Subscribe to EIR Online

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CASE NUMBER 1:96CV01816
JUDGE: Thomas Penfield Jackson
DECK TYPE: TRO/Preliminary Injunction
DATE STAMP: 08/02/96

Civil Action No.
No. 96-1816 (TPJ)
(Three-Judge Court)

LYNDON H. LaROUCHE, Jr. ;

Committee to Reverse the Accelerating
Global Economic & Strategic Crisis - A
LaRouche Exploratory Committee
Leesburg, Virginia ;

ALEX D. PROMISE
Ferriday, Louisiana ;

CHARLES SHAW
Sicily Island, Louisiana ;

DELORES WHITAKER
Norfolk, Virginia ;

NATHANIEL SAWYER
Virginia Beach, Virginia ;

JOEL DEJEAN
Houston, Texas ;

ELOI MORALES
Houston, Texas ;

GENEVA JONES
Washington, D.C. ;

GRACE LITTLEJOHN
Washington, D.C. 20011 ;

MARIA ELENA LEYVA MILTON
Scottsdale, Arizona ;

and

JOHN AND JANE DOE, & others similarly
situated whose rights have been violated

Plaintiffs,

vs.

DONALD L. FOWLER, individually & as
Chairman Democratic National Committee
Washington, D.C. 20003 ;

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
430 South Capitol Street, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20003 ;

JAMES L. BRADY, as Chairman
Louisiana Democratic Party
Baton Rouge, LA 70801 ;

LOUISIANA DEMOCRATIC PARTY
263 Third St., Suite 102
Baton Rouge, LA 70801 ;

LOUISIANA DEMOCRATIC
STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Baton Rouge, LA 70801 ;

SUE WRENN, as Chairman
Virginia Democratic Party
Richmond, VA 23219 ;

KENNETH GEROE, as Chair of the Virginia
2nd Congressional District Caucus
Virginia Beach, VA 23454 ;

VIRGINIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY
1108 E. Main St., 2nd Floor
Richmond, VA 23219 ;

VIRGINIA DEMOCRATIC
STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Richmond, VA 23219 ;

WILLIAM WHITE, as Chairman
Texas Democratic Party
Austin, TX 78701 ;

TEXAS DEMOCRATIC PARTY
815 Brazos, Suite 200
Austin, TX 78701 ;

TEXAS STATE DEMOCRATIC
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Austin, TX 78701 ;

WILLIAM SIMONS, as Chairman District
of Columbia Democratic State Committee
Washington, D.C. 20003 ;

DIST. OF COLUMBIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY
499 So. Capitol Street, SW
Fairchild Bldg., Suite 110
Washington, D.C. 20003 ;

DIST. OF COLUMBIA
DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE
Washington, D.C. 20003 ;

SAMUEL G. COPPERSMITH, as Chairman
Arizona Democratic Party
Phoenix, AZ 85004 ;

ARIZONA DEMOCRATIC PARTY
2005 No. Central Ave., Suite 310
Phoenix, AZ 85004 ;

ARIZONA STATE
DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE
Phoenix, AZ 85004 ;

and

Unknown JOHN DOES, RICHARD ROES,
JANE DOES, who conspired to deprive
Plaintiffs of their rights

Defendants.

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF,
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES

(Voting Rights Act 42 USC §1971 et seq. and)
(Civil Rights Act 42 USC §§1983 et seq. and 1985 et seq.)

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

  1. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 28 USC §§1331, 1343, 1344, and 2201; 42 USC §§1971(d), 1973b (a), 1973c, 1973j (f), and 1973l (b); 42 USC §§1983 and 1985, as well as the First, Fifth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, statute, regulation, custom or usage, of rights, privileges and immunities secured thereunder.

  2. Venue is proper under 42 USC §1973c and 28 USC §2284.

  3. A three-judge panel is requested of this Court.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

  1. This action arises under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended, 42 USC §1971 et seq. This action seeks declaratory judgment by a Three-Judge District Court panel as follows:

    1. Declaratory judgment that Rule 11(K) of the Democratic Party Delegate Selection Rules for the 1996 Democratic National Convention, and its subsequent implementation, is void, of no force and effect, and legally unenforceable for lack of preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and is otherwise unconstitutional under Article II, §1, Clause 4, of the Constitution of the United States of America.

    2. Declaratory judgment declaring that such provisions as are in Rule 11(K) are in themselves unable to be precleared.

    3. Declaratory judgment declaring the actions taken by Defendant Donald L. Fowler whereby the issuing of a January 5, 1996 and an April 1, 1996 (and such other and unknown correspondence and/or actions by Defendant Fowler) disqualified Plaintiff LaRouche's Presidential candidacy from seeking the nomination of the Democratic Party which had the purpose and/or effect of disqualifying and discriminating against voters who are African-American, Hispanic-American, American-Indian, and disabled, among others, and delegates pledged to LaRouche and/or who wish to be a delegate pledged to candidate Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. to be seated at the 1996 Democratic National Convention, are void, of no force and effect, and legally unenforceable for lack of preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

    4. Declaratory judgment declaring the actions of Defendant Fowler are in themselves unable to be precleared as they have the purpose and/or effect of denying Plaintiffs and others similarly situated of their rights in violation of the Voting Rights Act, the Civil Rights Act, and the Constitution of the United States and the Amendments thereto.

    5. Declaratory judgment declaring that to the extent the remaining Defendants acted to enforce Defendant Fowler's directive, their actions are void, of no force and effect, and legally unenforceable for lack of preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

    6. Declaratory judgment declaring that the actions of Defendant Fowler deny to Plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, rights guaranteed them by the First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and under 42 USC §1983 and 42 USC §1971 et seq.

    7. Declaratory judgment declaring that the actions of Defendant Democratic National Committee ("DNC") deny to Plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, rights guaranteed them by the First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and under 42 USC §1983 and 42 USC §1971 et seq.

  2. This action seeks preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining and enjoining the enforcement, execution and operation of Rule 11(K) of the Democratic Party Delegate Selection Rules for the 1996 Democratic National Convention.

  3. Injunctive relief, both temporary and permanent, is also sought against Defendant Fowler restraining and enjoining him from refusing to certify and seat delegates pledged to Plaintiff LaRouche from Louisiana's 6th Congressional District and Virginia's 2nd Congressional District at the Democratic National Convention to be held August 26-29, 1996 in Chicago, Illinois.

  4. Injunctive relief is also sought enjoining Defendant DNC from promulgating similar provisions as found in Rule 11(K), in the future.

  5. This action seeks pursuant to 42 USC §§1983 et seq. and 1985 et seq. an award of compensatory and punitive damages and attorney fees, from Defendant Fowler as his actions caused the violation of Plaintiff LaRouche's rights under the U.S. Constitution Article II, §1, Clause 4, and all Plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fifth Amendments, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, 42 USC §1971 et seq., and 42 USC §1973i.

  6. This action seeks equitable relief as may be fashioned by the Court to allow Plaintiffs and others similarly situated to select a delegate pledged to Plaintiff LaRouche to participate as delegates where, but for the void actions taken, they would be certified and seated as duly elected delegates pledged to LaRouche to the Democratic Party National Convention to be held August 26-29, 1996 in Chicago, Illinois.

PARTIES PLAINTIFF

  1. Plaintiff Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. ("LaRouche") is a resident of the State of Virginia, a Democrat, and a duly qualified presidential candidate seeking the nomination of the Democratic Party for President. He has been duly certified for Matching Funds by the Federal Election Commission (FEC). LaRouche's name has appeared as a Democratic candidate for President on the Presidential Preference Primary ballots in 26 states, and he has already received almost 600,000 votes in those primaries. In contravention of those almost 600,000 voters' preference, LaRouche has been denied his right to be a candidate for nomination at the Democratic Party National Convention. He has also been denied his right to have duly elected delegates (by popular election or at Party caucuses) be certified to attend the National Convention of the Democratic Party as delegates pledged to LaRouche.

