The following report bears upon the subject of currently proposed U.S. missile-defense policy. It is a report which has been in preparation in my thoughts, since the Summer of 1999. As the new Russian Presidential election loomed for March, the importance of issuing this report increased. Against that background, the decision to sit down, finally, to write out those thoughts, and present that material in the form presented here, was prompted by today's reading of a featured, April 2nd Washington Post book-review, on this subject, by Thomas Powers.
The quality of desperation expressed by that Post author's psilological fallacy of composition, should be considered in the context of both the presently ongoing, terminal phase of the presently onrushing world financial crisis, and in the context of the lunatic proposals on missile defense currently circulating in the U.S. Congress. Otherwise, the item on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), published by that newspaper, was so typical of the pompously Lilliputian, self-styled critics of President Reagan, in that newspaper and elsewhere, over the course of nearly two decades since SDI was announced, that I found that newspaper's review a suitably ironical occasion for presenting what needs to be said on that subject, and that urgently, now.
It is sufficient to remark, as an aside, that Powers' rant, under the Post's infantile choice of title, "Captain America," is represented as a review of a Simon & Schuster book by author Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War. It should also be noted, that my statement here, does not reflect a reading of that book itself, but only the issues implicitly posed by reviewer Powers' own fantasy-strewn commentary on the subject of strategic missile defense as such.
The focus of my present report on that matter, is the way in which Soviet General Secretary Andropov's Hamlet-like, 1983, and also Secretary Gorbachev's foolish, 1985-1986, knee-jerk reaction, both against the original proposal for a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and also against me personally, doomed the Soviet Union to the choice of either war, or, in the alternative, that disintegration of the combined Soviet and Warsaw Pact systems, which, in fact, erupted during 1989.
Since those developments, the history of the past decade is dominated, in effect, by the way in which the combined actions of three of the most shallow leading fools of recent decades, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, France's President François Mitterrand, and President George Bush, responded to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact system. They, motivated chiefly by their larcenous cupidity against a unified Germany, and for the opportunity to loot both eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, bungled one of the Twentieth Century's greatest opportunities for durable peace and global economic security, a bungle leading into the increasingly turbulent, and soon catastrophic global financial situation of the present moment. It is to be stressed, in attempting to assess the issues of strategic defense today, that the rabid delusion, called the "New Economy," will soon evaporate, and that, therefore, all leading global issues today, must be assessed in terms of a post-"information society" world situation.
The issues which must be considered and understood, in this connection, go to those deeper aspects of the current strategic issues which have been overlooked by the new generation which succeeded Thatcher, Mitterrand, and Bush, the generation which emerged to leading positions of influence during the 1990s, that presently in leading positions in universities and government. Apart from the actual, or virtually political-economic illiteracy permeating today's mass media, even most among the present generations' university classrooms, the loss of competence in Classical, so-called "traditionalist" strategic thinking, now pervades the U.S. establishment, in the universities, as in government. That pervasive economic and cultural illiteracy, top down, has become the single most deadly threat to global civilization as a whole.
The issues underlying, and expressed by the launching and prompt abortion of the SDI, are pivotal, still today, for understanding the most crucial issues of the recent thirty-five years of global history. Therefore, because of the pervasive loss of competence, on that and related accounts, among today's leading circles, a competent treatment of SDI and related matters, before such audiences, would not be possible without also identifying those relevant issues of which most present-day, leading policy-makers are generally oblivious. Some such issues I must include here. To minimize the range of such topics which I must reference in this report, I refer the reader to what I have presented in significant depth in my recent report on the subject of needed new accounting method, I simply refer the reader to that publication. The importance of this present report, is not only that my viewpoint, and competence on the subject of the strategic issues implicit in strategic missile defense, are not only unique among today's published circles, but point toward the essential incompetence of most among today's leading in-governmental circles on all of the crucial issues which will determine the fate of humanity during the months and years immediately ahead. Thus, my present report, on the subject of the SDI-related tragedy of Secretary Andropov, is as follows.
April 2, 2000
To cut through that fog of so-called "popular opinion." which presently obscures almost any among the presently leading strategic policy-making issues of the U.S.A., is it essential to begin by adopting the Classical, Renaissance viewpoint, as typified by François Rabelais, who wrote aptly about similar patterns of behavior, about four and a half centuries ago. Thus, for example, reflection upon the image of Rabelais' account of the common doom of "Ding-Dong" and "The Sheep of Panurge," is virtually indispensable for a more adequate understanding of the foolishness shown today by typical supporters of Presidential pre-candidates such as Governor Bush and Vice-President Gore. Similarly, to get to the essential point of current Republican Party trends in shaping of official U.S. missile defense policy, it must be said, that a man who keeps his nose tucked into an inappropriate place in someone else's anatomy, suffers considerable difficulty in seeing the larger picture of the world around them both.
Without a well-developed, Rabelaisian sense of earthy irony about such matters, one could not see such issues clearly, in the lifetimes of Rabelais or Miguel Cervantes, or now. The latter instinct for irony, is also indispensable for the reading of almost any edition of Katharine Graham's Washington Post, notably including the leading book review contributed by collateral spook Thomas Powers for the Post's April 2 edition.
President Ronald Reagan's March 23, 1983 address, including an announcement of his proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), stated a very clear policy-outline, uttered to a world-wide television audience, within a well-crafted segment of approximately five minutes duration, during the closing portion of that broadcast. To be blunt, Powers' account of the history of SDI, makes no reference to the crucial features of that policy-statement, as actually uttered by President Reagan in his television broadcast of that date. In short, Powers' review is just as fraudulent a piece of fallacy of composition, as he portrays Frances FitzGerald's book to be.
Since President Reagan is not presently permitted to defend his own actual policy-statement of March 1983, hacks such as Powers and many others sense themselves at liberty to redefine the original policy-statement as fraudulently and as indecently as publishers such as the Post might wish them to do. The affixing of the title, "Captain America," to the Post's review, a purely spiteful gesture of hatefulness against the former President no longer situated to defend himself, is typical of the mephistophelean malice permeating what passes for the mortalists' souls of pompous Katharine Graham and her myrmidons.
In short, if one starts with a fraudulent representation of that March 23, 1983 statement by the President, as the Post does, any passing scalawag, such as its reviewer, might think himself at liberty to misinterpret that broadcast statement, as actually broadcast (whose crucial features he does not reference), in whatever way he might wish to do. Then, as Powers accuses his subject, Frances FitzGerald, of doing, he himself sets out to appear to explain a policy which is directly contrary, on crucial points, to the policy-statement which the President actually made to the television audiences of the nation and world on that momentous occasion.
When the President's actually spoken statement to the world, is heard, not only does Powers' hoax become most obvious; but, those remarks show us today, that the true story to be told, is a Classical tragedy: a tragedy not of President Ronald Reagan, but of Soviet General Secretary (November 1982-February 1984) Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov. Andropov is the case of what a living Shakespeare would have recognized as a modern Hamlet, a tragic figure whose folly brought about the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This is a type of folly hopefully not to be renewed, in the admittedly different, but related set of strategic circumstances of today.
The President proposed opening a new strategic flank for scientific cooperation between the powers, but the Soviet General Secretary, tragically, turned it down flat. The President made an explicit offer to share development of such technologies with the Soviet Union, but Andropov foolishly, recklessly turned that down. From that strategic blunder, like Hamlet of the celebrated Third Act soliloquy, neither Andropov's nor Gorbachev's Soviet Union was ever to recover.
General Secretary Andropov's knee-jerk reaction, showed that, at least, he had clearly and simply failed to do his homework; in fitting dramatic irony, in this instance, he failed as a foreign-intelligence professional! In real-life history, where one fatal error breeds others to match, compounded ironies such as that one, tend to appear in bunches.
Contrary to the usual gossip, then and now, the SDI was not a military system per se; it was a strategic policy for outflanking, and thus changing the dimensionality of the global strategic, political, and economic equations, and that in a fundamental way. It was the President's offer of that to Andropov, and Andropov's refusal, which is the subject of SDI. Any different representation, such as that of the Post's Powers, is simply a fraudulent concoction.
If Andropov did play, thus, the part of a Classical tragic figure of modern times, the U.S.A.'s present-day toleration for the follies of those Bush-league members of the Congress, and others, who are pushing their silly versions of "missile defense" now, is playing a part more tragic, even vastly more foolish, and disgusting, than Andropov did in his rejection of President Reagan's offer of peaceful cooperation. That continuing tragedy on Andropov's side then, and on the side of the Caspar Weinbergers and Zbigniew Brzezinskis now, is the true-life story, concerning SDI, which must, at last, be told in the setting of the global crisis and related, new, Bush-league U.S. strategic follies of today. The understanding of the Andropov case, as a true Classical form of tragedy, ought to be a crucial, included feature of the definitions of both immediate and long-range U.S. strategic, war-avoidance doctrine today.
It is my duty, under presently impending circumstances, both because I am, under present conditions of global financial crisis, the only competent choice for election as the next U.S. President, and because of my central place in the SDI affair as a whole, to tell that story of the Andropov tragedy, and write the policy corresponding to that lesson, for the sake of our nation's, and the world's hope for a peaceful and prosperous future.
On the other side of the Andropov-Reagan conflict, it is to be conceded, to get that side of the issue out of the way, that Ronald Reagan was a somewhat complicated personality, but, all said and done, was one of only two interesting Presidents elected since the departure of Lyndon Johnson. The other is the incumbent, William Jefferson Clinton.
First of all, on that account, President Reagan is of my generation, the generation of World War II veterans, a man whose crucial formative years in adolescence and early adulthood, were rooted, like my own, in the upward-looking, hopeful time of the Franklin Roosevelt Presidency. He represented that Franklin Roosevelt generation, in contrast to the President's and my own junior, as the Caligula-like, whimpering thug, George Bush, never could or would. That is the Bush whom Reagan defeated, in the 1980 campaign for the Republican Presidential nomination. That aspect of Ronald Reagan's role is real, perhaps his best side, the side shown, in retrospect, most indelibly in his promulgation and continued advocacy of that SDI policy which the Bush circles always opposed, then as now.
