our job to oversee this; if there's an abuse, we want to know it. I've made that work fairly successfully as the chairman of HPSCI, actually. I believe I can make it work
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Congressman Goss.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. GOSS: Thank you very much, Vice Chairman.
SEN. ROBERTS: During our two days of open hearings, all members have had an ample opportunity to ask questions. The nominee has been, I think, every forthcoming and very generous with his time, as have members. We are about at the eighth hour three hours by the current three members, plus private meetings. We have created a thorough record here, it seems to me. We have expressed our concerns to Mr. Goss and he has given us important commitments. The intelligence community needs leadership and the need is now.
It seems to me it's time to move the nomination. In that regard, we have noticed a business meeting for tomorrow for this purpose. I look forward to a good turnout. Will the nominee make himself available today, if any member would like a private meeting?
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir, of course.
SEN. ROBERTS: Mr. Goss, to refer back briefly to a question from Senator Wyden, I ask you now, would you support any effort on the part of anybody in the executive, or for that matter and I can't imagine this in the intelligence community of weakening the congressional oversight of the intelligence community or activity?
REP. GOSS: No, sir.
SEN. ROBERTS: I have a note here that Senator Levin wants to ask an additional question. I will recognize him for that purpose.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Goss, as reported by the Senate Intelligence Committee report, the intelligence community report or assessment relative to the question of whether or not Saddam Hussein had trained al Qaeda operatives in chemical and biological warfare, said, in the classified form, that the sources relative to that were of varying reliability and sometimes contradictory. The national security adviser said that, quote, "We know that there was training of al Qaeda in chemical and perhaps biological warfare."
Would you agree that that statement that, "We know that there was training of al Qaeda in chemical and perhaps biological warfare," goes beyond the intelligence, which said that reports thereof come from sources of varying reliability and are sometimes contradictory? Would you just agree that that statement of the national security adviser did not reflect the underlying intelligence?
REP. GOSS: Sir, if that were the totality of the issue or the picture, I would feel obliged, I think, if I were confirmed as DCI, to ask the national security adviser what exactly was the basis for the statement.
SEN. LEVIN: If that were the totality?
REP. GOSS: If that were. I'm not sure that is the totality, because even I will tell you totally honestly, I'm not sure right now what's what with the training, but I honestly believe there was training. Again, this is getting into classified stuff. And I'm happy to talk to you privately about why I believe that.
So
SEN. LEVIN: I understand that. But my question is whether or not if that were the totality, that the underlying intelligence said if I'm giving you this question
REP. GOSS: Yes, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: says that the report of training was based on sources of varying reliability which were sometimes contradictory, if that's the underlying intelligence, and if the statement made by the policymaker is, "We know that there was training," would that be a fair characterization of the underlying intelligence, if that's the totality?
REP. GOSS: I would say that the source description of that situation that you've outlined, the totality is we're not sure of our sources, would not qualify me to say, as the DCI, "we know." I would qualify it and caveat it.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. Now, in your judgment, when the national security adviser said on September 8th, 2002, that, quote, "We do know that there have been shipments going into Iraq of aluminum tubes that are really only suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs" and that is an exact quote did that accurately reflect the underlying intelligence?
REP. GOSS: Senator, I have no idea what intelligence the national security adviser had received.
SEN. LEVIN: You know what the estimates were. I'm asking you, from what you know of the intelligence relative to that issue, did that statement, in your judgment, reflect the underlying intelligence accurately? That's all I'm asking you.
REP. GOSS: On September 8th in 2002 I don't honestly remember my I do know that my assessment of the question of the suitability of those tubes for anything other than a devilish nuclear purpose has changed as information has changed. I can't tell you the exact timeline. And I do know there were dissenting opinions. What I can't tell you is when I knew there were dissenting opinions.
SEN. LEVIN: You can
REP. GOSS: So I'm trying to answer your question faithfully and say I just don't know when that cognizance came to me. But if I knew that there were other possibilities for dual use equipment, I would say so, yes. I would certainly say so.