  2. Plaintiff Committee to Reverse the Accelerating Global Economic and Strategic Crisis - A LaRouche Exploratory Committee (LEC) is the principle campaign committee registered with the FEC which supports LaRouche's candidacy.

  3. Plaintiff Alex D. Promise ("Promise") is a resident of the state of Louisiana, a Democrat, and a duly registered voter of the Sixth Congressional District ("6th C.D.") in Concordia Parish, Precinct 1-1. Promise is a citizen of the United States of America who is of African-American descent who voted in the March 12, 1996 Democratic Party Presidential Preference Primary, and cast his vote for Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. Promise is being denied his right to be represented by a delegate pledged to LaRouche at the Democratic Party National Convention. (Exhibit 1.)

  4. Plaintiff Charles Shaw ("Shaw") is a resident of the state of Louisiana, a Democrat, and a duly registered voter of the 6th C.D. in Catahonla Parish, Precinct 2-1. Shaw is a citizen of the United States of America who is of Afro-American descent who voted in the March 12, 1996 Democratic Party Presidential Preference Primary, and cast his vote for Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. Shaw is being denied his right to be represented by a delegate pledged to LaRouche at the Democratic Party National Convention. (Exhibit 2.)

  5. Plaintiff Delores Whitaker ("Whitaker") is a resident of the state of Virginia, a Democrat, and a duly registered voter of the Second Congressional District ("2nd C.D."). Whitaker is a citizen of the United States of America who is of African-American descent who attended her Democratic Party City/County caucus on April 13, 1996, and was elected as a delegate candidate pledged to LaRouche. Whitaker attended the 2nd C.D. convention held on May 11, 1996, and was prevented from voting for a National Delegate pledged to LaRouche. (Exhibit 3.)

  6. Plaintiff Nathaniel Sawyer ("Sawyer") is a resident of the state of Virginia, a Democrat, and a duly registered voter of the 2nd C.D. Sawyer is a citizen of the United States of America who is of African-American descent who attended his Democratic Party City/County caucus on April 13, 1996, and was elected as a delegate candidate pledged to LaRouche. Sawyer attended the 2nd C.D. convention held on May 11, 1996, and was prevented from voting for a National Delegate pledged to LaRouche. (Exhibit 4.)

  7. Plaintiff Joel Dejean ("Dejean") is a resident of the state of Texas, a Democrat, and a registered voter in Precinct 431, of the Sixth Senate District ("6th S.D."). He was the Democratic Party precinct chair from 19901994, and a Democratic Party candidate for Congress in the Twenty-fifth Congressional District in 1994. Dejean is a HaitianAmerican, is disabled as he has been declared legally blind, and is an engineer by training. Dejean attended his Democratic Party precinct caucus on March 12, 1996, was elected as a delegate pledged to LaRouche, after which he attended his Senate District caucus on March 30, 1996, and was elected as a LaRouche alternate to the State Convention. Dejean was, based on Defendant Fowler's directive, excluded from the Texas Democratic Party State Convention on June 7-8, 1996 in Dallas, Texas by a vote on June 6, 1996, of the State Democratic Executive Committee (SDEC). (Exhibit 5.)

  8. Plaintiff Eloi Morales ("Morales") is a resident of the state of Texas, a Democrat, and a registered voter in the Seventeenth Senate District ("17th S.D."). He is a citizen of the United States of America who is of Hispanic-American descent, who was elected as a LaRouche delegate at his precinct caucus on March 12, 1996. He attended the 17th S.D. caucus on March 30, 1996, but was, based on Defendant Fowler's directive, excluded from participating and/or voting in the 17th S.D. caucus held in Harris County. (Exhibit 6.)

  9. Plaintiff Geneva Jones ("Jones") is a resident of the District of Columbia, a lifelong Democrat, and a duly registered voter of D.C.'s 2nd C.D. Mrs. Jones is a citizen of the United States of America who is of African-American descent, who has served as an Advisory Neighborhood Council Commissioner for Ward 4 for 18 years. She is a retired administrative assistant for D.C. public schools, and an active member of the National League of Women Voters. Mrs. Jones sought to be a delegate candidate pledged to LaRouche and circulated a delegate nominating petition on which she had gathered 387 signatures from registered D.C. Democratic voters. The Democratic State Committee of D.C. declared Jones's candidacy void based on Defendant Fowler's directive to exclude delegates pledged to LaRouche. (Exhibit 7.)

  10. Plaintiff Grace Littlejohn ("Littlejohn") is a resident of the District of Columbia, a lifelong Democrat, and a duly registered voter of D.C.'s 2nd C.D. Mrs. Littlejohn is a citizen of the United States of America who is of African-American descent, a retired teacher who was cited by the D.C. Council for outstanding service, past President of the D.C. City Librarians Association, the organizer of the first student voter registration drive in D.C., has been awarded the Woman of the Year by the National Association of University Women College Alumni Association, and is currently the President of South Manor Neighborhood Civic Association. Mrs. Littlejohn sought to be a delegate candidate pledged to LaRouche and circulated a delegate nominating petition on which she had gathered 408 signatures from registered D.C. Democratic voters. The Democratic State Committee of D.C. declared Littlejohn's candidacy void based on Defendant Fowler's directive to exclude delegates pledged to LaRouche. (Exhibit 8.)

  11. Plaintiff Maria Elena Leyva Milton ("Milton") is a resident of the state of Arizona and a duly registered voter of the Arizona's 6th C.D. Milton is a citizen of the United States of American who is of Hispanic-American descent, a Democrat, and currently a declared Democratic candidate for Congress for the 4th C.D. Milton desired to vote for Plaintiff LaRouche whose name was certified to appear on the Presidential Preference Primary ballot, but was prevented by the action of Defendant Fowler and others who obtained the cancellation of that primary election, even though the State of Arizona primary procedure had been duly precleared by the Attorney General of the United States. (Exhibit 9.)

PARTIES DEFENDANT

  1. Defendant Donald L. Fowler ("Fowler") is the present "Chair" of the Democratic National Committee and is the author of certain letters. (Exhibits 10 and 11.) Fowler issued directives and conspired with the other Defendants, and others unknown to Plaintiffs, which actions had the purpose and/or effect of denying Plaintiffs and others similarly situated of their rights in violation of the Voting Rights Act, the Civil Rights Act, and the Constitution of the United States and the Amendments thereto.

  2. Defendant DNC is the national political committee of the Democratic Party which is charged with and did adopt Delegate Selection Rules for the Democratic National Convention and the accompanying Call for the 1996 Democratic National Convention. Parts of such Rules and Call set forth changes in voting practices and procedures that effect the rights of voters and candidates in presidential primaries and caucuses. The Democratic Party is qualified for federal funds to finance its National Party Convention, and along with State Democratic Party organizations prescribes the manner of selection of delegates and candidates for nomination to national offices of President and Vice President. The DNC has established the Democratic National Convention Committee, Inc. ("DNCC") as its agent to exercise the authority of the DNC for the National Convention.

  3. Defendant James L. Brady ("Brady") was the Louisiana Democratic Party chairman at all times relevant to this action, and in that capacity, in concert with Defendant Fowler and others unknown, took actions which had the purpose and/or effect of depriving Plaintiff LaRouche of his right of candidacy to federal office, and Plaintiffs Promise and Shaw (and others similarly situated) of being represented by a delegate pledged to LaRouche at the National Convention. Brady is president of the Association of State Democratic Party Chairs, and the vice-president of the Executive Committee of Defendant DNC.