Andropov obviously had either not done, or had flunked his foreign-intelligence homework on the subject of that aspect of U.S. history. Otherwise, the Soviet General Secretary could not have missed, so tragically, the crucial point about the role of the so-called "Reagan Democrats" in the President's earlier primary defeat of his and my own rival pre-candidate, George Bush, and Reagan's victory, in the general election, against the miserably failed, and then widely despised, Trilateral asset, President Jimmy Carter. Part of the fruit of Andropov's folly, which he did not live to see, was that Andropov's turning down the President's offer, enabled the machinery behind virtual co-President, former Trilateral Commission figure, Vice-President George Bush, to take control of the Presidency, step by step, year by year, out from under President Reagan, as became clear during the course of the second Reagan Administration.
For reasons which I have just stated, and others, President Reagan demonstrated, that he had come to really believe in superseding arms-control, by the new form of scientific and technological cooperation expressed by SDI. In that reflection upon the experiences of the Franklin Roosevelt experience, the President was correct, and all among the opponents of that policy, including the circles of Vice-President George Bush, were wrong, some terribly wrong, some, like Andropov, tragically wrong. But for his own personal blunder in intelligence assessments, the Soviet General Secretary should, and probably would have dealt with Reagan's offer in good faith. I was situated in an excellent position to know that then, as now, and there were those among Andropov's key advisors who understood the point, but stopped short of pressing that point, at the point of absolutely ruining their continued influence, and careers at that time.
It was, thus, Andropov's folly which was crucial for the deterioration of the United States from late 1983 onward, a turn symptomized by the shifting of Judge Clark out of the National Security Council, in favor of the faction of "Iran-Contra's" Vice-President Bush and James Baker III, during late 1983. Thus, Andropov's tilting U.S. politics in the direction favorable to Bush's cause, led to the destruction of his own nation, and the present state of moral, political, and economic ruin of my own.
I was, from the beginning, in the center of the launching of what became SDI. From that vantage-point, I can state all the essential, relevant features of the case, even without risking betrayal of what might be still legitimately secrets of our government. I have said what is essential to that effect in earlier published reports on SDI, including some dating from February 1982, more than a year before the President's initial announcement. My purpose here, is to emphasize the tragic role of Andropov, insofar as that points to crucial issues for U.S. strategic doctrine for today, and for the U.S.A. and the world in general, during the months and years immediately ahead.
Those preliminary observations situate the tragedy itself.
Andropov's response spoke for itself: It said, in effect, that whatever he might have imagined the effect of his action might be, his point of view was, in effect, not to save the Soviet Union, not to gain a proffered result of great value for the overburdened Soviet society, but to defeat the U.S.A. within the framework of, even at the price of either launching or risking general warfare, or, in the alternative, which actually ensued, the later collapse of the already tottering, immanently self-doomed Soviet economy from within.
That point is crucial, therefore I restate it now. Andropov's expressed conception of strategy itself, was fatally flawed; his conduct in the SDI affair showed clearly, that his experience as a diplomat and foreign-intelligence operative, had failed to qualify him for dealing with the most crucial kinds of strategic decisions then confronting him. I am not prepared to explain exactly why he might have failed in that way, although I do know some contributing factors in his situation, including the return to the old Menshevik anti-voluntarist dogma, which had become visibly a commonplace, of public and related sources, among Soviet leading circles by the late 1960s and 1970s. All mere speculations aside, what is clear to me, and should become clear to all U.S. policy-planners today, is his failure as such. Otherwise, why he lacked the ability to do better, is a mystery which I relegate, in the spirit of Johannes Kepler, to the work of future specialists. I limit myself here to what I know with certainty: that he failed, and how he failed, and that tragically.
It is fairly said, he made the same fatal blunder, in principle, the blunder of simple-minded conceptions of the application of power, which the two doomed Roman commanders had committed at Cannae. Like those self-doomed Roman commanders, his fixation upon resisting his chosen opponent with blind stubbornness, caused him to bring about the outflanking of his own forces, and thus he bequeathed the subsequent doom of his command to be inherited by Gorbachev. He had not grasped the most essential, deeper, political conceptions of modern civilized warfare; otherwise, he would never have risked brushing off the President's offer in the foolish fashion he displayed.
What Andropov may have thought he intended to accomplish, is irrelevant. It is the intent of their actions, not the mere opinion of the actors, not what they may delude themselves to believe their purpose might be, which will determine history's true judgment of what constitutes the efficient component of the persons' intent. Whatever Andropov might have thought he intended, the effect of that intended choice was, in effect, to lose everything vital to his nation, perhaps for the sake of seeking revenge, or some illusory utopian scheme, or some combination of both. How he failed, is certain; why he chose to fail so, and that with such foolish hubris, is the area which contains the only matters which still remain a mystery to me.
Whatever he might have thought he was doing, the actual reason he failed is clear. His included failure as an intelligence professional, was, essentially, to ignore, apparently wishfully, the long-ranging implications of the systemic strategic controversy between President Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, that controversy concerning both the conduct of the ongoing World War II itself, and, more crucial, more fundamental, the global prospect for the post-war world.
It has been my estimation, for about a quarter-century to date, that the key to some of the known factors affecting the Andropov tragedy, is to be found in what had emerged as prevailing, post-Lenin Soviet mythology, especially under the leadership of N.S. Khrushchev and his successors: their attachment to the popularized, mythical explanation of the birth of the Soviet Union itself, a myth crafted from the standpoint of what is recognized among Russian social-democrats as the anti-voluntarist doctrine of Karl Kautsky, G. Plekhanov, et al.
Ironically, as V.I. Lenin himself insisted, from the time of his self-tortured break with those social-democrats, at the beginning of that century, the success of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, was essentially a voluntarist intervention in the then ongoing processes of history. It was not an historically inevitable consequence of the global crisis of capitalism, not some mechanically predetermined destiny of Bolshevism. It was something which occurred despite the Bolshevik leadership in general; it was a situation in which Lenin himself personally seized the opportunity to change the course of history, by exploiting the aggregated incompetence of the incumbent governments of London, Paris, and the silly Woodrow Wilson's U.S.A. Most notably, that seizure of power was not an accident; it was the opportunity which Lenin had anticipated in his break with Plekhanov, which he had, later, foreseen as the necessary opportunity to be created by the Czar's folly in joining England and France for the war, and for which Lenin waited, eagerly, but strictly self-controlled, like a leopard awaiting the arrival of his prey.
Precisely because human beings, and society, are set apart from, and above the beasts, only self-doomed nations react to severe systemic crises, like that of 1914-1917 Russia, as all of Lenin's immediate rivals did, with rigid application of pre-existing academic or kindred varieties of shopworn dogma. Thus, in a similar sense, an out-manned Frederick the Great of Prussia outflanked, and routed, a vastly superior, well-trained Austrian force at Leuthen, twice during the same day. Similarly, an outmanned Hannibal destroyed, and obliterated a superior Roman force at Cannae. So, an inferior Russian force, aided by the friends and ideas of Friedrich Schiller, slaughtered the invading Grand Army of the Emperor Napoleon, by preparing the Moscow trap, and luring Napoleon into it. So, Alexander the Great, earlier, commanding a relative handful, had obliterated the hordes of the Achaemenid Empire on the plains of Gaugamela.
The essence of history, like the history of fundamental scientific progress, is novelty. Every crucial turn in history occurs as the fruit of what had been previously discounted as an anomaly; every true mastery of that situation, is also such an anomaly. The essence of strategy is the principle of the flank, as Lenin applied his foresight into such an anomaly, in his years-long preparations for, and conduct of his Russia campaign of 1917. The essence of the principle of the flank, is the principle of cognition, the principle which sets the human individual above the beasts, and the creative thinker above the monotonous mind-set of the mere pedants and other opportunists.
The birth of the Soviet Union was not the fruit of Marxist doctrine; it was a lawful anomaly within generally accepted Marxist doctrine; it was an anomalous action which Lenin deployed, in response to, and in exploitation of an historical juncture which was itself already a lawful anomaly, a paradox which shattered the pre-existing doctrine, as Lenin himself might have chosen such words, on the hard rocks of reality. The efforts, by Lenin's successors of the 1950s and beyond, to conduct their policy according to some rigidly codified, current, academic sort of quasi-Marxist theory of history, created that predisposition for historic folly which ultimately doomed the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet Union was conceived and born as the fruit of anomalies, and was itself always an anomaly in world history thereafter, an anomaly which, in the end, could not be successfully led, but by leaders with a certain zest for the fact that the essential features of all history are understood only when they are understood as lawful forms of apparent anomalies.
The success of any flanking operation, in military strategy, or otherwise, is always the ability of leadership to find the way to victory by utilizing what their opposition would steadfastly consider, almost to the end, as a mistake, would condemn as the U.S.A.'s foolish Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Daniel Graham did, during 1982-1984, and preclude from chosen courses of action, as an anomaly. The general exposition of that point may be taken from my already referenced, recent report on the subject of cognition, my "The Becoming Death of Systems Analysis."
Among other lessons directly relevant to understanding the tragic nature of Andropov's decision, he had clearly not mastered the underlying lessons of the Thirty Years War and the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia; these have been no less than the determining precedents for the entire, subsequent history of Europe, no small matter safely to be overlooked. As I shall clarify this point below, his behavior in this matter also pointed to an incompetent, related, essentially ideological, mis-assessment of the United States: in this case, a crucial strategic blunder. See the likeness to those self-doomed blunderers who overrode Wallenstein's efforts to secure peace in collaboration with Sweden's Gustavus Adolphus. This was the Wallenstein whose assassination immediately, and inevitably drowned Europe in the hopeless ensuing years of the Thirty Years War. Like most U.S. voters in the present year's primary elections so far, Andropov was, in effect, like the foolish assassins of Wallenstein, in the assassins' moral travesty, of defending, in the name of honor, an adopted, foolish, ideological posture, not one fit to shape a defensible real-world result. What the Soviet General Secretary produced, by his choice of decision in the crucial turning-point of late March 1983, was the 1989-1992 collapse of Soviet power.