SEN. LEVIN: And that if at the time the intelligence indicated that there were other uses that were possible, that then to state that we know that they are really only suited for nuclear purposes would be an exaggeration, in your judgment?
REP. GOSS: Senator, in a hypothetical sense, that would be an exaggeration if that were the totality. But in a specific case in the past, I simply do not know what people knew or what other information they had.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. You've indicated, Congressman Goss, that national security is one area where bipartisanship is essential. And I think you include in that intelligence estimates, and I couldn't agree with you more. We just unveiled the portrait of Arthur Vandenberg, from my home state of Michigan, who surely led the way in that regard.
We've seen over the decades too much too many instances where intelligence has been manipulated or politicized. Secretary of Defense McNamara used classified communication intercepts to push for passage of a Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which was then used by President Johnson as the legislative foundation to expand the war in Vietnam. Bill Casey, a CIA director and here George Shultz's book just lays out what really amounts to an indictment, but in any event a case that during the Iran-contra period the CIA director and here I'm quoting from the Iran-contra report, in this case, not from Secretary Shultz's book, but from the Iran-contra report, bipartisan report said that Director Casey, quote, "misrepresented or selectively used available intelligence to support the policy that he was promoting," close quote.
We saw much too much shaping and exaggeration of intelligence prior to the Iraq war, and we've got to do everything we can, in my judgment, to try to prevent that from happening. There's been too much of it in the past. It's not limited to Republican or Democratic administrations. And I'm just wondering if you'd comment on that.
REP. GOSS: Sir, I agree with you on that, that and I'm guilty, too, as I have said, of slipping into some partisan comment in areas of national security, and I'm sorry that I have. And it's usually because I have been had to respond to a question which or a situation which I considered provocative, in order to defend what I think needed to be defended on behalf of national security. My judgment's not perfect. I've been wrong, and certainly I regret sometimes being sucked into those things. I do understand the need to get out of the debate. And I do understand the need, if I'm confirmed, to get into the management business. And I do understand the need to make sure that there's not only no partisanship but that we keep the politics out of it.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much, Congressman.
SEN. ROBERTS: Are there are any other questions by the members? Not wanting to beat a dead horse, or split the shingle I'm not referring to you, sir
REP. GOSS: Thank you, sir. (Laughs.)
SEN. ROBERTS: We did numerous statements by members of this committee or the House committee, or any other member of Congress, just as declarative, just as aggressive, in regards to those concerns that have been raised here today by members of Congress, without the benefit of the WMD report that was done by this committee. Did that represent an exaggeration of the use of intelligence?
REP. GOSS: Sir, I think that the WMD report done by this committee, the conclusions you've received, were the right conclusions. I would have supported those conclusions had I been on this committee.
SEN. ROBERTS: Well, I think the conclusions represented a shotgun no, a flashlight of truth, if you will, that spread a broad light not only on those in the executive but those in the legislative. And I can cite you statements made by myself and others on this committee, on the House committee, and by many members of Congress, that were very declarative, very assertive, very aggressive, and all pertaining to the concerns that have been raised here, and that we were wrong.
Now, I didn't exaggerate it. I stated what I thought to be true. But the intelligence that was provided was not accurate. And so consequently, when we get to the use of intelligence, as to whether it's exaggerated or not, or whether I felt pressured or whatever and I'm not going to get into all that again I think that's a consideration. I'm not sure that you, as the CIA director or the national intelligence director, would feel comfortable, however, if somebody made the statement on the floor of the House or Senate, or in public or on television that you would immediately feel an obligation to come to them and say, "Senator Roberts, I think you're wrong." You may feel that way, but you wouldn't have any time to do anything if you were trying to correct the members of Congress when perhaps they exaggerated anything.
With that, this hearing is concluded. I thank all members for their participation, and I thank the witness for his patience and perseverance.
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