  4. Defendant Louisiana Democratic Party and its Democratic State Central Committee, at all times relevant to this action, in concert with Defendant Fowler and others unknown, took actions which had the purpose and/or effect of depriving Plaintiff LaRouche of his right of candidacy to federal office and Plaintiffs Promise and Shaw (and others similarly situated) of being represented by a delegate pledged to LaRouche at the National Convention.

  5. Defendant Sue Wrenn ("Wrenn") is the Virginia Democratic Party chairman and in that capacity, in concert with Defendant Fowler and others unknown, took actions which had the purpose and/or effect of depriving Plaintiff LaRouche of his right of candidacy to federal office and Plaintiffs Whitaker and Sawyer (and others similarly situated) of the right to vote for or be represented by a delegate pledged to LaRouche at the National Convention.

  6. Defendant Kenneth Geroe ("Geroe") is the Virginia Democratic Party 2nd C.D. caucus chairman, and in that capacity, in concert with Defendant Fowler and others unknown, took action which had the purpose and/or effect of depriving Plaintiff LaRouche of his right of candidacy to federal office and Plaintiffs Whitaker and Sawyer (and others similarly situated) of the right to vote for or be represented by a delegate pledged to LaRouche at the National Convention.

  7. Defendant Virginia Democratic Party is a political party as defined in Virginia Code annotated 24.2-101, and its Democratic State Central Committee, constituted under Article 4 §4.1 et seq. of the Virginia Democratic Party Plan, at all times relevant to this action, in concert with Defendant Fowler and others unknown, took actions which had the purpose and/or effect of depriving Plaintiff LaRouche of his right of candidacy to federal office and Plaintiffs Whitaker and Sawyer (and others similarly situated) of their right to vote for or be represented by a delegate pledged to LaRouche at the National Convention.

  8. Defendant William White ("White") is the Texas Democratic Party chairman, and in that capacity, in concert with Defendant Fowler and others unknown, took actions which had the purpose and/or effect of depriving Plaintiff LaRouche of his right of candidacy to federal office and Plaintiffs Dejean and Morales (and others similarly situated) of participating and exercising their right to vote as duly elected delegate candidates pledged to LaRouche at the State Democratic Party Convention.

  9. Defendant Texas Democratic Party and its State Democratic Executive Committee ("SDEC"), at all times relevant to this action, in concert with Defendant Fowler and others unknown, took actions which had the purpose and/or effect of depriving Plaintiff LaRouche of his right of candidacy to federal office and Plaintiffs Dejean and Morales (and others similarly situated) of participating and exercising their right to vote as duly elected delegate candidates pledged to LaRouche at the State Democratic Party Convention.

  10. Defendant William Simons ("Simons") was, at all times relevant to this action, the chairman of the District of Columbia Democratic State Committee, and in that capacity, in concert with Defendant Fowler and others unknown, took actions which had the purpose and/or effect of depriving Plaintiffs Jones and Littlejohn (and others similarly situated) of their right to seek election as a delegate candidate pledged to LaRouche and otherwise participate in the State Democratic Party caucus.

  11. Defendant District of Columbia Democratic Party and its Democratic State Committee, at all times relevant to this action, in concert with Defendant Fowler and others unknown, took actions which had the purpose and/or effect of depriving Plaintiffs Jones and Littlejohn (and others similarly situated) of their right to seek election as a delegate candidate pledged to LaRouche and otherwise participate in the State Democratic Party caucus.

  12. Defendant Samuel Coppersmith ("Coppersmith") is the Arizona Democratic Party chairman, and in that capacity, in concert with Defendant Fowler and others unknown, acted to deprive Plaintiff Milton (and others similarly situated) of their right to vote for Plaintiff LaRouche and to participate in the Party caucus as a delegate candidate pledged to LaRouche.

  13. Defendant Arizona Democratic Party and its State Democratic Committee, at all times relevant to this action, in concert with Defendant Fowler and others unknown, took actions which had the purpose and/or effect of depriving Plaintiff LaRouche of his right of candidacy to federal office and Plaintiff Milton (and others similarly situated) of their right to vote for a candidate of their choice.

  14. Defendants unknown John Does, Richard Roes, Jane Does, and others unknown, conspired in concert with Defendant Fowler, to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights under the laws of the United States.

F A C T S

  1. Plaintiff LaRouche meets the criteria established in Article II, §1, Clause 4 of the Constitution of the United States to be a candidate for President of the United States. LaRouche is a Democrat actively seeking the nomination of the Democratic Party for President. He is certified for Matching Funds by the Federal Election Commission, and met the criteria to appear on the Presidential Preference Primary ballots in 28 states. (Exhibit 12, Marla Minnicino affidavit.)

  2. The total votes officially reported in those primaries for LaRouche's candidacy, nationwide, is 597,853. Candidate LaRouche received double-digit percentiles of the vote cast in a number of state primaries, despite a deliberate policy by the national news media to virtually black out his campaign -- even when he campaigned in various states, holding press conferences and "town meetings." (Id.)

  3. On or about March 12, 1994, Defendant DNC adopted Rule 11(K) of the Democratic Party Delegate Selection Rules for the 1996 Democratic National Convention which changed a voting qualification as defined in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (42 §1973c et seq.), which had the purpose and/or effect of depriving persons of their right to vote.

  4. Rule 11(K) of the Democratic Party Delegate Selection Rules for the 1996 Democratic National Convention states:

    For purposes of these rules, a Democratic candidate for president must be registered to vote, must be a declared Democrat, and must, as determined by the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, have established a bona fide record of public service, accomplishment, public writings and/or public statements affirmatively demonstrating that he or she has the interests, welfare and success of the Democratic Party of the United States at heart and will participate in the Convention in good faith.

    (Exhibit 13, DNC Rule 11(K).)

  5. Section 5 provides that whenever a state or political subdivision thereof "shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard or practice" different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, such state or subdivision cannot enforce such new qualification, standard practice or procedure unless or until it has either:

    1. instituted an action before the District Court of the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such change does not have the purpose and effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color; or

    2. submits such qualification, etc. to the Attorney General of the United States and such Attorney General does not interpose an objection within 60 days after such submission.

    (Such process is generally and will hereafter be referred to as "preclearance.")

  6. Defendant DNC's change in the National Party Rules deprived persons protected by the Voting Rights Act, the Civil Rights Act, and others of an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect a candidate of their choice.

  7. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Defendant DNC did not submit its change to the National Party Rules (Rule 11(K)) to the Attorney General of the United States, nor did they seek preclearance from the District Court for the District of Columbia as required by the Voting Rights Act, and therefore actions taken pursuant thereto are void as a matter of law.

  8. The provisions of Rule 11(K) are not preclearable as they do not meet the criteria of the Voting Rights Act nor do they comport with the Constitution, and the discriminatory effect of such provisions is a denial of First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

  9. On January 5, 1996 Defendant Fowler issued a letter to all Democratic Party State Chairs which made a unilateral determination that under the Democratic Party Delegate Selection Rules for the 1996 Democratic National Convention and the accompanying Call for the 1996 Democratic National Convention, Plaintiff LaRouche is not a bona fide candidate. Fowler declares:

    ... I have determined that Lyndon Larouche (sic) is not a bona fide Democrat and does not possess a record affirmatively demonstrating that he is faithful to, or has at heart, the interests, welfare and success of the Democratic Party of the United States. This determination is based on Mr. Larouche's expressed political beliefs, including beliefs which are explicitly racist and anti-Semitic, and otherwise utterly contrary to the fundamental beliefs, values and tenets of the Democratic Party and is also based on his past activities including exploitation of and defrauding contributors and voters.

    Accordingly, Mr. Larouche is not to be considered a qualified candidate for nomination of the Democratic Party for President ... Therefore, state parties, in the implementation of their delegate selection plans, should disregard any votes that might be cast for Mr. Larouche, should not allocate delegate positions to Mr. Larouche and should not recognize the selection of delegates pledged to him at any stage of the Delegate Selection Process.