The President of the U.S.A. had made an offer of a new strategic relationship. Andropov's response reminds us of that great fool, that Romantic, real-life Don Quixote of Spain, King Philip II, as Friedrich Schiller aptly captures the historic essence of the situation in the great tragedy Don Carlos. As Schiller saw, Spain died as a power, suffocating in its own gore of the Netherlands war. Under Andropov's protégé, General Secretary (March 1985) Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, it became much worse, deteriorating at an accelerating rate. It was the ill-conceived, liberal economic-reform policies included under the rubric of Perestroika, associated with both Andropov and Gorbachev, which doomed the Soviet Union to its 1989-1992 internal collapse; and, it was the continuation of the same trend in the pro-gangster, so-called "liberal" economic reforms, as pushed by U.S. President George Bush and his U.S. Ambassador Robert Strauss, which ruined Russia over the course of the 1993-1999 interval.
As was discovered, once the East German government of Erich Honecker et al., had collapsed: during earlier 1989, the Warsaw Pact was in an advanced state of preparation for using the option of an impressive pre-emptive assault into western Europe, that in the same period that that state itself disintegrated. In my fore-warnings of the risk of the Soviet government's summary rejection of the President's offer, before it was clear he would make it, in February 1983, I warned the Soviet government that the rejection of such an offer would bring about the doom of the Soviet economic system, within about five years. I repeated that warning, both in my reports to my government, and on numerous public occasions, during the months and years which followed. Actually, it took six years before the Warsaw Pact proceeded to crumble, chain-reaction fashion, just as I had warned the world in my televised Berlin address of October 12, 1988.
It is clear from the events of March-August 1983, that Andropov had no effective comprehension of the principled features of modern history, modern strategy included. Neither, of course, do most of the leading, loudly triumphalist, strategic-planning circles in the U.S.A. and NATO today, who are generally intellectual Lilliputians by comparison with Andropov himself. That coincidence is not accidental.
Modern Classical military science and related statecraft emerged in the aftermath of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, following a long period of religious warfare which had dominated all Europe since the 1511-1513 period of Venice's triumph over the League of Cambrai. Nonetheless, since the latter triumph, no nation in Europe has succeeded in producing a durable form of modern nation-state republic as such, despite such noble, but aborted attempts as those of the circles of Lazare Carnot, the circles of Friedrich Schiller, and the launching of France's Fifth Republic under President Charles de Gaulle. The systems of government which have emerged in modern Europe since the League of Cambrai's defeat, have been, in net effort, no better than accumulated democratic reforms of the parliamentary underside of a feudal reign, which the Roman imperial tradition of Diocletian et al., had ultimately bequeathed to the modern age of financier-oligarchical rule.
Only under temporary, exceptional circumstances, as typified by the government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in what, in fact, continued to be occupied Germany, has a parliamentary form of government been able to approximate the quality of true republican government, one defined in principle and form by the combination of the 1776 U.S. Declaration of Independence and the 1789 U.S. Federal Constitution. Contrary to commonly taught, foolish doctrines circulating in the U.S. universities of today, the character of the U.S. republic was not a product of the frontier, as fools' echoes of the Romantic Frederick Jackson Turner, and Hollywood, insist; but, it was, rather, the fruit of an experiment launched by republicans from Europe, using North America as the location to build up a design, derived from the anti-Roman, Classical-Greek model, which had been crafted by the republican forces within old Europe itself.
To the present day, the legacy of pagan Rome and its empire, dominates the cultures of globally extended European civilization, including the U.S.A. itself. Typical of the prevalence of the Romantic degeneration dominant in U.S. political culture today, is the curious adoration of the mere name of "democracy," whose presently putative referent, is nothing other than a continuation of the notion of "popular opinion," as the ancient pagan oligarchy of patrician Rome defined vox populi, as the opinion of the dumbed masses of predators (populari), predators constituting the common pagan-Roman pestilence otherwise known as plebeians. This, "popular opinion" (vox populi) "public opinion" as Walter Lippmann defined it, was the mechanism of corruption, by means of which the Roman plebeians were controlled, as a deployed force of conquest and rapine against the targets of their depredations. Such masses of foolish, duped, "popular" predators, are typified, exactly, by the foolish followers of candidates George Bush and Al Gore, and the rabid co-thinkers of Caspar Weinberger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, today. Such is the lunatic notion of "strategy," underlying such wild-eyed, Romantic doctrines as the folly of Air Land Battle 2000, today. Today, a similarly, morally corrupt form of Orwellian popular opinion, or "democracy" as today's U.S. Project Democracy defines that term for practice, exerts its liberals' "Big Brother" style in dictatorship, increasingly, all in the name of "democracy," over the wills of the masses of the population in both many nations, and in supranational institutions.
Typical of the corrupt essence of that Romantic sort of "popular opinion," then and now, is that it is posed as an alternative to be preferred to truthfulness and justice. The explicitly Romantic and also Faustian irrationalism of Immanuel Kant, respecting physical science, law, and art, is that of Kant's follower, the Romantic, proto-Nazi philosopher of law, Zeitgeist doctrinaire Professor Friedrich Karl Savigny. Kant's and Savigny's notion of law, rooted in the pagan Roman law of the predators (populari), was rightly recognized, as by Heinrich Heine, for example, as the probable predecessor of future forms of tyranny in Germany. This notion is identical, axiomatically, to the doctrine of popular will characteristic of the fascism of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler, and of Napoleon Bonaparte and his police-state doctrine of Code Napoleon before them. It is axiomatically comparable to the tenets of English and British empiricism, as typified by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, Adam Smith, and Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism.
The rejection, as Kant and Savigny do, of a determination of truthfulness and justice, that as defined according to Socratic reason, in favor of a mystical faith in the benefits of sundry guises for anarchic licentiousness, including those of irrationalists Hobbes, Locke, Mandeville, and Adam Smith, when combined with a radical-positivist form of legal philosophy, is the germ of the most hideous, Orwellian form of fascism, as that emergence is in process in the increasingly, morally corrupted, judicial system of the U.S.A. today.
Contrast such morally degraded, Romantic notions of culture and popular opinion, to the opening three paragraphs of the 1776 U.S. Declaration of Independence and the Preamble of the U.S. Federal Constitution. The contrast there is between the predatory axiomatic Romanticism of British Eighteenth-Century Liberalism and the Classical-Greek traditions. The European oligarchical state, whether based upon landed aristocracy, as the irrationalist Dr. François Quesnay proposed, or the Venice-style financier-oligarchy of the Anglo-Dutch empiricist model, was always rooted in the history and traditions of law of pagan Rome. The opposing view, which asserts that no government can have legitimate authority to rule, unless it be an efficient servant of the general welfare of all of the population and its posterity, is a Christian expression of that Classical Greek legacy traced to predecessors such as Solon of Athens and Plato. Thus, Classical versus Romantic, is the essential conflict pervading the entirety of globally extended European civilization to the present day.
It is from that vantage-point, and only that vantage-point, that the modern European form of statecraft and strategy may be competently understood. It was those in the anti-Romantic, Classical tradition, such as the Winthrops and Mathers of the Massachusetts colony, who not only conveyed the republican principle into what became the emerging republics of the Americas, but who played a crucial, strategic role, as in the case of the intervention of Gottfried Leibniz's circles into the policy-planning for the American fight for independence, over the course of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, in assisting the republican cause's successes within the emerging nations of the Americas. Thus, the United States, like the leading republics of Central and South America, must be recognized, and understood as an integral expression of the work of the republican struggle on the battlefield of globally extended European civilization as a whole.
Lenin's successful crafting of the Soviet republic, could not be competently represented, except as a by-product of an anomaly generated by the successive Presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Ku Klux Klan fanatic Woodrow Wilson, in the U.S.A. The alliance between the Wall Street heirs of Jeremy Bentham's asset, Aaron Burr, the latter the treasonous founder of the Bank of Manhattan, and those unrepentant sons of the Confederacy, Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, created the possibility for British King Edward VII's orchestration of what became World War I, and the temporary absence of the legacy of the American Revolution from the government of the U.S.A. during the historically crucial period between McKinley's assassination and the election of President Warren Harding.
Had President McKinley not been assassinated, by complicity of New York City's rabidly Anglophile Henry Street Settlement House, Britain and France would never have succeeded in organizing Edward's intended great war throughout Europe. Had the U.S. been committed still to the allies of Lincoln and the Lincoln legacy, Emil Rathenau's and Walter Rathenau's Germany, and to Mendeleyev's and Sergei Witte's Russia, World War I would never have occurred as it did, as King Edward VII pushed this forward with assurances implicitly given by unregenerate scion of the Confederacy, Theodore Roosevelt.
Thus, the absence of the real U.S.A. from the stage of history at that juncture, created an anomaly in the flow of history up to that point. It was in that circumstance, that the situation was created inside Russia and Europe more widely, in which a Classical form of strategic flanking opportunity was handed to Lenin, just as the folly of the Roman commanders at Cannae, supplied Hannibal the opportunity to subject the Roman forces to a shattering hecatomb on that occasion.
The later problem was, that the post-Lenin Soviet leadership, especially after the most untimely death of Franklin Roosevelt, and especially after Khrushchev's consolidation of his power, failed to grasp the nature and implications of the irony which had created the possibility for the creation and consolidation of what had become Soviet power. The continuity of history, which is to say the avoidance of new dark ages for entire civilizations, is expressed by an impulse within history which abhors a vacuum. It was that vacuum which gave Lenin his strategic flanking opportunity, and the Soviet system its opportunity for a certain durability. The culmination of a certain, later, creeping intellectual decadence within the Soviet leadership, combined with its failure to comprehend the grand irony of the very existence of a Soviet power in history, found its culminating expression in the succession of tragic follies of Andropov and Gorbachev, and in their supercession by the carpetbaggers, the emergence to power of an outrightly criminal class of vultures, called, euphemistically, reforming "economic liberals"--they stole all too liberally, under direction of agencies such as Project Democracy's International Republican Institute (IRI) and Margaret Thatcher's London-based financier oligarchy.
This points to the entire complex of essential intelligence, tragically, even viciously lacking in the mentalities of Andropov and Gorbachev. The problem was not merely that they were ignorant of essential principles, but that they, like the Hamlet of the Third Act soliloquy, refused to consider learning.
