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Air Force Journal Admits
U.S. Aggressive Intention against Russia

March 7, 2013 (EIRNS)—The risk that nuclear weapons will be used in a future conflict has been heightened by two changes that have taken place since the end of the Cold War, despite the reduction of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, argue two authors in a feature article published last week in the Strategic Studies Quarterly journal of the U.S. Air Force Air University. The authors are Keir A. Leiber, associate professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and Daryl G. Press, an associate professor of government at Dartmouth University

The danger that they are pointing to is actually the result of the binding of U.S. war policy—that of the Obama and George W. Bush administrations—to British imperial geopolitical intentions to wipe out most of the world's population.

Leiber and Press posit at the outset of their article that, number one,

"technological innovation has dramatically improved the ability of states to launch 'counterforce' attacks—that is, military strikes aimed at disarming an adversary by destroying its nuclear weapons."

Number two, they argue that

"in the coming decades, deterring the use of nuclear weapons during conventional wars will be much harder than most analysts believe."

The basis of Leiber and Press's first argument is that:

"Very accurate delivery systems, new reconnaissance technologies, and the downsizing of arsenals from Cold War levels have made both conventional and nuclear counterforce strikes against nuclear arsenals much more feasible than ever before.'

During the Cold War, they note, neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union could launch a disarming first strike against the other because each side had so many weapons deliverable by different modes that an attempted counterforce strike could not prevent a retaliatory reply. This is no longer the case. The reduction of nuclear arsenals on both sides means there are now fewer targets to hit.

In 2006, they modeled a hypothetical U.S. first strike against Russia. "The same models that were used during the Cold War to demonstrate the inescapability of stalemate—the condition of 'mutual assured destruction,' or MAD—now suggested that even the large Russian arsenal could be destroyed in a disarming strike." Their point wasn't in reference to the U.S.-Russia nuclear relationship, but rather to demonstrate that the Cold War axioms of mutual and assured destruction and deterrence no longer apply.

But Lieber and Press go further to argue that the U.S. is knowingly pursuing a strategy of strategic primacy against potential adversaries,

"meaning that Washington seeks the ability to defeat enemy nuclear forces (as well as other WMD) but that U.S. nuclear weapons are but one dimension of that effort. In fact, the effort to neutralize adversary strategic forces—that is, achieve strategic primacy—spans nearly every realm of warfare: for example, ballistic missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, intelligence, surveillance-and-reconnaissance systems, offensive cyber warfare, conventional precision strike, and long-range precision strike, in addition to nuclear strike capabilities."

The danger that this represents is obvious, but they point it out by asking:

"How is deterrence likely to work when nuclear use does not automatically imply suicide and mass slaughter?"

The authors' point fully supports the charges by the Russian government about the strategy of strategic encirclement which NATO and the U.S. are carrying out against Russia (and against China as well). It should raise the alarm: when are the American people going to realize that their President's policy is a threat to their survival?