    Further, Mr. Larouche will not be entitled to have his name placed in nomination for the office of President at the 1996 Democratic National Convention. No certification of a delegate pledged to [him] will be accepted by the Secretary of the DNC and no such delegate shall be placed on the Temporary Roll of the Convention. The National Chair will, if necessary, and upon the proper filing of a challenge, recommend to the Credentials Committee ... that the Committee resolve that any such delegate not be seated ...

    (Exhibit 10, supra.)

  10. Fowler's declarations are false, made with reckless disregard for the truth, and imposed voting qualifications, standards, practices or procedures which deprived Plaintiffs of their rights under the laws of the United States, and upon information and belief, were not precleared in accordance with 42 USC §1973 et seq.

  11. On January 8, 1996, Plaintiff LaRouche, having learned of the issuance of Defendant Fowler's January 5, 1996 letter to State Chairs, issued a reply to Fowler, Democratic Party State Chairs, and relevant other party members. LaRouche's reply states in relevant part:

    I am in receipt of a two-page, scurrilous letter, which presents itself as a policy statement, from Democratic National Committee chairperson Donald L. Fowler, to each and all `Democratic Party state Chairs.' ...

    The purpose of the letter is stated within the third of the letter's five paragraphs. The signator, ostensibly Fowler, states that `Lyndon Larouche is not a bona fide Democrat ... This determination is based on Mr. Larouche's expressed political beliefs, including beliefs which are explicitly racist and anti-Semitic ... .'

    On this account, either Mr. Fowler, or whoever issued this letter in his name, is purely and simply a liar.

    I am not obliged to speculate on the motives of whoever caused that letter to be put into circulation. However, since I have been an active Democratic Party campaigner during more than fifteen years, and have campaigned for the party's nomination five times, such an obviously hysterical document now, suggests that someone is terribly afraid of the extent of my estimated potential support for my candidacy... Since Mr. Clinton's reelection is virtually inevitable, and since I am committed to support his reelection after the August convention, one may ask: whether the authorship of the scurrilous letter either wrote in a deranged state of mind, or is operating under the influence of some secret agenda?

    Ironically, given its reliance upon that flagrant lie, the text of the letter as a whole is fairly described as recalling the totalitarian style of `political correctness' (Gleichschaltung) practiced by Nazi Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels, a quality which one might have thought were `utterly contrary to the fundamental beliefs, values and tenets of the Democratic Party.'

    Since that letter's reported determination by the Chair is explicitly premised upon no evidence other than a flagrant lie, I propose that the letter be tabled by all National and State party officials, until such time as Mr. Fowler may have rebuked whomever might have misused his name, or, in the alternative, may have made suitable apology for the utterance of so flagrantly false and disgusting a lie. ...

    (Exhibit 14.)

  12. Defendant DNC's adoption of Rule 11(K) and Defendant Fowler's actions are also in violation of Article II, §1, Clause 4 of the Constitution of the United States.

  13. Defendant DNC's adoption of Rule 11(K) and Defendant Fowler's actions are also inconsistent with Rule 4(B)1 and 2 of the Democratic Party Delegate Selection Rules for the 1996 Democratic National Convention which read:

    4(B)1
    All public meetings at all levels of the Democratic Party in each state should be open to all members of the Democratic Party regardless of race, sex, age, color, creed, national origin, religion, ethnic identity, sexual orientation, economic status, philosophical persuasion or physical disability (hereinafter collectively referred to as "status").
    4(B)2
    No test for membership in, or any oaths of loyalty to, the Democratic Party in any state should be required or used which has the effect of requiring prospective or current members of the Democratic Party to acquiesce in, condone or support discrimination based on "status."

  14. Plaintiffs find no provision in said Rules or procedure whereby the actions of Defendant Fowler could be challenged, despite the falseness of the charges and impropriety of his directives.

Louisiana

  1. Plaintiff LaRouche timely filed his declaration of candidacy and filing fee with the Louisiana Secretary of State to have his name appear on the March 12, 1996 statewide President Preference Primary. (Exhibit 12, supra Minnicino affidavit.)

  2. The filing deadline for declarations of candidacy to be a delegate and/or alternate was February 2, 1996. No one filed at that time as a delegate candidate pledged to LaRouche.

  3. Plaintiff LaRouche's name, along with President William Clinton and Elvena E. Lloyd-Duffie, appeared on the March 12, 1996 Presidential Preference Primary ballot as Democrats seeking the Democratic Party Presidential nomination. The official returns calculated by the Secretary of State's office show that candidate LaRouche received 18,150 votes, or 11.7% statewide.

  4. In the 6th C.D., the official returns also show that LaRouche received 3,995 votes, which is over 15%. (Exhibit 15, Debra Hanania-Freeman affidavit.)

  5. Louisiana Election Code at Part III. Presidential Preference Primary, §1280.27 Delegates to political party conventions; selection; oaths; voting; allocation among presidential nominees, provides:

    1. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, at least ninety days prior to a presidential preference primary election, the state governing body of each eligible political party shall establish procedures to be followed in the selection of individual delegates and alternates to the convention of that party, including procedures for the selection of committed and uncommitted delegates. A copy of any rule adopted by the state party shall be filed with the secretary of state within seventy days after its adoption and shall become public record.

    2. Delegates shall be allocated among the presidential candidates according to the results of the presidential primary and according to guidelines established by the governing bodies of the respective parties.

    (Id.)

  6. According to the governing Party Rules (both nationally and in Louisiana), a Presidential candidate qualifies to receive a district level delegate to the National Convention when "a threshold of at least 15% of the votes cast at the primary in each congressional district" is reached. (Id.)

  7. The actual calculation of Plaintiff LaRouche's percentage of vote garnered in the 6th C.D. is 16.696%, which under the Rules requires that he be awarded a district level delegate to attend the National Convention pledged to him. (Id.)

  8. Because no Louisiana resident of the 6th C.D. had prefiled as a delegate pledged to LaRouche, LEC national campaign representative Debra Hanania-Freeman, attempted to reach Defendant James J. Brady, the Louisiana Democratic Party state chairman, to work out the post-primary procedure by which a dele-gate pledged to LaRouche would be selected for the 6th C.D. (Id.)

  9. The governing Democratic Party Rule for such a selection, from the national Delegate Selection Rules is Rule 12(C), under the title "Fair Reflection of Presidential Preferences." Rule 12(C) reads:

    A presidential candidate or his/her authorized representative(s) should act in good faith to slate delegate and alternate candidates, however, in any event, if a presidential candidate ... has qualified to receive delegates and alternates but has failed to slate a sufficient number of delegate and alternate candidates, then additional delegates and alternates for that preference will be selected in a special post-primary procedure. The State Party will administer special post-primary procedures according to rules approved by the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee and such procedures should be set forth in the state's delegate selection plan, where applicable.

    (Id.)

  10. On March 18, 1996, Mrs. Freeman called the Louisiana Democratic Party headquarters in Baton Rouge, attempting to reach Defendant Brady. She was told that Brady was not in the Baton Rouge office, but worked in Washington, DC. (Id.)

  11. Freeman explained the reason for her call. The secretary acknowledged that she knew LaRouche had qualified for a delegate in the 6th C.D., and told Freeman the matter was being handled by Jim Nickel, the Executive Director of the Louisiana Democratic Party. (Id.)

  12. On March 19, the next day, Freeman reached Nickel at the Baton Rouge office and explained that based upon the Secretary of State's official returns, LaRouche is entitled to one district level delegate and one alternate. Nickel replied, "Yes, indeed, it certainly does appear that he is." (Id.)