One can not understand real history, and its willful making, by treating contending forces childishly, as in a sand-box game. Only fools are "objective" about such matters. To become competent, one must first choose the right side in the conflict, which is not necessarily either of the sides considered in the sand-box model. In all of the history of European civilization, the right side is the Classical standpoint, whose perennial adversary is the Romantic mind-set, the so-called "oligarchical model," that latter left over, successively, from ancient Babylon, the Delphi cult, and pagan Rome. One must always seek the way to orchestrate the putative strategic conflicts from the higher standpoint of that Classical world-outlook, the which is reflected in the opening three paragraphs of the 1776 U.S. Declaration of Independence and the 1789 Preamble of the Federal Constitution. The purpose of the republican master strategist, such as any qualified President of the U.S.A., is to address any conflict from that Classical vantage-point.
The immediate point here, in referencing the Andropov case, is: How should one resolve the conflict between a U.S.A. presently dominated by a powerful Anglo-American financial-oligarchical cartel, and what had been, on the opposing side, both the Soviet Union, and, a third force, the so-called developing nations as a whole? That is the way in which I have always viewed the current strategic reality of this planet, since my war-time years in Burma and India. Thus, the side of Leibniz and Benjamin Franklin, and, therefore that of President Abraham Lincoln, was always my side thereafter.
Since the deaths of Franklin Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, no U.S. President has represented that side efficiently, the side of the creation of the U.S. republic. Nixon was a poor fool, already a broken man years earlier, a man who seemed to have lost most of himself but his personal political ambition. Carter was an unspeakable parody of Woodrow Wilson, who did more to destroy the very soul of the United States than any administration since the Coolidge-Mellon travesty of the twenties. The possibility for a needed reversal of the decay represented by Carter, was lost as "co-President Bush" took the administration, more and more, out from under President Reagan, especially after Andropov's tragic rejection of the SDI. Bush was the proverbial pits. The Clinton Presidency has suffered the corrosive effects of something akin to Bush's role in the Reagan Presidency, or, as a modern Rabelais might write, a greedy, gritty, utterly back-stabbing, and generally mean-spirited, Uriah Heep-like parody of the evil Woodrow Wilson, the Gore "co-Presidency."
Without a leading representative of the legacy of Washington, Monroe, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt in the Presidency, history as a whole is inevitably monstrously distorted by the lack of efficient representation of what extended European civilization's efforts define, as the American power opposing the British financial-oligarchical power and its pernicious influence in the planet as a whole. Although the U.S.A. does not, and should not dominate the world, the lack of suitable, and effective leadership among nations, from within the U.S.A., has, during any part of the past two hundred years, so far, made the existence of political life on this entire planet a turbulent set of anomalies, just as that is illustrated by the case of Lenin's creation of Soviet power. In such awfully anomalous situations, either anomalous solutions succeed, or civilization as a whole must tend to be plunged into some new dark age. The establishment of the U.S. Federal constitutional republic remains, as it was for late Eighteenth-Century European patriots, the beacon of hope for all mankind; but, sometimes, that light has been turned off, and that in times when the political seas of the world are stormy.
As in the success of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, true strategic leadership is always to be found, as President Franklin Roosevelt had intended to deal with the reconstruction of the post-war, post-colonialist world, by rising above apparently opposing sides among the national powers, to make the U.S. itself an instrument for building up to a true global community of principle, a principle, as understood by U.S. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, as consistent with what Dr. Edward Teller once described, so amiably, in late 1982, as "the common aims of mankind." That catalytic role of the U.S. republic as a temple of liberty, and beacon of hope for all mankind, has always been the only true manifest destiny of the U.S. republic constituted by our 1776 Declaration of Independence and 1789 Preamble of our Federal Constitution.
Had Secretary Andropov been wise, he would have addressed the U.S.-Soviet conflict in those terms of reference, as I did, from the U.S. side, in my role in proposing and working to bring into being what President Reagan announced as the original statement of the SDI policy.
Thus, in those same historic terms of reference, the conflict between the two, thrown-together, war-time allies, Roosevelt and Churchill, is the key to all competent reading of subsequent worldwide history, and all strategic thinking. The conflict between what Henry A. Kissinger denounced as "the American intellectual" tradition, as opposed to that British Hobbesian tradition which Kissinger espoused, is key to all competent formulation of strategy today.
The significance of that Roosevelt tradition, so bitterly hated by Kissinger, is that it is a reflection of the Classical, anti-Romantic tradition in extended European civilization; whereas, Churchill, like his predecessor Palmerston, represents the modern Romantic heritage, as expressed currently in the form of financier-oligarchical world-domination. In this respect, to place oneself on the side of Britain against the republican impulse within the U.S.A., is to bring the worst upon oneself. To find a "lesser evil" in a Bertrand Russell, or a Russell clone such as the Kissinger who, like fellow William Yandell Elliot protégé Zbigniew Brzezinski, is an avowed and practicing disciple of Jeremy Bentham, Castlereagh, and Metternich, is the mark of the mortalist preparing to relegate his nation to nothing as much as its own coffin. To be such a dupe, as the Emperor Nero's Seneca typifies this, is to foster a cause which can have no consequence, but to promote the resurgence of some modern expression of the same Romantic legacy which produced the Emperor Napoleon, Benito Mussolini, and Adolf Hitler.
The failure to grasp that fact, was the essential folly of Secretary Andropov. The tragic blunder of Secretary Andropov, was to fail to grasp that point, even when it was set before him, under his nose, so to speak, both by me personally, and by President Reagan's broadcast March 23, 1983 address.
In the republican outlook, so situated and understood, military and related strategy is concerned primarily, not so much with the relatively secondary matter of warfare between and among nations; we must be primarily concerned with the higher, subsuming purpose, of establishing upon this planet what Secretary of State John Quincy Adams defined as a "community of principle," a community of perfectly sovereign nation-states, each and all based, internally, and in their foreign relations, upon commitment to the principle of promoting the general welfare by methods consistent with truthfulness and justice, as both Plato's dialogues and the Apostle Paul's I Corinthians 13 identify the principle called agape¯. Since the time of ancient Greece, for all of us who are republicans, that definition of a community of principle, that comprehension of the fundamental opposition of the Classical Greek to the degenerate tradition of, successively, Babylon, the Delphi cult, Rome, and feudal and modern Romanticism, has always defined the playing-field upon which the issues of strategy are variously defined and played out.
According to such notions of strategy, the adversary is never an opposing nation as such. The adversary is always a principle of evil, whose influence must be defeated. That principle may be expressed, for the moment, as the current policy of some specific nation; but, it is the principle, not the ostensibly opposing nation as such, which is the underlying strategic issue. The central issue of strategy, is not, "Who is our potential adversary?" but, rather, "What principle is our enemy?" Simple-minded people never seem to grasp that crucial distinction. The promotion of the victory of the Classical notion of a community of republics, over such evil principles as the Romantic legacy of both the landed-aristocratic and financier-oligarchical forms of law and society, is the essence of republican strategy for any nation or other force committed to promotion of the principle of the general welfare of both existing and future generations of humanity. It is agreement in practice to that Classical principle, of promotion of the general welfare, which is the pivot on which cooperation in mutual security, among nations of differing constitutions, should prosper.
The capitalism consistent with the American System of Alexander Hamilton, the Careys, Friedrich List, and the Lincoln-Carey agro-industrial revolution of 1861-1876, is a form of national economy in which the state is responsible for provision of the development and maintenance of basic economic infrastructure, and for the protection of those forms of private entrepreneurship upon which growth of the physical-economic productivity and standard of living of the population as a whole depends. The British East India Company system, as defined by that Company's Haileybury School economists Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Malthus, John Stuart Mill, et al., is a rentier-financier system, which can not prosper without looting of either its own land and inhabitants, or raping foreign populations and the territories which they inhabit. The fight between the patriots (the protectionists) and the "free traders," the latter also known sometimes as "American Tories" in the U.S.A., was never anything but a reflection of the mutually exclusive character of the superior system of political-economy, the economic-protectionist American System, over the predominantly parasitical British rentier, or so-called "free trade" system.
The idea, which became popular among the Marxists, that the capitalism of Adam Smith is scientific economics, and that the economics of Alexander Hamilton and Henry C. Carey are a poor copy of Adam Smith, is a delusion, which happens to have been fostered in Karl Marx by British agents Friedrich Engels and the British Library's Urquhart and others; it was never a premise of effective strategic thinking. In fact, under Alexander II, especially after 1876, under the leadership of scientist Mendeleyev and Minister Sergei Witte, it was the methods of the Lincoln-Carey agro-industrial model of 1861-1876, which contributed to pre-Soviet Russia the foundations of its greatest rates of economic progress. It was Lenin's adoption of the American methods of Henry Ford, for example, and the same American methods of 1861-1876, embedded in the Germany of Walter Rathenau, on which the building of the war-shattered Soviet economy was launched. It is pro-British delusions in political-economy and related matters, on the sides of both the U.S.A. and Russia, for example, which have been the single greatest source of the unnecessary, and, indeed, foolish motives for conflict between the U.S.A. and Soviet Union in past times, and which have contributed greatly to the anti-Russia and other self-ruinous follies of the U.S.A. and other NATO partner-countries, among others, today.
The question which Andropov should have posed to himself, is: whether he preferred the Classical legacy, as echoed by Franklin Roosevelt, or the Romantic legacy as represented by Churchill, Wall Street, and the legacy of the Confederacy? Which current did a prudent Soviet government prefer to have as a diplomatic partner within the U.S.A.? There, in failing to think in those terms, lies the root of Andropov's tragic folly of March-April 1983. Preferring the British as the lesser evil, imagining that Adam Smith was "scientifically" superior to Hamilton and Carey as economists, and considering Bertrand Russell, and Russell's arms-control dogmas, as a lesser evil, is typical among the contributing factors underlying the folly of Andropov's preferences for the proffers of Kissinger et al. to those of President Reagan.
Such follies imply a preference for a correspondingly foolish strategic doctrine. The SDI represented the Franklin Roosevelt legacy. By his actions of late March and April 1983, Andropov, in effect, chose Kissinger, George Bush, Margaret Thatcher, and also Mitterrand, and the evil legacy of Bertrand Russell, instead. In that choice, he embraced his own ruin, and the aggravated suffering of both the Soviet Union, and post-1991 Russia, too.
Look at the matter of military strategy from this standpoint.
