Executive Intelligence Review


Former CIA Korea Chief Presents the U.S. and the North Korea Negotiations Positions‘

Feb. 26, 2019 (EIRNS)—Andrew Kim, who retired at the end of last year as the head of the CIA’s Korea Mission Center, spoke at the Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University on Feb. 22, presenting for the first time the basic negotiating positions of both North Korea and the Trump Administration in the unfolding peace and denuclearization talks. Although Kim said he was speaking only for himself, his speaking freely about the negotiations was most unusual for a retired CIA official, and almost certainly intended by the Trump Administration to put things on the table at this critical moment.‘

Kim was present for both Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s and President Donald Trump’s meetings with Kim Jong Un. He said that Kim Jong Un told Pompeo in April 2018, when asked if he was willing to denuclearize, that, “I’m a father and a husband. And I have children. And I don’t want my children to carry the nuclear weapon on their back their whole life.”‘

According to the South Korean daily Hankyoreh,

“Andrew Kim described the North Korean leader as charming and a good negotiating partner, that he knows how to get to the point, is well-informed on technical matters, and is capable of a positive speaking style.”‘

Andrew Kim said that Kim Jong Un is taking a chance in these negotiations since some powerful figures in North Korea do not want to give up nuclear weapons.‘

On the negotiating positions, the former CIA officer described Kim’s plan for North Korea’s denuclearization and the U.S. corresponding measures. As Hankyoreh reports it:

“In regard to the roadmap for North Korea’s denuclearization, Kim suggested that the North could begin with a continuing suspension of its nuclear weapons and missile tests; make a comprehensive declaration of its program and allow inspections by experts; dismantle its nuclear weapons, delivery systems and nuclear materials; and rejoin the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, from which it withdrew in 2003.”‘

Andrew Kim also addressed the U.S. approach, which, according to Hankyoreh,

“divided the incentives that the U.S. could give North Korea in compensation for its denuclearization into three categories: economic, political and security. Economic incentives included humanitarian support, easing international transactions by North Korean banks, easing sanctions on North Korean imports and exports and lifting sanctions on joint ventures in North Korean economic zones. Political incentives included lifting the travel ban, establishing joint liaison offices, initiating cultural exchange, removing Kim Jong Un’s family members and senior officials from the blacklist and revoking North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Security incentives included signing an end-of-war declaration, military cooperation with North Korea, signing a peace treaty and establishing diplomatic relations.”‘

Hankyoreh observes:

“While [Andrew] Kim offered the caveat that the lecture represented his personal opinion, he said that this was the U.S. position when it started dialogue with North Korea two years ago and that he didn’t think that position had changed in the meantime.”‘