  13. Freeman then proposed, in accordance with the National Party Rules, that a LaRouche caucus be convened in the 6th C.D. on March 30, along with the other district caucuses scheduled to meet. She further stated that if this presented a problem, she was open to working out alternative dates. (Id.)

  14. Nickel's response to Freeman was to ask her if she was aware of Defendant Fowler's January 5, 1996 letter to all state chairmen, stating his intention to deny certification of any delegate pledged to LaRouche at the National Convention. After discussion, Nickel asked Freeman to send him a letter summarizing the facts and LaRouche's request for the convening of a post-primary procedure. (Id.)

  15. On March 20, 1996, Freeman faxed and mailed her letter to Nickel, with copies to Vice Chair Mary Lou Winters, and State Chair Defendant Brady who was in Washington, D.C. (Id.)

  16. After receiving no reply to her letter, and having made several calls to the Baton Rouge office to speak with Nickel, on March 27, now three days before the scheduled district caucuses, Freeman was told by the secretary that as far as she understood no decision had been reached on "the LaRouche matter." (Id.)

  17. By April 1, 1996, still having received no reply Freeman sent a second letter to Nickel, Winters, and Defendant Brady. (Id.)

  18. On April 9, 1996 Freeman received, by fax, a letter from Defendant Brady which was dated April 4, 1996. Brady's letter stated in relevant part: "Please be advised, [based on] the declarations of the National Party Chair ... Lyndon LaRouche was not entitled to a delegate or an alternate to the 1996 National Convention from Louisiana." (Id.)

  19. Freeman attempted to reach Brady by phone at the Baton Rouge office, but was told he could only be reached at Defendant DNC's offices in Washington, D.C. Freeman called the DNC head-quarters to speak with Brady who refused to take her call. (Id.)

Virginia

  1. The Virginia Democratic Party opted for using only a caucus procedure, foregoing a primary election as is allowed under Virginia Code §24.2-101 and §24.2-500 et seq.

  2. Democrats seeking to be delegate candidates filed their statement of candidacies by April 8, 1996 with Party officials. A little over one hundred delegate candidates, with a declared preference for Plaintiff LaRouche, timely filed the required papers with Party officials all across the state, all of which were accepted.

  3. City and County caucuses were held on April 13 and 15, 1996, at which over 70 persons were elected around the state as delegates pledged to LaRouche. The Congressional Districts in which delegate candidates pledged to LaRouche won are the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 10th. (Exhibit 16, Suzanne Klebe affidavit.)

  4. At the local caucuses in Virginia Beach and the 2nd C.D. of Norfolk, together comprising all of the 2nd C.D., LaRouche delegates polled 18% and 22%, respectively, resulting in 29 delegates in Virginia Beach and 15 in the 2nd C.D. of Norfolk elected to represent LaRouche. Twenty alternates pledged to LaRouche were also elected in these caucuses.

  5. At sometime between April 15 and May 10, 1996, after these 2nd C.D. LaRouche delegates had been elected, Defendant Wrenn and/or Geroe and/or Virginia Democratic State Central Committee, sent the 2nd C.D. Rules pertaining to the delegate selection process to the headquarters of Defendants DNC and Virginia Democratic Party, "for approval." (Id.)

  6. On May 3, 1996, in compliance with Virginia Delegate Selection Plan Rule 2.5.3, four elected LaRouche delegates from the 2nd C.D., filed the required papers to run for a National Convention delegate position with 2nd C.D. Chairman, Defendant Geroe who accepted them on behalf of the 2nd C.D. (Id.)

  7. On May 10, 1996, the day before the 2nd C.D. convention was to be held, Defendant Geroe spoke with LaRouche's Virginia campaign representative, Suzanne Klebe, who was also an elected LaRouche delegate from the 2nd C.D. She asked Geroe to explain the section of the 2nd C.D. Rules that changed the Rules of the Virginia Democratic Party Plan which, on the eve of the convention, added a new qualification for the election of Nat-ional Convention delegates -- a qualification that would poten-tially exclude delegate candidates pledged to LaRouche. (Id.)

  8. Defendant Geroe replied that he "had heard" that LaRouche was not considered to be a Democrat, but that unless he had some written verification of this from Defendant Fowler, it was his intention to proceed at the next day's caucus to recognize and allow LaRouche delegates to participate. (Id.)

  9. Klebe, lastly, asked Geroe if he was being fully forthcoming since the last minute change incorporated into the 2nd C.D. Rules seemed to have no other purpose than to exclude LaRouche delegates at this last stage of the selection process. Moreover, she pointed out that the new qualifications for President are in conflict with those in the United States Constitution. (Id.)

  10. Defendant Geroe responded by saying that if he had a letter from Defendant Fowler he would have to follow its direction, and besides the Democratic Party can make its own requirements for choosing candidates.

  11. The Virginia 2nd C.D. convention was held on May 11, 1996. One-hundred eighty six delegates/alternates attended, and of these, 51 were LaRouche delegates (44) and alternates (7). The LaRouche caucus, therefore, had 44 delegates out of 179 delegates in attendance which constituted 24.58%. (Id.)

  12. The 2nd C.D. LaRouche delegate/alternate slate is 25% AfricanAmerican voters, and has one Hispanic voter, one adopted American-Indian voter, and one disabled voter. Additionally, there is a mix of men, women and senior citizens. (Id.)

  13. The Virginia Delegate Selection Plan, 5.4.k. reads:

    There are no filing or petition requirements for presidential candidates. Any candidate receiving at least 15% of the vote cast at any caucus or convention will be awarded delegates in proportion to that candidate's share of the vote.

    (Id.)

  14. The Delegate Selection Rules for the 1996 Democratic National Convention adopted by Defendant DNC provides at Rule 12(B):

    States shall allocate district-level delegates and alternates in proportion to the percentage of the primary or caucus vote won in that district by each preference, except that preferences falling below a 15% threshold shall not be awarded any delegates....

    (Id.)

  15. Thus, according to both the Virginia Delegate Selection Plan, and the national Delegate Selection Rules, the LaRouche caucus was viable (i.e., had passed the 15% threshold), and because it represented 24.58% of the people in attendance at the caucus, would have elected and been awarded a National Convention delegate.

  16. Defendant Geroe, five to ten minutes before calling the convention to order, told Klebe that he had just been given Defendant Fowler's January 5, 1996 letter by Virginia Democratic Party Counsel, Jack Young. Geroe also indicated he had a copy of Plaintiff LaRouche's January 8, 1996 reply letter to the Fowler letter. Geroe then said based on the rules and the Fowler letter he was going to declare the LaRouche caucus "nonviable." (Id.)

  17. Klebe challenged Geroe's announced course of action, noting that this would be in violation of the Virginia Democratic Party Plan and Delegate Selection Plan. Defendant Geroe replied that he was not willing to go against Defendant DNC's determin-ation, and that the only recourse for the LaRouche delegates was to oppose the Rules. (Id.)

  18. When the 2nd C.D. caucus was called to order by Defendant Geroe, the LaRouche delegates raised objections to the Rules as applied, specifically stating that Defendant DNC's Rule 11(K) is in contradiction to the Virginia Democratic Party Delegate Selection Plan Rules 5.4.d and 5.4.j which read:

    5.4.d
    No delegate at any level of the delegate selection process shall be mandated by law or Party rules to vote contrary to that person's presidential choice as expressed at the time the delegate is elected. (Rule 11.l.)
    5.4.j
    No delegate at any level of the delegate selection process shall be mandated by law or Party rules to vote contrary to that person's presidential choice as expressed at the time the delegate is elected. Delegates elected to the National Convention pledged to a presidential candidate shall in good conscience reflect the sentiments of those who elected them.
    (Id.)

  19. The Chairman of the 2nd C.D. Rules Committee, William Nusbaum, responded to the LaRouche delegates' challenge stating that the national Party rules had to take precedence. A motion was made and seconded to strike from the 2nd C.D. Rules sections 10.4 and 10.5, and those sections which incorporated Rule 11 and 11(K). By voice vote the motion was defeated. (Id.)