The Romantic legacy, the impulse for limiting the notion of strategy, to the matter of imposition of political will by force, may appear, by fallacy of composition, to be, in fact, a transitional mode of strategic action; but the raw, often infantile impulse to impose will by sheer force, must never become the political motive for the commander's, or strategic planner's role in military action. The political will of the commander must always be of a cognitive quality, like that mustering of concentration required for discovering, validating, and implementing a validatable universal principle, never the simple, raw stubborn will of the common brawler. The proper strategic political motive, is to bring harmony among republics, and to defeat every threat to the cause of hegemony of the republican cause of perfect national sovereignties, among existing and emerging republics upon this planet.
Sometimes, that republican policy requires not only military action, but also preparation, and determined application of war-winning capability. However, such means are to be subordinated, absolutely and always, to a higher, overriding objective: to bring about the desired result, either without war-fighting, or, by means of an early, successful termination of that warfare. These were precisely the overriding considerations in my design for what was initially proposed as SDI.
The preferred method of true strategy is that derived directly, as was Alexander the Great's, from Plato's Socratic method. In the last analysis, the most important wars in the post-1648 history of European civilization, express a conflict rooted inclusively in several or more falsely held axiomatic assumptions, by one or both contending parties. The folly of the Roman commanders, in their misguided deployment of their superior forces against the inferior forces commanded by Hannibal, also illustrates the point. The aspect of battle underlying the principle of the flank, is not a matter of the terrain as such. Exemplary is the direction by Frederick the Great, against a superior Austrian force at Leuthen. Terrain, and the method by which it may be controlled with greatest relative economy of effort, is but an important, subsumed practical consideration, in the way in which the mind of both the commander and his command deploy against both the material resources and, above all, the mind of the opposing forces and its command. Lenin's preparation for, and orchestration of the Soviet seizure of power, in 1917, is an example of this same principle. This principle of the flank was the crucial feature in my design for what President Reagan named the SDI, a point which former U.S. DIA chief General Graham and his Heritage Foundation were morally and intellectually incapable of comprehending. I shall come to that crucial point, in due course here.
The proper choice of axioms to replace those currently in vogue, will always be of implicit great benefit to each of the quarrelling parties, if those parties define the meaning of benefit in terms of the republican principle, the promotion of the general welfare, rather than in terms of some variety of oligarchical presumption. Such had been the intention of the murdered Wallenstein; such was the successful outcome of the Treaty of Westphalia, upon which the long era of lunatic religious wars in Europe was brought more or less to an end, and by which, therefore, modern civilized law of sovereign nation-states was more or less securely established, in principle. That, admittedly, still contested legacy of the 1648 Treaty persisted, until the outbreak of the war which Britain's King Edward VII planned and launched, the great war of 1914-1917, a foul blow from which civilization has never fully recovered, up to the present date.
Thus, the essential function of strategic thinking, is to define and introduce such an axiomatic remedy for the ostensible cause of conflict. If, however, that conflict can not be avoided, then that same strategy serves as the guiding policy for the conduct of warfare, and for defining the goal selected for cessation of hostilities. A good illustration is provided by the conduct of the Pacific war under General MacArthur's command, seen in the light of MacArthur's role in the conduct of the ensuing peace with Japan, a peace which avoided the tragic barbarism, leading to World War II, practiced by Ku Klux Klan enthusiast Woodrow Wilson, Secretary Lansing, Clemenceau, et al., in the adoption and enforcement of the Versailles Treaty. A related example, is provided by the last public address of President Abraham Lincoln: to bring back the states which had been occupied by the now destroyed Confederacy, as if those states had never departed the union. That, unlike Versailles, and unlike President Truman's cruel and unnecessary nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is typical of the strategic thinking of honorable men, and of proper strategic conceptions.
In such cases, valid remedies occur only in the same form as validatable discoveries of universal physical principle. The solution is always, to break asunder the fatal grip of prevailing mind-sets, and to introduce an added, valid principle, thus transforming the mind-set, thus transforming the definition of the issues underlying the prospective continuation of the conflict. There lies the underlying principle of military strategy for the SDI, as I had developed and campaigned on that specific point since middle to late 1977. As I have said, I will return to that crucial point again, at an appropriate point below.
It is upon such premises, that the shaping of republican military policy, as such, is to be elaborated. I summarize with aid of reference to a few relevant examples.
On this account, modern republican military policy has been based, especially since the work of France's "Author of Victory" Lazare Carnot, and the complementary figure of Gerhard Scharnhorst for Germany, on the principle of the strategic defense. This is the same conception of strategic defense, devised by von Wolzogen on the basis of the work of Friedrich Schiller, as what became the war-winning strategy of Russia and its Prussian allies for the Russian campaign of 1812, against the fascist Emperor Napoleon admired by Adolf Hitler. Carnot's defense of France, in the circumstances of the predator Napoleon's rout, is an example of the principle involved.
Thus, the point I made about Classical, or so-called traditional military strategy, the which I introduced publicly, in successive steps, over the 1977-1988 interval, was not in itself a new conception; all the great commanders and teachers had emphasized this in one degree or another, Carnot and Scharnhorst, and also our Sherman, among the most notable. Sherman beat the Confederate forces in his path, because he had the superior mind of a senior ranking engineering officer, deploying thus the more efficient application of force. So, Carnot and Scharnhorst, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan typify commanders, like President Lincoln, and like MacArthur later, who were first of all statesmen, rather than merely soldiers, whose policy is not the mere scores piled up in winning of battles, but early successful conclusion of war, that in an historically decisive, timely fashion. The object of warfare is winning the peace, ultimately the peace that brings to a close the need to continue to practice war on this planet, and nothing else, a peace which could never be achieved without first establishing global hegemony for a community of sovereign, republican nation-state republics.
What I added to such a well-grounded, pre-existing tradition in republican statecraft, was my demystification of certain previously unresolved, fundamental issues of statecraft, as my discovery is summarized as the LaRouche-Riemann Method. In this way, I added a specific dimension of principle to what great commanders, for example, such as Carnot and Scharnhorst, had done earlier, or Czar Alexander I had accepted as necessary, in the case of Moscow.
It is notable, that my relative success, especially during the interval 1982-1985, in attracting endorsement for the SDI, and collaboration with such an effort from among senior military figures of several nations of Europe, and elsewhere, in addition to a significant ration inside the U.S.A. itself, was my success in situating my proposals precisely within the context of a well-established, Classical military tradition typical of the best senior professionals from the World War II generation. I had simply added a new principle to the well-established Classical republican tradition in strategic thinking and practice, a new principle specific to the application of my LaRouche-Riemann method in the science of physical economy. The introduction of my added principle made Classical republican strategic policy feasible once again, and the best senior military professionals, especially those who were veterans of the World War II period, readily recognized this fact. Otherwise, it was not necessary for me to add much of anything to the otherwise well-established Classical tradition.
My introduction of that added physical principle to the task of defining a Classical application of the already established principle of strategic defense, was what electrified a wide assortment of policy-making and other senior military professionals from various parts of the world. It was on this account, that I was enabled, even before the President's first announcement of his own commitment to the SDI, to have briefed, and consulted with senior military circles in France, Italy, Germany, and a significant number of other nations, in addition to U.S. circles. As some of these from Germany summarily described my initiative to me: "Your policy has put us back into developing strategy again." Such reports, relayed back to relevant circles of the President, were an important part of the preliminaries for the announcement of the SDI.
To understand the SDI politically, to understand the various reactions to my initiatives on this account, one must take prominently into account the battle between traditional military professionals and the wild-eyed, New Age utopians rallied around the nuclear-warfare and arms-control chimeras introduced to U.S. and other policy-making on the initiative of the most evil mind of the Twentieth Century, the late Bertrand Russell.
Despite the Romantic influences expressed, typically, by Henri Jomini, the renewal of the U.S. Classical tradition under Presidents Monroe and John Quincy Adams, brought the influence of the circles of France's Lazare Carnot into the revitalized West Point Military Academy under Commandant Sylvanus Thayer. As for Carnot, and also for Scharnhorst and his followers, the basis for military professionalism was science and engineering, and their bearing upon logistics. The principle of strategic defense was paramount, as attested by General Billy Mitchell's recognition of the development of carrier-based aircraft, as the key to meeting the challenge to strategic defense, as posed for U.S. War Plans Red and Orange, for defense of the Hawaiian Islands against the continued threat of that Japan naval attack on Pearl Harbor, the which had been planned by Japan and its British anti-American allies during the early 1920s period of naval-power parity negotiations.
General Douglas MacArthur's leadership in the Pacific war of the 1940s, which I have already referenced, is one of the most brilliant demonstrations of economy of effort over vast distances, in accord with the principle of strategic defense. The way in which Averell Harriman and others orchestrated the pathetic President Harry Truman's ouster of General Douglas MacArthur, locates the date at which the adoption of Bertrand Russell's nuclear-weapons policies, was used to crush the U.S, military professionals' tradition definitively, at least for decades to come, and to bring in the psychedelic utopianism currently expressed by that lunatic substitute for strategic thinking and practice, known as "Air Land Battle 2000." The Truman-led lynching of Churchill adversary MacArthur, was the choice of example used by London's Washington, D.C. accomplices, to bring about the destruction of the competence of the U.S. military arms as instruments of republican statecraft. The prolonged folly of the U.S. war in Indo-China, virtually finished off the Classical military tradition, turning West Point-trained, and other high-quality professionals, such as the unfortunate Daniel Graham of Tet Offensive memory, into the virtually demoralized, pathetic Lt.-Gen. Graham of the U.S. DIA. Thus, many U.S. professionals sent from Europe for a tour in Southeast Asia, never returned to the real world thereafter. Many, including Brent Scowcroft, became degraded into mere lackeys, or perhaps the virtual walking dead, of arms-control freak John McCloy's own lackey, rabid utopian Henry A. Kissinger.
This principle of strategic defense, is in direct opposition to the currently popular Nintendo-like U.S. military doctrines of "war from afar." I have no objection to over-the-horizon-controlled warfare-fighting capabilities; indeed, I was focussed upon the obvious emergence of such developments, especially in respect to both tactical missile defense, and related counter-measures against such defense, and discussed these matters actively with professionals, during my continuing work on defense policies, during the middle to late 1980s. However, these are auxiliary matters of tactics, not the proper basis for defining strategy.