  20. Defendant Geroe moved the agenda and the Rules were voted up. Geroe then read the Fowler letter out loud to the assembled attendees. He then declared that "under the ruling of Democratic National Chair ... I declare that there is only one viable caucus at this Convention" i.e., the Clinton caucus. Despite further challenges to the actions of Geroe, he disbanded the LaRouche caucus. (Id.)

  21. Following the caucus, Klebe questioned Mr. Young as to why the Virginia Democratic Party was now excluding LaRouche and duly elected delegates pledged to him, which it had up until this caucus allowed to participate in the selection process. Young replied that LaRouche is not a Democratic candidate according to Defendant Fowler's January 5, 1996 letter, and therefore people were supporting someone who is not a candidate. (Id.)

  22. On May 16, 1996, Klebe timely filed a Challenge to the 2nd C.D. convention results with both Defendant Sue Wrenn, Chair of the Virginia Democratic Party, and Defendant DNC's Rules and Bylaws Committee at DNC headquarters. (Id.)

  23. On June 8, 1996 at the State Convention, Defendant Young handed Klebe a letter from Defendant Wrenn which acknowledged the May 16th Klebe Challenge, but which stated the Party would take no action. (Id.)

  24. Defendant DNC, despite having received the Challenge, has never acknowledged or responded to it. (Id.)

Texas

  1. On December 28, 1995 Plaintiff LaRouche, in accordance with Texas Election Code Title 11 §191.002 and the Rules of the Texas Democratic Party, had his Application for a Place on the Democratic Party 1996 General Primary Ballot filed with the Texas Democratic Party headquarters in Austin, Texas. Receipt and acknowledgment was received by Plaintiff LEC of a form letter dated January 1995, signed by Greg Beatty, Primary Director. (Exhibit 17, Brian Lantz affidavit.)

  2. On January 25, 1996, Texas DNC member Billie Carr announced to a meeting of Democratic Party precinct chairmen from the 17th Senate District (S.D.) that Defendant DNC had ruled LaRouche is not a Democrat. Based upon that determination, Carr demanded that precinct chairs not allow anyone to sign in with a preference for LaRouche at the up-coming Presidential Preference Primary caucuses. (Id.)

  3. The Texas Presidential Primary was held on March 12, 1996, and candidate LaRouche received 28,258 votes statewide. (Id.)

  4. Texas Democratic precinct caucuses were held on the evening of March 12, 1996. Democrats with the presidential preference "LaRouche" were allowed to sign in, and statewide 35 of these Democrats were elected as delegates to attend their respective state Senate District caucuses.

  5. On March 30, 1996 the Senate District caucuses were held throughout the state. Three delegates and three alternates pledged to LaRouche were elected in the 6th S.D. to attend the State Convention.

  6. In the 17th S.D. more than one S.D. caucus site was used. At the Brazoria County 17th S.D. caucus one LaRouche delegate was elected. (Exhibit 18, Linda Browning affidavit.)

  7. However, at the 17th S.D. convened in Harris County, duly elected precinct delegates pledged to LaRouche were refused credentials at the door. These individuals were told that if they changed their preference to "Clinton" or "Uncommitted", they would be credentialed to participate in the caucus. (Exhibit 17, supra Lantz affidavit.)

  8. These 17th S.D. LaRouche delegates received no prior notice of a challenge to their credentials, in violation of Article V-A of the Texas Democratic Party Rules which provides that a "challenger shall deliver a copy of the challenge to the County or Senatorial District Chair and to the challenged Delegate(s) or Alternate(s) at least 3 days before the date of the Convention." (Id.)

  9. Based on a challenge to this exclusion, the 17th S.D. chairman, Ken Olive, before calling the convention to order, convened the Rules Committee to hear the LaRouche delegates' challenge. (Id.)

  10. The 17th S.D. Rules Committee hearing was chaired by Ed Cogburn who, among others, stated that the grounds for the unseating of the LaRouche delegates was Defendant Fowler's January 5, 1996 determination. After a hearing the Rules Committee voted to exclude the 17th S.D. LaRouche delegates from the caucus. (Id.)

  11. On June 5, 1996 6th S.D. LaRouche delegate Michael Maddi received a message that a person identifying himself as a representative of the Temporary Credentials Committee had called to tell him that credentials of Maddi and the other LaRouche delegates from the 6th S.D. had been challenged. The person also said that a meeting of the State Democratic Executive Committee (SDEC) would be held the next morning in Dallas. (Id.)

  12. Plaintiff LaRouche, having been informed of the arbitrary actions of the Temporary Credentials Committee, issued a statement addressed to the Texas State Democratic Executive Committee which states:

    The decision by the Temporary Credentials Committee of the Texas Democratic Party to exclude from the state convention duly elected delegates pledged to Presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche, if adopted by the [SDEC], would be in flagrant violation of the Voting Rights Act.

    No party organization could lawfully accept an order by its chairman which violates this Act. The order from Don Fowler to exclude LaRouche delegates is a violation of this Act.

    This decree by DNC chairman Fowler must therefore be nullified in order to comply with federal law. The DNC chairman does not have the lawful authority to deprive voters of their rights.

    (Exhibit 19, LaRouche statement.)

  13. On June 6, 1996, the SDEC held its meeting, chaired by Defendant Bill White, to approve various committee reports. After the reports of the resolutions and rules committees were read and approved, Temporary Credentials Committee Chair Roberta Bilsky simply asked for a vote on her committee's report without reading it. (Exhibit 20, Michael Maddi affidavit.)

  14. Maddi took time off from work and went to Dallas to attend the SDEC meeting. Defendant White told Maddi before the meeting began that the challenge to the LaRouche delegates' credentials was initiated on the basis of Defendant Fowler's directive. When Maddi attempted to address the committee, he was ruled out of order by Defendant White. The SDEC proceeded to adopt the Temporary Credentials Committee report, even though its contents were not read or made public. (Id.)

  15. On June 7-8, 1996, the Texas Democratic Party State Convention occurred. When Maddi and other 6th S.D. duly elected LaRouche delegates arrived at the Convention they were refused credentials. Other LaRouche delegates from different Senate Districts were not refused credentials and were seated at the State Convention. (Id.)

  16. Linda Browning, a 17th S.D. LaRouche delegate, filed a challenge to the exclusion of the 6th S.D. LaRouche delegates which was addressed to Chairman White. The challenge was timely submitted and accepted by officials representing the Chair. Browning was told that the "Permanent Credentials Committee" would hear the challenge. (Exhibit 18, supra Browning affidavit.)

  17. The Permanent Credentials Committee met within one hour after the Convention opened and was presented with the report of the Temporary Credentials Committee and challenges made to a list of elected delegates. Along with the report, each committee member was handed a copy of Defendant Fowler's January 5, 1996 letter which was to be considered in connection with the challenge to LaRouche delegates elected from the 6th S.D. (Exhibit 21, Linda Minor affidavit.)

  18. Committee member Linda Minor asked whether the committee was following Texas Democratic Party Rules or the rules referred to in the Fowler letter. Chairman Bilsky replied that "all the rules" were to be considered. (Id.)

  19. Minor then asked that the committee members be provided with the full text of the rules referred to in the Fowler letter as she was troubled by several matters:

    1. what authority did the DNC have to adopt rules after the last national convention in 1992, which rules had not been adopted by the National Party delegates?

    2. could those rules supersede the rules adopted by the Texas Democratic Party?

    3. could the rules contravene the Texas Election Code?

    4. did the DNC rule (Rule 11(K)) contain any provisions for due process?