Contrary to oligarch's lackey Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Brzezinski's own official lackey, the recklessly, and dangerously lunatic Samuel P. Huntington, the real clash of civilizations is only that between Romantic and Classical civilizations. On that account, the principle of strategic defense is a modern expression of Classical tradition, whereas the currently prevailing doctrines of the U.S.A. and NATO are, like H.G. Wells' and Bertrand Russell's interdependent doctrines of preventive nuclear warfare and arms-control--Kissinger's perverted, Hobbesian notion of modern strategy--the pathetic dogmas still presently dominating recent decadence in U.S. military policy, and the decadence of its practice, into purely Romantic, utopian follies, the latter being feudal fantasies poorly disguised and festooned with pieces of what passes, at least, for modern technology.
Above all, it was my policy, as I stated this during the Spring of 1982, in my insisting upon the U.S. maintaining our nation's honor, by upholding of extant Monroe Doctrine and related treaty doctrine, in defending the Americas against predatory British military intervention against a nation of the Americas, Argentina: the object of military science is not to perfect war, but rather to end the circumstances under which the application of such practices must be continued. That is, the goal of republican military policy, is to bring into being a community of perfectly sovereign nation-state republics, each and all sharing in common those principles reflected in the opening three paragraphs of our 1776 Declaration of Independence, the 1789 Preamble of our Federal Constitution, and the perfection of such doctrine defined by the words and actions of President Abraham Lincoln. The object is to remove the continued power of both the inherently predatory Romantic tradition, such as that of Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, Palmerston, et al., and anything like it, from any position of power on this planet. Such an accomplishment, that goal, is properly, as St. Augustine implicitly defined this, the ultimate goal of Classical military doctrine. Once that were accomplished, there were no wars to be fought upon this planet; at which point, military capability continues to exist, to be recalled into being if and when needed, embedded within functions typified by the Classical role of the U.S. military Corps of Engineers and an extended space-frontier program of a similar nature.
It was no mere coincidence, that my design for what became the initial proposal of SDI was already afoot during that time, and that my design for resuming the Monroe, Adams, Roosevelt, Kennedy, policy toward the republics of the Americas, was also set afoot during the Spring and Summer of that same year.
My design for a U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, as developed over the 1977-1982 interval, is most readily understood, as to matters of principle, by viewing my contribution to the extant Classical notions of strategic defense in terms of its scientific component. The analog to be found in physical science, for a Classical application of the theory of the military strategic flank, is the effect upon technology of applying a newly discovered, validated universal physical principle. The most efficient example of this from physical science as such, is Carl Gauss's method for adducing the asteroid orbits as Keplerian planetary orbits, from a mere several brief available observations. The fact that Gauss thus confirmed Kepler's assessment of a necessary, but destroyed planet, located between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter, established the superior authority of Kepler-Gauss astrophysics in modern science, and provided the cornerstone for the establishment, successively, of the Gauss and Riemann notions of multiply-connected manifolds. Although this still little understood principle of physical science was otherwise well-established at the time, my recognition that my own discoveries in the field of a science of physical economy were best represented by applying Riemann's principle to them, resulted in the LaRouche-Riemann method in physical-economy and long-range forecasting. This provided the principled basis for my design for a strategic defense against otherwise crushing thermonuclear ballistic missile salvoes. In short, essentially, the application of a validated discovery of a universal physical principle to scientific practice, outflanks pre-existing scientific practice, in the exact same sense that Hannibal outflanked the Romans at Cannae, and Frederick the Austrians at Leuthen.
A good example of such a connection, is found in implications of the relationship of Philadelphia's West Point graduate Alexander Dallas Bache, the great-grandson of Benjamin Franklin, to Germany's Alexander von Humboldt. This connection of Bache et al., to the work of the Gauss-Weber-Riemann group in developing the principles of electromagnetism, and the connection to the original contributions of the U.S.A.'s Joseph Henry, were crucial in the Philadelphia circle's development of the talent of Thomas Edison. It was this latter work, as influenced by Weber's experimental proof of the Ampère principle of the angular force, which resulted in the transformation of the economies of the U.S.A., Germany, and Russia, by the introduction of electrification over the lunatic objections of the New York Times. The application of this development of electrification, as it became increasingly applicable to the point of production, accelerated the productive powers of labor in a most stunning degree. That illustrates the theory of the flank in physical economy.
We might reference the earlier developments in this direction, in both economy and military practice, over the sweep of more than five centuries to date since the Fifteenth-Century Renaissance. The case of Leonardo da Vinci and Niccolò Machiavelli, shows the connection between military and physical science, and that copiously. The circles around Colbert, Huyghens, and Leibniz, during the late Seventeenth and early Eighteenth Century, provide another example of such a connection between the proliferation of scientific progress and those revolutionary changes in military technology illustrating the principle of the flank. The strongest case, is the role of a man who was both one of the greatest military figures and physical scientists of the late Eighteenth Century, Lazare Carnot. The general point is made clear by the collaboration of Moses Mendelssohn and his friend Schaumburg-Lippe, in the emergence of Gerhard Scharnhorst's role in Germany. Special emphasis is to be placed on the integrated roles of Carnot's relationship to Ecole Polytechnique founder Gaspard Monge, and the close association of both Carnot and Monge with Alexander von Humboldt over a period approaching two decades.
Carnot and Scharnhorst mark a decisive quality of change in the sociology of strategic command, and, thus, that social and scientific revolution in modern warfare otherwise typified by the development of the West Point Military Academy under Commandant Thayer. Although figures such as Colbert and Vauban, had implicitly foretold this change, it was the emergence of the leading roles of Carnot and Scharnhorst, in the aftermath of the American Revolution, which catalyzed the shift in leadership in military science and related development of practice, from the control by the landed aristocracy, into a crucially leading role by engineering and artillery officers of usually "plebeian" antecedents.
Carnot, unlike Napoleon, the would-be Caesar from the gutter of the Genoese aristocracy, exemplified this best for the case of France, but Scharnhorst, because of the roots of his development in the work of Classical followers of Leibniz and Bach, such as Gotthold Lessing and Moses Mendelssohn, and because of the revolutionary impact of Friedrich Schiller upon the entire circle of the Prussian reformers, implicitly contributes to German military science a dimension either lacking, or more weakly developed in Code Napoleon-afflicted France. France lacked the quality of revolutionary cultural development which both Schiller and the great Classical composers, from Bach through Brahms, typify for the best of German-language culture. Despite the betrayal of Germany by the Prussian monarchy, in the aftermath of the Vienna Congress, and despite the planting of the roots of fascism in the influence of Kant, Hegel, Savigny, and the impact of Metternich's 1819 Carlsbad Decrees, the positive impact of the Lessing-Mendelssohn-Schiller-Humboldt legacy situated something of very special importance within German Classical culture as a whole, and within the military tradition as well. It was this Classical legacy of Schiller's admirers among the Prussian reformers, which embedded in the German military the extraordinarily superior per-capita capabilities shown over the course of the century preceding the close of World War II. Ironically, as the role of Moses Mendelssohn in shaping Schaumburg-Lippe's education of Scharnhorst, underscores this fact, it is meaningfully useful to note that the creation of the best qualities of the German general staff was the fruit of a Jewish conspiracy. Those who do not appreciate the delicious appropriateness and justice of that piece of irony, are not morally qualified to shape strategic policies today.
Before going to my role in the technical specifics of the initially proposed form of the SDI, there is an important thing to be emphasized here, lest omission of the point foster an oversimplification of the case. That is to emphasize, that the role of Classical forms of principles of culture play an important, even more decisive role in the execution of the flanking principle than technologies. I have elaborated this point at some relevant length in my recently published report on new accounting principles. The ability to employ technologies, is delimited by the social relations among those processes by means of which discoveries of validated principles, and of their application, are shared among the cognitive processes of individuals, and, thus, within society more widely. The coordination of the cognitive processes of individual members of society in general, and in social formations such as military ones, is as essential to effective mastery over nature, and coordination of physically-efficient efforts, as are universal physical principles as such. Machiavelli already emphasized the significance of the potential strategic advantages of modern urban populations, on this account. The increasing role of engineering in modern strategy, since Colbert and Carnot, expresses social principles even more emphatically than physical ones.
Moreover, in assessing the impact of technological innovations upon military performance, the effect of high rates of effective assimilation and development of successively more advanced technologies, upon the military personnel, and upon the peoples developing and producing productive forces supporting the military effort, is of crucial significance. A military effort energized in its development by the force of an effective science-driver and related effort within the labor-force generally, and in the impact upon the military personnel as such, is a strategically significant consideration. High rates of mission-driven scientific and technological progress, foster effects recognized as greatly enhanced optimism, improved morale generally, and disposition and competence for innovation by the military forces and others affected by these conditions. An individual human being can never be reduced, as an animal may, to a countable individual quantity per se. The qualitative expression of cognitive development and related ferment in the more or less cultivated individual, is, in itself, a crucial variable in the tactical and strategic equation. In ordinary soldiers' experience during World War II, for example, this qualitative factor was strikingly evident, notably including the frictional, non-combat costs and sheer attrition experienced in overall operations. The military situation is comparable to that in the economy in general.
The application of the foregoing physical and social considerations to the matter of strategic defense against salvoes of thermonuclear warheads, was developed in two successive approximations.
The starting-point was economics, as the science of physical economy defines this subject-matter. The initial question to be addressed was, would it be cheaper to deploy a system which would, incrementally, "kill" salvoes of thermonuclear warheads, than it would cost to supersaturate an anti-missile defense with the building and launching of larger salvoes? It was clear that the cost of attempting this through so-called "kinetic energy" defenses, would give the overwhelming advantage in cost-ratios to the offense.
In first approximation, we must also consider ratio of cost incurred to the victim, by the detonation of the warhead on target, to the cost of interception. Here, the combined costs of the attempted defense by "kinetic" systems of interception, skyrocketed beyond reach of any acceptable solution. No solutions were possible without reaching into the domain of new physical principles. That point had already been made by the relevant Soviet military strategists in 1963, and they were right. The "High Frontier" charade promoted by the Heritage Foundation's General Daniel Graham during the early 1980s, was pure fraud, the use by a suspected double-dipper of a mere ruse for promoting the fraudulent sale of off-the-shelf hardware at government expense.
In the second approximation, we must not be lured into the delusion, that any fixed design of strategic defense would be durable. Our policy must be rooted in a commitment to rapidly overwhelming effects of technological attrition. What was needed was not a single system, but a policy for continual transformation of systems to higher scientific and technological levels. What was needed was not some imaginary design, but, rather, a policy of providing continually, upgrading of systems deployed.
Not only was there no possibility of an effective strategic ballistic missile defense without reliance, chiefly, upon rapid development of new physical principles; such development could not be expected without resorting to a crash-program effort modelled upon the lessons of the war-time Manhattan project, and the Kennedy manned Moon landing effort of the 1960s. This would be a massive, and very costly undertaking. However, as the economic return to the U.S. domestic economy from the Kennedy space program had demonstrated, returns of up to a factor of ten times or more could be reasonably expected for every dollar put into such a mission-oriented crash program. This is nothing other than the most fundamental principle of all modern economy: that the primary, and ultimately only source, of increase of the physical productive powers of labor, is the technological realization of fundamental scientific progress, the endless forced-draft discovery of validated new physical principles. That sort of program, is the only competent way to run a modern economy.
However, although the feasibility of such a crash program was clear enough to offer a "this is the way we have to do it" proposal, the realization of such compensating economic benefits on a scale comparable to the cost of the program, required a very broad base, much broader than the existing U.S. economy of the mid-1970s, or the greatly depleted U.S. economy left behind after the depredations wrought by the Carter Administration's wrecking-crew and its Federal Reserve appointee Paul Volcker. The foreseen base must include a prospective vast and high-gain-oriented increase of the average physical productive powers of labor throughout the so-called developing sector in general.
Think of that need for a broadened base in the following terms. In a large industrial corporation, of the type we had still back during the 1960s, or even the early, pre-Carter 1970s, we might have imagined a qualitative up-shift in the employment of the labor-force, to increase the percentiles of those employed in scientific and related high-technology elements. Such an upshift would require a projectible corresponding rate of increase of the physical productivity of the total employed labor-force, or a large increase in the base in which increases in productivity were being realized. What I was projecting, implied a large upshift in the scientific-technological composition of the labor-force of the economy as a whole. That base must be found either within the nation itself, or through export of increasingly powerful technologies to a broad-based scale of employment in the so-called developing sector. This latter option would be required, since other technology-exporting regions, such as western continental Europe and Japan, would also be seeking export markets for the same purpose. Following that same, rather obvious line of reasoning to also rather obvious next steps, presented us with an interesting strategic problem.
The U.S. could not, at that point, launch an independent strategic defense without creating an ostensible threat to the Soviet Union. The evolution of strategic military affairs, which had been set into motion by the U.S.A.'s foolish adoption, under President Truman, of the nuclear and arms-control dogmas of Bertrand Russell et al., and the further closing of the ring caused by the negotiations around the 1962 missile crisis, prescribed that, by the late 1970s, any independent development would tend to accelerate the likelihood of a new thermonuclear crisis more deadly than that of 1962. There could be circumstances which might require independent development, but these were of such high strategic risk that that would not be undertaken beyond laboratory developments without a determination of a pre-existing commitment to attack from the U.S.S.R. Yet, merely maintaining the nuclear balance, as the diplomats had boxed us into this mess, had a built-in joker: the better the mutual deterrence became, the more dangerously paradoxical, and unstable it became. The fact that the Wells-Russell nuclear and arms-control policies had been designed for the purpose of bringing about world government, the dissolution of the sovereign nation-state as an institution, was the big joker in the deck. The better arms-control became, the more explosively deadly it became. By the middle to late 1970s, it became increasingly evident, that something had to give.
For me, the crucial window of opportunity, the way out of this mess, lay in the fact that the Soviet Union had an excellent scientific-military-industrial capability, but a terrible, and decaying civilian economy. The shift of the Soviet economy toward increasing reliance upon export of its mineral resources, spelled threatened collapse for that economy somewhere along the coming decades. However, if the U.S.A. and the continental NATO allies, and Japan, could join with the U.S.S.R. in jointly developing a strategic defense aimed to free all of us from the sheer MADness of the Russell-McCloy-Kissinger lunacy of nuclear utopianism, and if such developmental efforts could incorporate the developing sector within the broad base of the global physical-economic pyramid, a feasible solution was available in principle.
At the close of the 1970s, when my first public proposals in this direction had been issued, the foregoing description of the general situation considered, we faced the following relevant situation.
Such a change would be impossible under a continuation of the U.S. Carter Administration. Not only had Carter wrecked the U.S. economy even before the Volcker appointment was foreseen; no effort of the sort I envisaged would be possible without reversing every economic and related policy which Carter's administration had put into place. We required a new President, one willing to sharply reverse not only Carter's policies, but the policies otherwise associated with Henry Kissinger. By January of 1980, candidate Ronald Reagan appeared as a possible prospect for playing that needed role of a new President. Circumstances developing around the New Hampshire primary campaign, brought me into the orbit of the incoming Reagan Administration, and one thing led to another. A routine "walk-in" sort of signal from a Soviet representative was something which I recognized as requiring my signal to relevant circles in the new administration. In February 1982, I launched my campaign for the proposed new policy, to a well-attended two-day seminar in Washington, D.C. The possibility of setting the needed first phase of cooperation between the U.S. and Soviet governments into motion, was not assured, but there were hopeful indications.
I was determined not to fall into the trap which Friedrich Schiller and my wife identified as the tragic error of the Don Carlos character, the Marquis of Posa. There would be no subterfuges; what would be said to one, would be said to all. Those who know me, know that is my style, in any case. I included relevant circles in certain developing nations, in addition to relevant circles in Europe. That approach proved itself as the only viable one. Succeed or fail, we were walking the right road.
The mission was primarily twofold. To get the world out of the utopians' MAD trap designed by Russell, Leo Szilard, McCloy, et al., and to use that as a vehicle for establishing the kind of just new world economic order which President Franklin Roosevelt had intended for the post-war world. The cooperation among the scientific establishments of the U.S. allies and Soviet system, would create the de facto crash program which produced not only the technologies of strategic ballistic missile defense, but also, as spin-offs, the revolutionary industrial and related technologies, to accelerate the rate of increase of the per-capita and per-square-kilometer physical-economic productive powers of labor globally. The economic benefit of this would obtain its required broad economic base of the pyramid, through the creation of long-term credit for purchase of new capital technologies, both among the more highly industrialized nations, and also the poorer ones.
Since Colbert, and especially since the leading role of Lazare Carnot in post-1791 France, the modern world has experienced, repeatedly, the extraordinary benefit of science-driver crash-program efforts. Unfortunately, in the main, such programs have been launched and maintained only to the extent that military imperatives moved governments to undertake such programs. Yet, there was never any principled reason why such approaches would not work as well, or better, for peace-time purposes, than military ones. The difference was, that the perceived urgency of not losing the ongoing war, or the prospective next one, seemed to be the precondition for arousing governments to do what they should have done without war as an incentive for doing so. The way in which the Truman Administration and Congress mismanaged the transition to peace-time economy, was a most painful demonstration of just such foolishness.
Thus, ironically, the only way to get the world safely and rationally out of the nuclear trap fashioned by the evil utopians Wells and Russell, was to follow a pathway of cooperation whose principal result would be organizing the world around the goals which President Roosevelt had intended for the post-war world, using "crash" science-driver programs as the instrument for transforming the world's economies in the way required. The military side of the matter, thus showed itself to be a kind of by-product of the longer-range historic problem of economy, the need to accelerate the rate of fundamental scientific progress sufficiently, to enable the world to develop and maintain the rate of increase of technological progress required to sustain endless growth in the productive powers of labor, per capita and per square kilometer, world-wide.
In the end, such cooperation would, inclusively, cause the participating economies and political systems to evolve in a natural way. This would not mean that we would produce an homogenized world, but rather one in which sovereign nation-states of varying constitutional composition, would acquire the habit of living together as a global community of principle among sovereign nation-states should.
There is a very real who-hit-whom side to the fight inside the U.S.A., for and, mostly, against SDI. However, it is not necessary to detail that in this location; it is sufficient to get down to the basics of the matter. Take it from the top down. The source of the concerted opposition to SDI was the Anglo-American financier-oligarchy, as merely typified by the case of that screeching, scheming, but not very bright, mean old British nanny, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. In the U.S.A., top-down meant the Wall Street gang, the financial organizations and their attached law firms, as the latter are merely typified by John J. McCloy's roles during the 1950s and 1960s. It meant those parts of the permanent bureaucracy of the Executive Branch controlled by Wall Street and its law firms, since the days of Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Top-down means the oligarchy and its lackeys.
At the bottom, there is vox populi, the potential political lynch-mob of the standard collection of neighbors, the modern populari, the modern predators of public opinion, the type who, at a signal from the mass media, will rise as one in the Colisseum, to cheer for those lions who are tearing the Christians apart in the arena below. Thumbs up for Nero! Thumbs up for Woodrow Wilson! Thumbs up for war with China! Thumbs up for the so-called "new economy" which is about to impoverish you! All very Romantic.
It has been a long time since the U.S. population was even moderately rational. Perhaps not since President Franklin Roosevelt's time, or perhaps President John F. Kennedy's. In general, during this century, and also during earlier intervals, the complaint to be made against our typical citizen is essentially the same which Solon of Athens had to make against the morally decadent Athenian population of his later years. He had rescued them from slavery, and gave them the laws which made Athens a great state of that time. Then, they slid back into the old, corrupt ways, and were in danger of losing their freedoms as a result. This has happened to the U.S.A. repeatedly. Only a perceived grave crisis has awakened the people from their foolishness, and that only when an exceptional leader was able to capture their attention, and thus lead them up out of their slide into periods of depravity. We have come to such a time of terrifying crisis, a crisis caused chiefly by aid of the follies of popular opinion, and of all-too-popular misleaders. What will you people do now? Are you capable of recognizing the kind of unusual leadership you require, if our republic is to outlive the presently onrushing global financial debacle?
SDI is dead, but the lesson it provides is more alive than ever before. It was a good idea, but suffered the disadvantage of being proposed at a time, when the people had slid too far down into their bad old ways. When our failed politicians of that time, rallied to Andropov, against President Reagan, and also against me, the initial U.S. support for SDI largely evaporated, and SDI was, for the time, dead. The corpse of a noble attempt, SDI, lies dead on the pavement, and the ghouls of the Washington Post, are, quite naturally, pleased with that.