    5. if a delegate was prevented from serving in the convention by the imposition of an unconstitutional rule passed by the DNC, would that open up the Party to a lawsuit and possible damages under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act or other federal laws?

    (Id.)

  20. At this point, LaRouche delegate Maddi was allowed three minutes to speak on the challenge. After some questions were put to Maddi and further discussion, a Hispanic member of the committee made a friendly amendment to the motion on the floor to vote on the LaRouche delegate challenges separately. A voice vote was taken, but was so close to call that roll call vote was taken, and this friendly amendment was defeated. (Id.)

  21. Chair Bilsky then moved the agenda and a motion was made to vote on the Report as a whole, without considering each challenge separately, even though this violates Texas Democratic Party Rule Article V (H) which requires the Convention to vote on each challenge separately. The committee then voted to adopt the report of the Temporary Credentials Committee, excluding the LaRouche delegates. (Id.)

  22. Committee member Minor noted that during the discussion, "most of the persons concerned about the challenge of the LaRouche delegates were minorities." One such person even remarked to her, "This is exactly how they kept us (Blacks) out of the Party; if they can do this to them, they can come back and do it to us again." (Id.)

District of Columbia

  1. Plaintiffs Jones and Littlejohn, as well as eight other persons, sought election to the office of delegate pledged to candidate LaRouche in the District of Columbia.

  2. Plaintiff Jones gathered 387 petitions signatures from registered Democrats in support of his/her candidacy for delegate, and Plaintiff Littlejohn gathered 408 petitions signatures from registered Democrats in support of his/her candidacy for delegate. (Exhibits 7 and 8, supra, Jones and Littlejohn affidavits.) Similarly, the other LaRouche delegate candidates gathered petition signatures such that a total more than 4,000 D.C. registered Democrats had signed petitions. (Exhibit 22, Diane Sare affidavit.)

  3. By letters dated March 18, 1996 and April 24, 1996, Defendant William Simons issued a letter (co-signed by Mary Eva Candon, co-chair of the Delegate Selection Committee) to delegate candidates pledged to LaRouche stating that their candidacy "is voided" and/or "not permitted" because of Defendant DNC had sent a notice to the D.C. Democratic State Committee that it had determined LaRouche is not a bona fide Democrat, and thus not a qualified candidate. The March 18 letter further states, LaRouche will not be entitled to have his name put in nomination and no delegate pledged to him will be certified. At the bottom of the letter it reads: "Attachment: DNC Letter Dated 01/05/96." (Id.)

  4. On or about March 25, 1996 Defendant William Simons wrote to Defendant Fowler. Upon information and belief, Simons' letter concerned the delegate candidates from the District of Columbia pledged to LaRouche. (Id.)

  5. By letter dated April 1, 1996, Defendant Fowler replied to Defendant Simons' March 25th correspondence. Fowler's response reiterates his determination that LaRouche is not a bona fide Democrat and "accordingly LaRouche is not to be considered a qualified candidate." Fowler also writes that the DNC "supports the DC Democratic Party's decision to deny petitions to individuals wishing to file as LaRouche delegate candidates." He concludes that persons pledged to LaRouche "should not be allowed to participate in post-primary caucuses, and "Should it become necessary, the DNC will provide full legal support in conjunction with the DC Democratic Party in its implementation of the Party's position..." (Id.)

  6. On May 1, 1996 seven of the ten LaRouche delegate candidates, accompanied by political and legal observers, went the D.C. Democratic Party headquarters to file the delegate nominating petitions for all ten candidates. D.C. Democratic Party Executive Director Ms. Mumbi Carter refused to accept the petitions, stating that each LaRouche delegate candidate had been sent a certified letter telling them that their candidacy is void. Ms. Carter when asked the reason for her refusal referred each person to the March 18 letter they had received. (Id.)

  7. To ensure that the delegate petitions would be timely filed with Defendant D.C. Democratic Party, Mrs. Sare, the designated LaRouche campaign representative for D.C. and a delegate candidate, sent by certified overnight mail, the petitions gathered by each of the ten LaRouche delegate candidates, and four declarations of candidacy which the Party had refused to accept earlier. (The filing deadline for delegate petitions was May 2.) (Id.)

  8. Mrs. Sare did receive back from the U.S. Postal Service the Certified mail receipt evidencing that Defendant D.C. Democratic Party did receive the petitions etc. However, she received no response from Defendant Simons or the Party. (Id.)

Arizona

  1. Plaintiff LaRouche's nomination papers were timely filed with the Arizona Secretary of State's office requesting that his name be placed on the Democratic Party Presidential Preference primary ballot. On January 19, 1996 the Secretary of State's office notified Plaintiff LEC that it had certified LaRouche's name for the ballot. (Exhibits 9 and 12, supra Milton and Minnicino affidavits.)

  2. Upon information and belief, shortly thereafter, Defendant Fowler in concert with Defendant Samuel Coppersmith, state chairman of the Arizona Democratic Party, filed a lawsuit which sought, and ultimately obtained, the cancellation of the Presidential Preference primary election, thereby depriving Plaintiff Milton and others similarly situated of their right to vote for a candidate of their choice.

  3. At one of the hearings before Arizona Superior Court Judge Christopher Skelly, Coppersmith's attorney argued that the Democratic Party does "not extend the franchise to LaRouche." Moreover, Defendant Coppersmith was overheard repeating Defendant Fowler's determination that "LaRouche is not a Democrat" to news reporters who attended the hearings. (Exhibit 9, supra Milton affidavit.)

  4. Defendants' cancellation of the Arizona's first Presidential Preference primary denied Plaintiff LaRouche of his right to seek office and deprived him of the opportunity to obtain votes win delegates.

  5. The cancellation of said primary was not precleared, although the holding of this primary had been properly precleared by the State of Arizona.

Pennsylvania

  1. On or about July 7, 1996, Plaintiff LEC contracted with numerous television and radio stations in Pennsylvania to purchase advertising time, for the purpose of advancing LaRouche's candidacy for the Democratic Party Presidential nomination.

  2. Upon information and belief, the Pennsylvania Association of Broadcasters circulated a memorandum, including Defendant Fowler's January 5, 1996 letter, advising stations not to air the LaRouche advertisements because Fowler had said LaRouche is not a bona fide candidate. (Exhibit 23.)

  3. On July 26, 1996, David Skeba, vice president/director of programming, for Cornerstone Television, Inc. informed the Plaintiff LEC, that Cornerstone would not honor an executed contract to air the LaRouche advertisements on WPCB-TV in Pittsburgh, and WKBS-TV in Altoona, citing the Fowler letter as his reason. (Exhibit 24.)

  4. On July 23, 1996, attorneys representing WSEE-TV of Erie, Pa. also reneged on an agreement to air a LaRouche campaign advertisement citing the Fowler letter as a reason. (Exhibit 25.)

COUNT ONE

FAILURE TO OBTAIN PRECLEARANCE OF CHANGE OF
CANDIDATE STATUS AND RIGHT TO VOTE

  1. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 - 130.

  2. As a result of the adoption, enforcement, execution and operation of Rule 11(K) of the Democratic Party Delegate Selection Rules for the 1996 Democratic National Convention, Plaintiffs were affected by a change in voting standards, practices or procedures different from that in force or affect on November 1, 1964, in violation of 42 USC §1973c. The adoption, enforcement, execution and operation of said Rule denies to Plaintiffs rights guaranteed to them by the First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; 42 USC §1971 et seq.; and 42 USC §1983.

COUNT TWO

FAILURE TO PRECLEAR CHANGE IN PROCEDURE WHICH
DISQUALIFIED A CANDIDATE BY DEFENDANT FOWLER

  1. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 - 132.