 For a complete chronology, see Rachel Douglas, "Soviets' `LaRouche' Dossier: Their Attacks on Adversary #1," EIR, Jan. 20, 1989. A few examples include: Fyodor Burlatsky, "War Games," Literaturnaya Gazeta, Aug. 10, 1983 (attacks the SDI as "a casus belli for nuclear war") and Oct. 26, 1983 (attacks LaRouche by name); N. Paklin, "Sabbath at the Hotel Majestic," Izvestia, Nov. 15, 1983 (attacks LaRouche as a "caveman"); Izvestia, March 12, 1984 (denounces "Führer" LaRouche's role in convincing the Reagan Administration to adopt the SDI); Aleksandr Sabov, "Yankees and Teutons," Literaturnaya Gazeta, Feb. 3, 1988 (full-page attack on Lyndon and Helga LaRouche, blaming LaRouche for the SDI and especially for the support it gained in Europe).
 One might say almost Pomponazzi.
 This in the sense of Graf von Schlieffen's theory of the flank. This is a crucial point in this report, to which I shall turn at an appropriate, later place here.
 It was the folly of President Jimmy Carter's Presidency which brought about the defeat of Presidential pre-candidate George Bush, and Reagan's victory over Carter himself. It was the so-called "Reagan Democrats" i.e., "Roosevelt Democrats," who supplied the crucial margin of those victories, from the 1980 New Hampshire primary, on.
 As Gore was later to undercut and undermine the Presidency of President Clinton.
 I am advised, on the legal records, that some relevant parts of my communications with government then might still be classified.
 Ironically, the neo-Menshevik cult of "objectivity," came to be associated with revulsion against the adventurism of Khrushchev. Left unmentioned in these allegations against him, was the fact, that it was Khrushchev's channel to the author of the doctrines of both arms control and preventive nuclear war, Bertrand Russell, which typified Khrushchev adventures such as the 1962 missiles-crisis. When that fact is taken duly into account, the true face of the later anti-Khrushchev references to the dangers of "voluntarism," is better recognized as simply the old Menshevik dogma in new clothes.
 As Lenin's acquaintance and long-standing factional opponent, Rosa Luxemburg, spoke, from Germany, of the initiatives of Lenin and Trotsky at that time: "they dared." A student of the history of the principle of the flank, in military practice, would recognize the point, as the kind of act of genius which is responsible for all the qualitative sorts of revolutionary establishment of new institutions in history, the kind of leadership which brings about a sharp break in the prevailing mind-set of all those around him, allies and opponents alike.
 Lyndon H. LaRouche, "The Winter of Our Discontent," Presidential campaign broadcast, Oct. 31, 1988.
 a.k.a. National Endowment for Democracy, International Republican Institute, et al. An influential prescription for transforming the mass of U.S. citizens into a depraved body of Roman-style, or Orwellian "public opinion," is T.W. Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950).
 Heinrich Heine, Religion and Philosophy in Germany, original edition.
 The noted international law expert, Professor Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, in 1989, warned that the kind of judicial practice exhibited by Federal Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr.'s Alexandria court, expressed a fusion of Locke and modern radical positivism, which must lead rapidly toward a worse form of fascist law in the U.S. than appeared in Nazi Germany under Judge Roland Freisler and the influence of Carl Schmitt. Relevant utterances among those by Associate Supreme Court Justice Scalia corroborate that warning, and also that of Heinrich Heine, including the emphasis to be placed upon the legal roots of German fascism in the teachings of Immanuel Kant.
 Harding, elected on the wave of national revulsion against Ku Klux Klan liberal Woodrow Wilson, brought a mixed bag into government, partly patriotic, but otherwise infested with many dirty elements from the Theodore Roosevelt Wall Street legacy (e.g., figures such as the impossible Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, and Andrew Mellon). The "strange," in fact implausible, death of President Harding, allowed the Theodore Roosevelt legacy to resume control in favor of London, so that the real U.S.A. was unrepresented on the world stage until the election of President Franklin Roosevelt.
 Henry A. Kissinger, "Reflections on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign Policy, Address in Commemoration of the Bicentenary of the Office of Foreign Secretary," May 10, 1982, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London. Excerpts are published in EIR, Sept. 22, 1995, p. 33.
 Urquhart was a top agent of the British intelligence service, and also, in that capacity a famous rival of Lord Palmerston. Despite that rivalry, Urquhart was the principal controller for the entire network of British agent Giuseppe Mazzini on both the continent of Europe, and the Young America branch based at both Concord, Massachusetts and Charleston, South Carolina. It was that Mazzini, for example, who, at a London meeting, appointed Karl Marx secretary of the newly founded International Workingmen's Association. A somewhat humorous by-product of Urquhart's relationship to his sometime charge Marx, was Marx's labored effort to expose Palmerston as a Russian spy! Labored as it was, it is a tell-tale symptom of that phase in the successive phases of Marx's evolution from his years as a secondary student under the famous Wyttenbach at Trier. To understand Marx and his work, one must situate what were the relatively independent cognitive ferments within him, some of which showed an independent spark approaching the quality of genius, from the controlled environments which provided the controlling occasion, the enveloping mind-set of reference, for those personal intellectual developments. The differences which developed between Marx and Engels, respecting the U.S. Civil War, and Marx's repeated capitulation to processor of slave-produced cotton, Engels, on some of these matters, affords an insight of some significance for serious scholars in such matters. Engels' documented role, in imposing disgusting British views respecting Friedrich List, and, later, Henry C. Carey, upon Marx, is exemplary.
 General Douglas MacArthur's direction of the 1941-1945 Pacific War, for as long as President Franklin Roosevelt lived, is an outstanding model of economy in warfare, in contrast to the unnecessary, sometimes very bloody battles, for which some of MacArthur's factional opponents in the Navy Department sacrificed the men and other means under their command. This is to be contrasted with the effects of Winston Churchill's appointment and continued deployment of that Field Marshal Montgomery, who, in North Africa, and in the 1944 period of war in western continental Europe, prolonged the war unnecessarily, perhaps no less than twice, each time, in North Africa, and again in 1944, by about a half-year, or even longer, and wasted countless lives on all sides in so doing. It is consistent with this, that the same Montgomery qualified himself as the prospective Adolf Hitler of Africa in his stated genocidal, Rhodes Plan intentions toward the inhabitants of sub-Saharan Africa. Typical of the folly of Montgomery's military role, is the remark of Professor von der Heydte, who, reflecting upon his service as the commander of Rommel's rear-guard during the retreat from El Amein, replied wittily, to my remarks on Montgomery's war-time performance as a commander; he replied, in memorable English: "You can't say anything bad about Montgomery to me. He saved my life; he could have flanked me at almost any time; if he had ever chosen to flank my rear guard, when he might have, I would have been dead." Churchill's British policy for World War II, as exhibited, otherwise, by Churchill's efforts to delay the war's end by years, by diverting Allied efforts against "the soft underbelly of Europe," as by the virtual criminal "Market Garden" escapade, and by calculated British assistance to Hitler's Gestapo against the July 1944 German plotters against Hitler, was to postpone victory, over U.S. objections, as long as possible, to ensure that the maximum numbers of Germans and Russians killed one another before the war were brought to a conclusion. Montgomery's deep-rooted, if high-pitched personal defects, provided a convenient instrument for realizing that policy. Even Churchill's deployment of the eccentric Montgomery to Egypt, to replace a competent commander, expressed the same British policy.
 I have documented the argument on this subject in earlier locations. It is arguable that President Truman's decision was, in fact, a war crime: an unnecessary attack on an already hopelessly defeated, and blockaded nation. The myth that the bombing saved "one millions American lives" was an outright lie. There was never a need to invade the main island of Japan; the policy of MacArthur's command was to let the highly effective air-sea blockade do its work, until the relevant, rebellious Japan military factions had no option, but to accept the Emperor's already negotiated intent, through Vatican channels, to surrender.
 Granted, MacArthur's command fought brutal, grinding battles, at selected, crucial strategic points, as Grant had done. Such resorts were employed by great commanders only when that choice was crucial, and strategically unavoidable. Otherwise, economy is a principle of Classical methods of warfare. For example, given the treasonous Democratic Party election-campaign of August Belmont's puppet, General McClellan, for breaking up the Union, Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan were determined to bring the war to a conclusion before the traitorous Belmont and McClellan could bring about the British Empire's miraculous, last-minute triumph in the war, through a Democratic Party's negotiated settlement with the Confederacy. That circumstance, that time-factor, absolutely required the otherwise uneconomical actions conducted under Grant's command.
 op. cit.
 As one might surmise, my success to such effects had reached the point, during mid-1982, that I was considered dangerous by those high-ranking circles associated with Henry Kissinger et al., who launched the Justice Department's global secret intelligence operation intended to bring about my elimination by prosecutorial or other means.
 As one Buonaparte contemporary, Principessa Pallavicini, is reported to have said of what she controlled in Napoleonic France, "The best part."
 Worse than the holocaust of death against the German-Jewish and Yiddish Renaissance victims of the Nazi regime, is the holocaust of silence against the personalities of those victims. Blank-faced slabs of concrete, set in place of the memories of living faces, are typical of that holocaust of silence. We all die, some in great suffering, and of various forms of injustice, such as those practiced by controllers of U.S. HMOs today. In the end, the worst outcome is the virtual extinction of the memory of the soul, rather than the passing of the mortal body. If it were difficult to bring back to living memory, so, each and all of the individual persons victims of Hitler's Nietzschean legacy, we must at least celebrate those who made a signal, categorical contribution to civilization, as Moses Mendelssohn's work and influence best typify this. Exemplary is the fact, that but for the defense of the Leibniz and Bach legacy, by Abraham Kästner, Lessing, and Mendelssohn, most of the great Classical musical legacy would never have existed. The contribution of the German Jews associated with Mendelssohn and his extended family to civilization, is but exemplary of the contributions embedded in European culture by both German Jews associated with Mendelssohn and his tradition, and by the related Yiddish Renaissance in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. Mendelssohn's role in shaping the education of Scharnhorst is one of those delicious blows for long-overdue justice, which most efficiently hits the guilty perpetrators of the holocaust of silence in their gut, where they should at last feel that effect.
 Op. cit.
 V.D. Sokolovskii, Military Strategy, 1963.