  2. Defendant Fowler, purporting to act on the basis of the invalid Rule 11(K) of the Democratic Party Delegate Selection Rules for the 1996 Democratic National Convention, issued directives to State Party Chairmen which interfered with the right of Plaintiff LaRouche to be a candidate for nomination to Federal Office in Democratic Party primary caucuses in Louisiana, Virginia, and Texas, the District of Columbia.

  3. Defendant Fowler's directives had the purpose and/or effect of denying Plaintiffs an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice to be certified and seated delegates to the Democratic National Convention.

  4. The adoption, enforcement, execution and operation of Defendant Fowler's directives had the purpose and/or effect of denying to Plaintiffs rights guaranteed to them by the First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; 42 USC §1971 et seq.; and 42 USC §1983.

COUNT THREE

DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS

  1. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 - 136.

  2. Plaintiffs have no plain, adequate or speedy remedy at law except this Complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief implementing the rights declared. Without appropriate injunctive relief, plaintiffs will continue to suffer irreparable and immediate injury, hardship and harm.

  3. The adoption, enforcement, execution and operation of Rule 11(K) in combination with Defendant Fowler's directives denies to Plaintiffs rights guaranteed to them by the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

COUNT FOUR

CONSPIRACY

  1. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 - 139.

  2. Prior to March 12, 1994, Defendant Fowler and others unknown to Plaintiffs conspired together to amend the Democratic Party Delegate Selection Rules for the 1996 Democratic National Convention by formulating, sponsoring, and adopting Rule 11(K) with the intent and result of using said Rule to limit and otherwise damage the presidential candidacy of Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., for the Democratic Party Presidential nomination; and with the intent and result of depriving the named Plaintiffs and other voters similarly situated of their rights under 42 USC §1971 et seq. and 42 USC §1983, and First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; or by acting in reckless disregard of all of those rights.

  3. On or about January 5, 1996 Defendant Fowler and others unknown to Plaintiffs furthered their conspiracy by the formulation and mailing of a letter to all Democratic Party State Chairs with the intent and result of using said letter to limit and otherwise damage the presidential candidacy of Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., for the Democratic Party Presidential nomination; and with the intent and result of depriving the named Plaintiffs and other voters similarly situated of their rights under 42 USC §1971 et seq. and 42 USC §1983, and First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; or by acting in reckless disregard of all of those rights.

  4. On or about April 1, 1996 Defendant Fowler and others unknown to Plaintiffs furthered their conspiracy by the formulation and mailing of a letter to William Simons, co-chair of the District of Columbia Democratic State Committee, and others unknown to Plaintiffs with the intent and result of using said letter to limit and otherwise damage the presidential candidacy of Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., for the Democratic Party Presidential nomination; and with the intent and result of depriving the named Plaintiffs and other voters similarly situated of their rights under 42 USC §1971 et seq. and 42 USC §1983, and First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; or by acting in reckless disregard of all of those rights.

COUNT FIVE

DELEGATE CERTIFICATION & SEATING

  1. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 - 143.

  2. Plaintiff LaRouche had sufficient votes to be awarded a National Convention delegate in the 6th C.D. of Louisiana, but due to the improper actions of Defendants those votes were not counted and certified, all in further violation of Plaintiffs' rights guaranteed by the First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; 42 USC §1971 et seq.; and 42 USC §1983.

  3. Plaintiff LaRouche had sufficient votes to be awarded a National Convention delegate in the 2nd C.D. of Virginia, but due to the improper actions of Defendants those votes were not counted and certified, all in further violation of Plaintiffs' rights guaranteed by the First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; 42 USC §1971 et seq.; and 42 USC §1983.

  4. Plaintiffs Promise, Shaw, Whitaker, and Sawyer and others similarly situated in Louisiana and Virginia, have been deprived of their right to be represented at the Democratic Party National Convention by a candidate of their choice, due to the improper actions of Defendants all in further violation of Plaintiffs' rights guaranteed by the First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; 42 USC §1971 et seq.; and 42 USC §1983.

  5. Plaintiffs are without any remedy save the actions of this Court, and request the Court allow Plaintiff LaRouche and/or Plaintiff LEC to designate such proper persons to be seated and certified as National Convention delegates from those jurisdic-tions, and that the State and National Party organizations be enjoined from interference with the certification and seating of these delegates.

COUNT SIX

INJUNCTION

  1. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 - 148.

  2. Plaintiffs request that matters not precleared, Rule 11(K) and Defendant Fowler's directives, be declared void, and that this Court adjudge that such provisions are in themselves unable to be precleared as they have the purpose and/or effect of depriving Plaintiffs and others similarly situated of their civil rights, and that Defendants be enjoined, both temporarily and permanently, from promulgating similar provisions as found in Rule 11(K), in the future.

  3. Plaintiffs further request that such injunction be directed to Defendants, their Committees, agents, employees, and all persons acting in concert, voiding their actions which have deprived Plaintiffs of their rights.

COUNT SEVEN

DAMAGES

  1. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 - 151.

  2. Plaintiff LaRouche, acting through his duly constituted campaign committee (Plaintiff LEC), partially funded with Federal funds, has expended funds in excess of $269,000 in states where actions of the Defendants have denied him of his right to candidacy, and deprived the named Plaintiffs and others similarly situated their right to candidacy and/or vote, or both.

  3. The actions of Defendant Fowler caused the violation of Plaintiff LaRouche's rights under the U.S. Constitution Article II, §1, Clause 4, and all Plaintiffs' rights under the First, Fifth Amendments, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and their rights under 42 USC §1971 et seq., and thus an award of compensatory and punitive damages and attorney fees, from Defendant Fowler pursuant to 42 USC §§1983 et seq. and 1985 et seq. is sought.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiffs have not adequate remedy at law and unless the relief requested herein is granted, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm in that their rights to vote and to run for public office will be denied and abridged in violation of the Voting Rights Act (42 USC § 1973 et seq.); and further the rights of Plaintiffs under the First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution, and the provisions of the Civil Rights Act (42 USC § 1983 and 1985 et seq.) will be denied and abridged.

WHEREFORE PLAINTIFFS PRAY THAT;

1. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 USC §2284 and 42 USC §1973c, a District Court of three judges be convened.

2. That in light of the exigencies of time this Court expedite the response of the Defendants.

3. That this Court declare Rule 11(K) of the Delegate Selection Rules for the 1996 Democratic National Convention to be void for failure of preclearance under the Voting Rights Act.

4. That the actions taken by Defendant Fowler as "Chair" of the Defendant DNC be declared void for failure of preclearance under the Voting Rights Act.

5. That delegates be designated by Plaintiff LaRouche and/or Plaintiff LEC to be certified and seated as delegates to the National Convention from Louisiana's 6th C.D. and Virginia's 2nd C.D., that the Court enjoin those persons who purport to hold the seats in those two delegate districts (if there be any) from claiming such seat, and that the Court order Defendant DNC to certify, seat and direct the Secretary of the DNC to place those designated LaRouche delegates on the Roll of the Convention.

6. That this Court award damages, both compensatory and punitive, for the actions improperly taken in violation of the Civil Rights Act.

7. That this Court award costs and attorney fees as appropriate under both the Voting Rights Act and under the Civil Rights Act.

8. That this Court retain jurisdiction of this cause.

9. That this Court grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: August 2, 1996

Respectfully submitted,

ODIN P. ANDERSON
Mass. Bar #018400
Anderson, Rossi & Davis, P.C.
Four Longfellow Place, Ste. 3705
Boston, MA 02114
(617) 742-8200

JAMES E. WILSON, Jr.
Ala. Bar #
732 Carter Hill Road
Montgomery, AL 36106
(205) 834-9899

THEO MITCHELL
S.C. Bar #
9 Bradshaw Street
Greenville, SC 29601
(864) 235-6361

and

NINA J. GINSBURG
D.C. Bar #251496
908 King Street, Suite 200
Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 684-4333

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Back to top

clear
clear
clear